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ABSTRACT
THE CREATION OF THE ETERNAL TRUTHS

AND THE NATURE OF GOD IN DESCARTES

SEPTEMBER 2000

DANIEL

KAUFMAN, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT

P.

Ph D
•

.

,

UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST

Directed by: Professor Robert

C.

Sleigh, Jr.

Descartes held the seemingly bizarre doctrine that
the
eternal truths are freely created by God.

This 'Creation

Doctrine' has been the subject of great misunderstandings
and ridicule from philosophers and theologians from the

seventeenth century to the present.
This dissertation is a sympathetic interpretation of
Descartes' Creation Doctrine. After first briefly examining
some alternative views concerning the relationship between
the eternal truths and God,

I

argue that Descartes is

committed to the Creation Doctrine because of his acceptance
of traditional theological views concerning the nature of
God,

in particular,

God's simplicity and freedom.

I

then

argue that Descartes' Creation Doctrine, contrary to the

claims of some recent commentators, does not entail any

bizarre modal theses.

For instance, the fact that God could

have willed that the eternal truths are false does not

entail that there are no necessary truths.

I

conclude by

offering an interpretation of Descartes' explanation of the

necessity of the eternal truths.

Vll

We will see that the Creation Doctrine

theologically well-grounded,
modal claims, and (iii)

,

(i)

is

(ii)

does not affect ordinary

in fact,

guarantees the necessity

of the eternal truths.

viii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

.

.

ABSTRACT

Vll

ABBREVIATIONS....

CHAPTER

INTRODUCTION
1.

ALTERNATIVES TO THE CREATION DOCTRINE

16

Introduction
Descartes Unnamed Adversary: The Usual Suspects

19

Suarez
Duns Scotus

2.

2i
27

A Moderate Alternative: Aquinas and Leibniz

31

THE DOCTRINE OF DIVINE SIMPLICITY IN DESCARTES

40

Introduction
Reasons for DDS Aquinas
Reasons for DDS: Descartes
Kinds of Distinctions in Descartes
:

40
’’’’
...42

45
47

The Real Distinction
The Modal Distinction
The Conceptual Distinction

48
51
53

Descartes' Account of DDS
57
DDS and the Rejection of the Moderate Alternative .... 64
3.

DIVINE FREEDOM OF INDIFFERENCE
AND THE ETERNAL TRUTHS

74

Introduction
Different Senses of 'Indifference'
Why C- indifference is Not Essential
to Human Freedom
Why C- indifference is Essential to Divine Freedom ....
Divine Freedom and the Eternal Truths
4.

74
76
82

91
95

THE CREATION DOCTRINE AND MODALITY

105

Introduction
Universal Possibilism
Epistemic Necessity

105
108
110

ix

Problems with Universal Possibilism
Limited Possibilism
Problems with Limited Possibilism*.!!!!
The Real Problem with Possibilisms
Understanding the 'Could' in Terms of Indif f
erence
Brief Remarks on Descartes' Modal Epistemology
and the Conceptual Analysis ofModality

.,,,-

104
,
?R

*
*

131
136

THE NECESSITY OF THE ETERNAL TRUTHS

149

Introduction
Potentia dei absoluta et ordinata

149
151

A Short History of the Distinction

An Eleventh-Century Antecendent
Peter Damian
The Distinction in the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Centuries Aquinas and
Scotus
The Distinction in the Seventeenth
Century: Spinoza

152

4 53

:

Descartes' Alleged Use of the Distinction
Problems with the Potentia Interpretation
The Immutability Interpretation
Providence and Contingency: A Problem for the
Immutability Interpretation
An Alternative Explanation

BIBLIOGRAPHY

x

165
170
173

179
189

ABBREVIATIONS
AT

Descartes, Rene. 1996. Oevres de Descartes
eds
C Adam and P. Tannery. Paris: J. Vrin.
(cited bv
volume and page number)
.

CSM

Descartes, Rene. 1985. The_Philosophical Writing
o f Descartes
vo lumes I & II eds. J. Cottingham,
R. Stoothoff
D. Murdoch. Cambridge: Cambridge
U n i vers ity Press, (cited by volume and page
number)
,

.

.

,

CSMK

Descartes, Rene. 1991. The Philosophical Writings
—Descartes —volum e III eds. J. Cottingham, R.
Stoothoff, D. Murdoch, A. Kenny. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, (cited by page number)
,

CM

,

Spinoza, Baruch. 1925. Cogitata Metaphvsica In
Spinoza Opera ed. C. Gehardt Heidelberg: Carl
Winter, (cited by section number)
.

,

DM

.

Suarez, Francisco. 1861. Disputat iones
Metaphysicae In Opera Omnia Paris: Vives. (cited
by disputation, section, and paragraph number)
.

SCG

.

Thomas Aquinas. 1975. Summa Contra Gentiles
trans. A. Pegis (Book I), J. Anderson (Book II),
V. Bourke (Book III)
Notre Dame: University of
Notre Dame Press, (cited by book, chapter, and
section number)
,

.

ST

Thomas Aquinas. 1964-1981. Summa Theoloaiae
trans. Blackfriars. New York: McGraw-Hill (cited
by part, question and article number)
.

.

Theodicy

Leibniz, G.W. 1985. Theodicy
LaSalle, 111.
Open Court.
:

XI

,

trans. E.M. Huggard.

INTRODUCTION

In a series of three letters to Mersenne in
1630,

Descartes first presented his idea that the eternal
truths
are freely created by God.
The mathematical truths which you call eternal
have
been laid down by God and depend on him entirely no
less than the rest of his creatures. (AT I 145; CSMK
In God willing and knowing are a single thing in
such a
way that by the very fact of willing something he knows
it and it is only for this reason that such a thing
is
true. (AT I 14 9; CSMK 24)
I know that God is the author of everything
and that
these [eternal] truths are something and conseguently
that he is their author... [F] rom eternity he willed and
understood them to be, and by that very fact he created
them. (AT I 152; CSMK 25)
I

will call this view, following Margaret Wilson and Edwin

Curley,

1

'the Creation Doctrine'. Although the Creation

Doctrine does not appear in the body of Descartes' most
famous work, the Meditations of 1641,

it does appear in the

Fifth and Sixth Replies; and it was held by Descartes until
at least 1648,

and perhaps after.

2

The Creation Doctrine can be characterized by three
theses,

each stronger than the preceding one; and each

thesis serves to distinguish Descartes' position from an

alternative position:
Dependence Thesis: Like everything else, the
eternal truths depend on God.
3

Although Descartes employs the notion of dependence for
several purposes in his writings, most noticeably in

l

explaining degrees of reality,

4

in each case,

the notion of

dependence is something like the following:
x depends on y = df it is not possible that
x exists
without y, and it is possible that
y exists without

Descartes states this in many passages in his works. 5

x.

The

Dependence Thesis is a rather weak thesis, and one
that is
not peculiar to Descartes.
It simply amounts to saying:

If,

per

i mposs i bi le

not be true.

,

God did not exist, the eternal truths would

As Descartes states,

"we must not say that if

God did not exist nevertheless these truths would be true"
[

21 Deus not esset
,

^erae]

(AT

I

.

.

nih i l ominn s istae veri fates

149-50 ;CSMK 24)

Descartes' argument for the Dependence Thesis in the 27

May 1630 letter to Mersenne is quite simple:
1.
2.
3.

The eternal truths are something. 6 AT I 152)
Everything depends on God.
Therefore, the eternal truths depend on God. (AT
152; CSMK 25)

I

The Dependence Thesis serves to distinguish the Creation

Doctrine from the position of those who hold that the
eternal truths would be true even if, per

did not exist.

Exactly who held such

a

i

mpo.q.q-j

hi

1

p

f

God

view is the subject

of the next chapter.

The Dependence Thesis entails that there is no stanHaH
of truth independent of God

.

That is, the eternal truths

are true because of God; God does not will or know them

because they are true.

As Descartes states:

"nor did he

will that the three angles of a triangle should be equal to
two right angles because he recognized that it could not be

2

otherwise, and so on.

On the contrary ... it is because he

willed that the three angles of

a

triangle should

necessarily equal two right angles that this is
true and
cannot be otherwise." (AT VII 432; CSM II 291)
Efficient Cause Thesis: God is the efficient
cause of the eternal truths.
As Descartes states in response to Mersenne

:

"You ask me by

what kind of causality God has established the eternal
truths.

I

reply: by the same kind of causality as he

created all things, that is to say, as their efficient
and
total cause
25)

[af f i c i ens et

totalis causa

"

l

(AT

I

151-2; CSMK

An efficient cause of an effect E can be superficially

characterized as that which brings about
normally would think of as a cause

si

mpl

E;
i

ci

it is what we

ter

.

The Efficient Cause Thesis serves to distinguish the

Creation Doctrine from the view that God is the 'formal' or
'exemplar'
a long

cause of things.

8

Although exemplar causes have

history in the middle ages, even dating back to

Seneca's 65th Epistle, a particularly clear explanation of
them is found in the seventeenth-century writer Theophraste

Bouju
To these four kinds of causes we have just spoken of,
the Platonists add a fifth, which they call exemplar or
idea; for insofar as God is the universal artisan of
all things and only makes things wisely and perfectly,
understanding what he makes and why he makes it, there
must be ideas, intelligible notions or forms, in his
divine understanding, of the things he makes.
This
exemplary form is also found in the understanding of
men; for in this way the natural agent has in himself
the natural form by which he produces his effect and
renders it similar; similarly the agent who acts
through the understanding has in himself the
intelligible form of what he is making resemble it.

3

Thus the doctor tries to introduce health to
his
patient in accordance with the idea he has of
it, and
the architect to construct a house materially
similar
t° the one^in his thought, (quoted in Ariew
and Grene,
g

The divine i ds as

,

insofar as they are considered as a

'blueprint' or model of those things that God will
create,
are exemplars

this

9
.

Aquinas uses a human analogy to explain

:

Thus the likeness [uimilit.ndo] of the house pre-exists
the mind of the architect.
This can be called the
'idea' of the house; because the architect intends
to
make the house similar to the form which was conceived
in his mind.
Now since the world is not made by
chance, but is made by God acting as a intellectual
agent
it is necessary that there be a form in the
divine mind to whose likeness the world is made; and in
this consists the meaning [ratio] of 'idea'. (ST la
15.1 res

m

.

.

.

)

Descartes was certainly familiar with the concept of an

exemplar cause.

Weak evidence for this is Descartes'

familiarity with the writing of Eustachius

Sancto Paulo.

a

Eustachius wrote of exemplars in a traditional manner: "What
the Greeks call

nothing else but

'Idea',

the Latins call

'Exemplar', which is

the explicit image or species of the thing

to be made in the mind of the artificer." 10

Stronger

evidence is provided by Descartes himself, in the Third
Replies:

"I

used the word 'idea' because it was the standard

philosophical term used to refer to the forms of perception

belonging to the divine mind..."
However,

(AT VII 181;

CSM II 127)

there is no reason to think that Descartes intended

the Creation Doctrine to be a rejection of the exemplarview,

although it is clearly an (unintended?) consequence of

the Creation Doctrine.

4

The Efficient Cause Thesis is stronger than
the

Dependence Thesis in the sense that the former entails
the
latter but not vice versa.
For instance, according
to

Descartes, the modes of a substance depend on the
substance,
but the substance is not an efficient cause of its
modes.
So,

11

while the Dependence Thesis merely holds that the

eternal truths are ontologies

1

1

y dependent on God, the

Efficient Cause Thesis holds that the eternal truths are

causally dependent on God.
Free Creation Thesis:
eternal truths.

12

God freely creates the

This thesis is the most characteristic thesis of the

Creation Doctrine, and the one which, to borrow

a

phrase

from David Lewis, has produced the most incredulous
stares.

13

The Free Creation Thesis entails that for any

eternal truth

P,

Descartes states,

God could have willed that not-P.

Thus,

as

"he was free to make it not true that all

the radii of the circle are equal

not to create the world."

(AT

I

-

just as free as he was

152; CSMK 25)

As we'll see

throughout this dissertation, the Free Creation Thesis of
the Creation Doctrine produces incredulous stares precisely

because it is thought to entail that the eternal truths are
not necessary truths.

We'll see in Chapter Four that this

is false.

Before we continue, we should be clear about what

exactly the eternal truths are for Descartes.
Principles of Philosophy

proposition

[s]

,

In the

Descartes lists "the

Nothing comes from nothing.

5

.

.

.it

is

i mposs i b l e for the same th i ng to be and not

aa me time; Whet is done cannot, bp
,

u n done

1-0

hp ah h^ Q

whn

cannot but ex i st wh il e he th nks" as examples of eternal
,

truths

i

(AT VIII 23-4;

CSM

I

,

209).

And in the 15 April 1630

letter to Mersenne, Descartes adds mathematical truths
to
the set of eternal truths.

14

So,

included in the set of

eternal truths are strictly logical truths (e.g., it is

impossible for the same thing to be and not to be at the
same time), conceptual truths
but exist while he thinks),
(e.g..

(e.g.,

He who thinks cannot

'synthetic

a

priori

truths

Nothing comes from nothing), and the truths of

mathematics.

15

All of these kinds of truths may be called,

to use Plantinga's locution,

'truths necessary in the

broadly logical sense'. 16
The fact that Descartes believes both that the eternal

truths are freely created by God and that the eternal truths
are necessarily true, has led to widespread criticism, and

even ridicule, of the Creation Doctrine.

In the seventeenth

century, Leibniz stated that the Creation Doctrine

"unknowingly destroy

[s]

all of God's love and all his glory.

For why praise him for what he has done if he would be

equally praiseworthy in doing the exact opposite."

(AG 36)

Moreover, Leibniz believed that the Creation Doctrine

rendered God unfree. 17 Also in the seventeenth century,
Spinoza conceded that "this opinion, which subjects all

6

things to a certain indifferent will of God,"
is preferable
only in relation to the view that God's will is
determined

by independent factors. 18
Moreover, among the propositions condemned during
the

Fifteenth General Congress of the Jesuits in 1706 was
the
following Cartesian proposition:

"The essence of each thing

depends upon God's free will, so that in another order of
things he was free to create, the essence and properties,
for example, of matter, mind,

circle, and so on, would have

been other than they are at present." 19
In a recent paper,

Jonathan Bennett has catalogued the

less-than-f lattering adjectives used by twentieth-century
scholars to characterize the Creation Doctrine. 20

Among

them are Nicholas Jolley's 'strange' and 'peculiar', Louis

Loeb's 'peculiar' and 'curious', and Edwin Curley's
'incoherent'. 21

Perhaps the most flattering thing said

about the Creation Doctrine, until now, is Alvin Plantinga's

concession that "Descartes' view is neither unintelligible
nor incoherent.

The most we can fairly say... is that his

view is strongly counterintuitive." 22 So, Descartes'
Creation Doctrine has not only been thought to be silly in
some way, but also,

in some cases,

dangerous to theology and

philosophy
In this dissertation,

I

make a start toward an adequate

and sympathetic understanding of Descartes' Creation
Doctrine.

In fact,

I

hope to show that the Creation

Doctrine is a plausible view of the relationship between God

7

and the eternal truths, given the theolncnr^i
const™ im-o
Da scart es accepts
.

.

One may object that this does not
amount

to showing that the Creation Doctrine is
plausible

si mp li ci ter because the theological constraints
under which

Descartes formulates the Creation Doctrine could
be crazy.
I

agree, but the theological constraints Descartes
accepts

are not crazy; in fact,

they are traditionally-held

doctrines concerning the nature of God, his simplicity,
and
freedom.

What

I

want to suggest is that Descartes' Creation

Doctrine is a truly honest account of the eternal truths.
It

is honest in that Descartes accepts a traditional
view of

God as simple and free, takes it very seriously, and accepts
the consequences this view of God has for a theory of the

eternal truths.
In the first chapter,

I

examine alternatives to the

Creation Doctrine, in order to understand why Descartes
cannot accept any of them. In the second and third chapter,
I

discuss Descartes' reasons for holding the Creation

Doctrine and rejecting the alternatives.

The reasons are

the Doctrine of Divine Simplicity and Descartes

understanding of divine freedom.

The fourth and fifth

chapters are devoted to examining the relationship between
the two following propositions, both of which were held by

Descartes
(1)

The eternal truths are freely created by God.

(2)

The eternal truths are necessary.

8

In the fourth chapter,

I

argue that

(l)

incompatible despite the fact that nrim^

eliminates the possibility of

(2)

.

and
f

are not

(2)

^

Q

d)

in the fifth chapter,

I

examine Descartes' strategy for explaining the
necessity of
the eternal truths, that is, his explanation
of (2)
What
will emerge is a picture of the Creation Doctrine
that,

despite its pr i ma — ac i e weirdness, is not a silly
or

dangerous view.

it

is a view that preserves divine

simplicity and divine freedom and does not affect the
modal
status of the eternal truths.
In this respect, it is
a

rather desirable view for traditional theists.

A note on method:
compare Descartes

'

Throughout this dissertation,

I

thoughts with philosophers who either

held a view contrary to Descartes' view or who influenced

Descartes

thought on the subject at hand.

the philosophers with whom

In most cases,

compare Descartes are Christian

I

philosophers from the eleventh century through the sixteenth
century.
the

Earlier this century, the claim that Descartes is

'father of modern philosophy' was prevalent; and

scholars placed emphasis on an alleged, radical break

between medieval scholasticism and the prominent
philosophers of the seventeenth century.

There were notable

exceptions, of course, such as Etienne Gilson's Tndey

acholastico cartesien (1913)

But for the most part,

.

Descartes was seen as beginning fresh in philosophy.

phenomenon is perhaps most noticeable in undergraduate

9

This

courses on the history of early modern philosophy,
in which
Descartes is presented as a revolutionary,
fighting against
the tyranny of the scholastic philosophers.
Recently, however,

important scholarship has been done

emphasizing not Descartes' break with the scholastic

philosophy in which he was trained at La Fleche, but
rather
his indebtedness to scholastic philosophy.

Examples of this

are found in the works of Roger Ariew, Marlene
Rozemond,

Norman Wells, Eileen O'Neill, Timothy Cronin, Jorge
Secada,
and others

23
.

I

see myself as joining these scholars'

program
The influence of the philosophers of the Middle Ages

and sixteenth- century scholastics such as Suarez on

Descartes is most obvious in his metaphysics and

philosophical theology.

We are rightly disposed to think

that Descartes' scientific and epistemological projects are
novel.

However, his metaphysics and philosophical theology

bear the unmistakable imprint of the scholastics.
look no further than the Third Meditation
of the existence of God to see this.
of esse object i vum

,

realitas objective

a

We need

pn.gtprinri

pmnf

The scholastic notions
,

eminent containment,

and material falsity are prevalent in that argument. Other

examples of scholastic influence are abundant in Descartes
work: For instance, the account of error in the Fourth

Meditation in terms of privation is simply the scholastic
account of sin, applied to the problem of error

24
.

And

Descartes' theory of distinctions, employed prominently in

10

his Sixth Meditation argument for the
real distinction of
mind and body, is inherited directly from
Suarez.
As we'll
see, the influence of his predecessors
is especially

noticeable in Descartes' discussion of the
creation of the
eternal truths - the topic of this dissertation.

Another note on method: This dissertation,
despite
employing some methods of contemporary analytic

philosophy,

is an example of what Robert Sleigh has
called

history of philosophy'
Descartes

25
.

Although

I

'exegetical

believe that

Creation Doctrine is a viable strategy for

contemporary theists, my aim is not to defend the truth
of
the Creation Doctrine as a philosophical position,
using

Descartes merely as a guide.
Mates puts it,

Rather, my aim is, as Benson

"to discover and set forth,

as accurately,

objectively and completely as possible, the philosophical
views" of Descartes

26
.

Sleigh recognizes that there are two

components of doing exegetical history of philosophy:
the fact-finding component
said)

,

and (ii)

he said)

.

(i)

(what the historical figure

the explanatory component

(why he said what

I've already begun the fact-finding component

in the first few pages of this Introduction,

and the

remaining facts will be filled out in the course of the
dissertation, especially Chapters Four and Five. Chapters

Two and Three are devoted almost exclusively to the

explanatory component

11

It should be said at the outset that
there is very

little text in which Descartes discusses the
Creation
Doctrine.

However, almost every text in which it is

discussed contains a wealth of information about
that reason,

I

it.

For

will refer repeatedly to the same texts to

discuss different aspects of the Creation Doctrine.

12
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See AT VII 165-6; CSM II 117
and Kaufman (forthcoming)

,

AT VII 185; CSM II 130,

5

See, for instance, AT I 145; CSMK 23, AT I
149-150;
CSMK 24-5, AT VII 380; CSM II 261, AT VII 435-6;
CSM II 293AT V 160; CSMK 343
4
,

The issue of the ontological status of the eternal
truths in Descartes is controversial.
For three interesting
approaches to this issue, see Chappell (1997)
Nolan (1997)
Schmaltz (1991)
,

.

7

See also AT VII 436; CSM II 294.

Held by many medieval philosophers, including Aquinas
and Henry of Ghent (Quodlibeta IX q. 2 B)

(ST la 15)
9

A divine idea of something, which God could create but
does not, is not an exemplar, according to Aquinas; rather,
it is a rat i o
The difference is explained by Aquinas in ST
la 15.3. rfis.
"Plato postulated the ideas as principles of
the knowledge of things and of their coming into existence;
and an idea as postulated in the divine mind has both
functions.
As a principle of the production of things
—fact i on i s—rerum] it may be called an 'exemplar'
and belongs to practical knowledge; and as a principle of
knowing pr i nc i p i um cognosc i t i vnm
it is properly called a
rat i o and can belong also to speculative knowledge.
As
exemplar, it is related to all the things produced by God at
some time. As a principle of knowledge, it is related to all
the things God knows, even thought they never come into
existence." As Wippel states: "divine ideas or divine
rat i ones obtain even for possibles in the purest sense, that
is, for those that will never be realized in fact. Bit
divine ideas in the sense of exemplars obtain only for those
that will indeed enjoy actual existence." (1981) p. 733.
.

:

[

]

,

,

10

Summa Philosophica Ouadripart 1 ta Physica Ill.l.iii.
Quoted in Ariew and Grene (1995) p. 94

“See AT VII 165-6, 185; CSM II 117, 130.

13

12

In some cases, however, an x will
depend both
ontological ly and causally on a y
For instance, finite
substances are ontologically and causally
dependent on God.
.

ThlS
aim was recent ly supported by direct
_
empirical
; }
evidence.
When
some of the material in this dissertation
was presented at Cornell, the audience,
composed exclusively
of medievalists, simply could not fathom
that anyone could
believe the Free Creation Thesis.
(

I

i

Actually, in this letter, Descartes refers
to "the
mathematical truths which you [i.e., Mersenne] call
eternal." There is no reason, however, to think
that
Descartes would deny mathematical truths the status
of
eternal truths.
15

See Alanen and Knuuttila

(1988)

p.

14

.

Plantinga (1974) ch 1. An anonymous commentator
objected that many propositions that we would call
necessary
are not eternal truths for Descartes. The example
he or she
presents is: If Descartes s having a h^d hair dav. fh Pn
D escartes—rs hav i ng a—had—hair day. Although Descartes never
mentions an example like this, he does mention another
tautology,
(P &
P)
So, there is simply no reason to
think that he would deny P->P the status of being an
eternal truth.
.

i

1

'

1

'

17

See Theodicy §186: "But is the affirmations of
necessary truths were actions of the will of the most
perfect mind, these actions would be anything but free, for
there is nothing to choose. .That was preserving only the
name of freedom." At the time of the Theodicy Leibniz held
that there are three conditions (individually necessary and
jointly sufficient) for free action. (1) The agent, whose
intellect is naturally prior to their will, is presented
with alternative choices, (2) the action is spontaneous,
i.e., the source of the action is within the agent, and (3)
it is not par—££. necessary that the chosen course of action
obtain.
According to Leibniz, Descartes' God would not
satisfy condition (1).
See Sleigh (1990) p. 80-1.
.

18

Ethics p33s2

.

19

Rochemonteix (1889) vol 4, pp 89-93. Quoted in
Ariew, et al (1998) p. 258-9. Descartes believed that the
essences of things are dependent on God's free will; and the
eternal truths are truths concerning essences.
.

20

21

Bennett

(

1994

See Bennett

)

.

(1994)

p.

639.

14

.

22

Plantinga (1980) p. 124.

23

Ariew (1999)

Rozemond (1998)
Wells (1961)
(1966
r ° nin (1960)
U966)
“ecada
2000 'Th'
\
(2000).
The publication
of? Anew et a
a
M ed i tations Background Source m^pH.Ic moqq),
which
contains substantial portions of the sixteenth
and
seventeenth-century scholastics Francisco Suarez and
Eustachius a Sancto Paulo, indicates a recent
scholarly
interest
Descartes' scholastic influences.
Nei

^

(

,

,

987)

'

'

1

.

1

;

m

See AT VII 53-55, 59-61; CSM II 37-39, 41-42,
and
Aquinas De Main 3.1-2.
25

26

27

Sleigh (1990) p.

2.

Quoted in Sleigh (1990) p.
Sleigh (1990) p. 3-4.
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2.

CHAPTER

1

ALTERNATIVES TO THE CREATION DOCTRINE

Introduc t i on
To fully understand Descartes' reasons
for holding the

Creation Doctrine, it is helpful to have an
understanding of
alternative accounts of the relation between God and
the

eternal truths, accounts Descartes opposes.

In the

6

May

1630 letter to Mersenne, Descartes states the view
of the

eternal truths which he opposes
As for the eternal truths, I say again that they are
true or possible because God knows them to be true
or
possible, but not that they are known by God to be true
as if they were true independently of him... If men
really understood the sense of their words they could
never say without blasphemy that the truth of anything
is prior to the knowledge which God has of it. So,
we
must not say then that if God did not exist,
nevertheless those truths would still be true si Dpi id
non esset n i hi.lominus ista e veritates essent vprap
(AT I 149-150; CSMK 24)
,

,

f

.

]

The view, which Descartes is explicitly opposing, holds that
the eternal truths are true independently of God, and God

knows them because they are true.

Descartes,

as we know,

holds that the eternal truths are true because God wills
(and,

knows)

by the real identity of God's intellect and will,
them to be true.

Because everything real

privative) depends on God,

same thing,

2

1

(i.e.,

non-

and the eternal truths are

according to Descartes, the eternal truths

depend on God, not only for their being but also for their
truth.

That is, as we've seen, Descartes held the

'Dependence Thesis.

It is important to realize that the

16

Dependence Thesis is not something peculiar
to Descartes; in
fact, most philosophers from the
thirteenth through the
seventeenth centuries held the Dependence
Thesis in one form
or another.
However, Descartes certainly seemed to
believe that
n omeonh held the view that the eternal truths
are true

independently of God.

What isn't clear is who Descartes

thought held this belief.

Discovering who Descartes thought

held this view is difficult business.
worse by the fact that Mersenne

'

s

The matter is made

side of the correspondence

(with respect to the Spring 1630 letters on
the eternal

truths)

is lost;

so,

we can only speculate about the person

who has come to be known as 'Descartes' Unnamed
Adversary'
in these letters.

3

Three questions dictate the nature of our speculation:

Who a ctua l y held the view Descartes opposes?

(i)

!

(ii)

Who

Descartes be li eve to have held the view he opposes?
(

iii

Who,

)

if anyone,

both actually held the view Descartes

opposes and was believed by Descartes to have held such
view?.

a

An answer to the first question will provide

Descartes' Doctr i nal—Adversary

.

An answer to the second

question will provide Descartes' In-Mind Adversary

And an

answer to the third question will provide Descartes' Preci rp

Adversary

.

These questions are difficult to answer.

The first

question is difficult to answer because no philosopher seems

willing to come forth and proclaim that he held the view

17

Descartes opposes; in fact, the parties
typically charge
their opponents with holding this view.
The second question
is difficult to answer because it
involves knowing the
philosophers whose work Descartes would have
known at the
time of the 1630 letters to Mersenne
Despite our
knowledge of the works Descartes read at La
.

Fleche,

Descartes constantly downplays his familiarity
with the
works of his philosophical predecessors.

Thus, we can be

reasonably confident of Descartes' familiarity
with only

a

few explicitly mentioned philosophers:
Eustachius a Sancto

Paulo (AT III 232; CSMK 156),
II

154),

179),

5

4

Augustine (AT VII 219; CSM

Aquinas (AT III 274; CSMK 166, AT III 360; CSMK

Duns Scotus (AT VII 120-1; CSM II 85-6), Suarez

VII 235; CSM II 164), Toletus
(AT III

185;

CSMK 154)

.

(AT III 185;

(AT

CSMK 154), Rubius

But in most of these cases, the

depth of Descartes' familiarity with these philosophers is
not certain, nor is is clear whether Descartes was familiar

with these philosophers (with the exception of Aquinas and
Suarez)

at the time of the 1630 letters to Mersenne.

6

The

third question inherits and compounds the difficulties of
the first two.

For my part,

I

am not particularly interested in the

answer to the first question for its own sake.
I

This is why

don't take Wells' contention that Descartes' unnamed

adversary could be one of several Thomists (John Capreolus,
St.

Cajetan, Henry of Ghent)

seriously. 7

After all, if the

point of examining the position that Descartes opposes is to

18

shed light on the Creation Doctrine
(and, as far as I am
concerned, it is), then it is not helpful
to find someone,
possibly unfamiliar to Descartes, who held
the alternative
view.
I will be satisfied to find
a candidate
for

Descartes'

In-Mind Adversary as long as he is also
a prim^

Doctrinal Adversary. That is, the candidate
for being
the In-Mind Adversary must at least seem
to hold
the

position Descartes opposes.

The minimal condition for being

the In-Mind Adversary is simply that Descartes
was familiar

with him; and the minimal condition for being
familiar to
Descartes is that the philosopher is mentioned by
Descartes.
If somone satisfies these conditions,

then he will be a

cand i date for being Descartes' In-Mind Adversary.

I

think

that this is all we are likely to get.
In the first section of this chapter,

I

examine two

likely candidates for Descartes' unnamed adversary, based
on

my criteria.

In the second section,

I

will examine a

moderate, alternative account of the eternal truths and

their relation to God, one which is not explicitly denied by

Descartes

Descartes Unnamed Adversary: The Usual Suspects
The path to Descartes' Unnamed Adversay is well-worn

ground.

Starting in the early twentieth century with Gilson

and other French scholars,

and continuing to the late

twentieth century with Cronin, Curley, Frankfurt, and Wells,
scholars have attempted ad nauseam to locate the historical

19

source of the position Descartes opposes.

Given the fact

that almost every paper on Descartes on
the eternal truths
deals in one way or another with the question
of the unnamed
adversary, I don't wish to rehash the issue in
any great

detail.

Thus,

my discussion will be brief.

Descartes, as we have seen, explicitly contrasts
his
Creation Doctrine with the view expressed by (b)
(b)

The eternal truths are true independently of
God
such a way that if, per imp ossi hi
God were
not to exist, the eternal truths would still
be
true

m

1

Descartes, of course, rejects

Dependence Thesis.

(b)

,

because it violates the

Although there are several philosophers

who appear to have held

(b)

I

am only interested in those

philosophers who pr i ma— ac i e held

(b)

with whom Desr^rte.q

-i

c;

known to have been familiar
Before looking at the usual suspects, it is crucial to

notice that Descartes' Creation Doctrine concerns the truth
of the eternal truths;

they have.

it does not concern the type of pssp

This fact is commonly overlooked, particularly

by those interested in locating Descartes within a
tradition,

stemming from the middles ages through Suarez,

concerned with the ontological status of the essences of
creatures (and the eternal truths concerning those essences)

prior to their 'creaturely actualization' by God.

Although

the Creation Doctrine will have some consequences for the

ontological status of eternal truths and essences, this is
not Descartes' primary concern when he discusses the

Creation Doctrine and the eternal truths.
20

Descartes is

concerned with answering the question:
eternal truths

(necessarily)

true?

'What makes the

Given the scarcity of

texts in which he even comes close to
addressing it,
clear that Descartes is much less interested

it is

in the

question:

'What type of £ sse do the eternal truths
have? 8

This distinction between the truth and esse
of an eternal
truth is important because, as we'll see, there
are

philosophers who held that the eternal truths are
true
independently of God; but these same philosophers held
that
the

of an eternal truth is dependent on God.

Suarez
We know that Descartes was familiar with Suarez
because
he makes reference to Suarez in the Fourth Replies
when

justifying his use of the term 'material falsity'

:

"I

found

the word 'materially' used in an identical sense to my own
in the first philosophical author

Suarez,

I

came across, namely

in the Metaphy sical Disputations part IX,

number 4."

(AT VII 235;

CSM II 164)

section

2,

We also know that

Descartes would have been familiar with Suarez from his days
at La Fleche,

9

and it is widely thought that Descartes'

central concepts of

e_sse

objectivnm and eminent and formal

causation in the Third Meditation were inherited from
Suarez.

10

Moreover, Descartes' theory of distinctions bears

too strong a resemblance to Suarez's to deny the influence
of the latter on the former.

21

It

is most commonly believed that
Suarez is the

philosopher whom Descartes opposed for
holding
there is a 'smoking gun' text in Suarez,

(b)

11

if

.

it is the

following

^

A 9ain, th ose sminc i at ions H.p
trntfa]
n Qt
1Prpluse thp y
known by And bur rat-h^r
a re thus [known because They nro I-,-..* Rnrtis
rll ae ennnt j ariones snnt verae quia mir nnaniTifiii- a
S£Q PQt l UF!— deQ— ognoscuntur qu ia verse .qnnlotherwise no reason could be given why God would
necessarily know them to be true. For if their
truth
came forth from God Himself, that would take
place bv
means of God's will; hence it would not come
forth of
necessity, but voluntarily
Also, because in regard to
these enunciations, the divine intellect is
related as
purely speculative, not as operative. But the
speculative intellect supposes the truth of its
object
it does not produce it.
Therefore, enunciations like
this... have eternal truth, not only as they are
in the
divine intellect but also in themselves and prescinding
from it. (DM XXXI xii 4 0 emphasis mine)
.

,

f

•

.

]

.

.

'

.

.

,

The contrast between the first line of this quotation
and

Descartes

statements in his

is striking.

6

May 1630 letter to Mersenne

Suarez's statement in the first line of the

guoted passage is in direct opposition to Descartes
statement that "they [i.e., the eternal truths] are true or

possible because God knows them to be true or possible.
I

149;

"

(AT

CSMK 24) And Suarez's statement that the eternal

truths "have eternal truth, not only as they are in the

divine intellect, but also in themselves and prescinding
from it," is in direct opposition to Descartes' insistence
that the eternal truths are not "known by God to be true as
if they were true independently of him."

22

(AT

I

149;

CSMK 24)

In the passage above,

parties,

Suarez is arguing against two

those who think that the necessary
truth of the
eternal truths depends on the divine will
and (ii) those who
think it depends on the divine understanding.
According to
Suarez, the eternal truths cannot proceed
from God's will
because they would then not be necessary, but
contingent, as
(i)

the effect of a voluntary act.

On the other hand, the

eternal truths cannot be true merely because they
are in the
divine intellect for two reasons: (i) Because the
divine
intellect,
objects,

i

in this case,
.

e

.

,

it is

presupposes the truth of its

'speculative'.

(ii)

in criticizing the

view that the eternal truths are true because they are
the
objects of the divine intellect, Suarez argues that this

view doesn't sufficiently explain the difference between
eternal truths and those truths that are merely contingent.
As Suarez states:

Nor is it enough, were someone to answer with St.
Thomas ... that with the destruction of the existence
of creatures, these enunciations are true, not in
themselves, but in the divine intellect.
For, in this
way, not only enunciations of the type wherein
essential properties are predicated have eternal truth
in the divine intellect, but also all accidental or
contingent ones which are true. (DM XXXI xii 4 0 12
,

.

.

)

Suarez here levels a powerful criticism: If being an object
of the divine intellect were sufficient to make something an

eternal truth,

then every object of the divine intellect

would be an eternal truth.
of all things,

However, God has understanding

including contingent things.

Therefore,

being an object of the divine intellect is not suffcient to
make something an eternal truth.
23

In order to avoid these difficulties,

Suarez puts forth

the view that the eternal truths are in the
divine

intellect, but they do not depend on God for
their necessary
truth.
That is, Suarez's own view of the eternal
truths

seems to me to be that the esse of the eternal
truths (and
the essences they concern) depend on God.
Before
the

creation of creatures, their essences have no real essp
in
13
themselves.
Here Suarez disagrees with Henry of Ghent

(d.

1293)

,

Master in Theology at Paris shortly after Aquinas,

who famously held that prior to the creation of creatures
in

—ex i stent i ae
esse called

'

,

their essences had a diminished but real

esse essent iae
.

Henry argued that unless the

1

.

essence of creatures had esse essentiae

different than impossibles and chimeras.
argues,

they would be no

,

14

If,

Suarez

the eternal truths had some kind of esse in

themselves, then God's creation would not be ex
an objection to the Thomist John Capreolus

Suarez states:

(c.

ni hi

in

1

1380-1444),

"God would not have created all things from

nothing but would have transferred them from one (kind of)
esse to another (kind of) esse
So,

.

"

(DM XXXI. ii. 3,

my gloss)

the essences and eternal truths have no esse in rp

to the actualization of creatures,

only type of

according to Suarez.

15

p-r-io-r

The

they have is esse potentiale in causa in

God; but this is not any kind of esse in se

16
.

It has also

been suggested by Norman Wells that Suarez thinks that
eternal truths have esse objectivum in the divine intellect,
but this kind of esse is not something had intrinsically by

24

the thing itself; rather,

denomination'.

1

it is an

In any case,

’

'extrinsic

the eternal truths have no

esse ln themselves, but only in the divine
intellect and in
the divine power to cause them.
That is, this extrinsic
esse does depend on God.
But Suarez doesn't think that the
hxuth of the eternal
truths depends on God.
Take the eternal truth expressed by
(A)

:

Man is an animal

(A)

According to Suarez, the copula

'is'

can be understood in

two ways: call them 'the existential sense' and
'the

essential sense'.

If the copula is being understood in its

existential sense, then
of its terms; hence,

(A)

if true,

entails the existence

because the referents of the terms

require an efficient cause of their existence,

(A)

is not

eternally true in the existential sense, but only true when
the referents of the terms are caused to exist.

However,

the copula is being understood in its essential sense,

doesn't entail the existence of its terms.
in the essential sense,

(A)

(A)

When understood

is really a disguised

conditional
(A*)
(A*)

If man exists,

of

then he is an animal.

entails nothing about the actual existence of its

terms; thus,
(A))

the truth of

(which is an interpretation

does not depend on any efficient cause.

this sense that
exists,

(A*)

(A)

is necessarily true,

It

is in

even if no man

and even if there is no efficient cause able to

25

if

produce man (i.e., God)."

Thus, there are eternal truths

which do not depend on God for their truth

19
.

Norman Wells has argued that the common opinion
that
Suarez is Descartes' unnamed adversary is false.
Wells
points out that the the complex structure of DM
XXXI can

easily mislead one into thinking that Suarez holds
in fact,

it is certain Thomists

(Henry of Ghent,

Socinas, John Capreolus) who hold

widespread misreading of Suarez as

(b )

a

20

(b)

,

when

Paulus

He argues that the

Doctrinal Adversary of

Descartes has arisen from the fact that, in much of DM
XXXI,
Suarez is playing certain positions concerning essences
off
of one another;

so,

it isn't clear when he is presenting his

own positive views on the subject.

Although

I

believe

Wells is mistaken about Suarez's views, even if we grant his
point,

it is irrelevant to the present inquiry.

grant,

for the moment, Wells' point that Suarez is not a

Let us

Doctrinal Adversary of Descartes, but the manner in which
Suarez presents his own views allows for a natural

misreading.

In that case,

it

would not be shocking to think

that Descartes himself could have been misled by Suarez.
Hence,

Suarez could be Descartes'

In-Mind Adversary.

Moreoever, even if Wells' is correct, Suarez is a pri m^

Doctrinal Adversary. In any case, the texts from
Suarez which

I

smoking gun,

i.e.,

quoted above are as close as we'll get to

a

someone with whom Descartes was familiar

and who seemingly held

(b)

26

Duns Scotus

A position similar to Suarez's concerning
the es SP
the truth of the eternal truths is held
by Duns

and

Scotus: the

of the eternal truths is dependent on God,
but their

necessary truth does not depend on God. 21
Descartes was

(at

least a little)

We know that

familiar with Duns Scotus,

although the extent to which he knew Scotus' works
is
unclear.

In fact,

the only mention Descartes makes of

Scotus is in reply to Caterus concerning Scotus'
famous
'formal distinction'.
6)

(AT VII 100,

120-21; CSM II 72-3,

85-

Given that Caterus provides Descartes with an account
of

Scotus'

formal distinction in the First Objections,

it isn't

clear that Descartes was familiar with Scotus' ideas on
anyth i ng before Caterus brought them to his attention.

On

the other hand, Roger Ariew has made a convincing case that

Scotistic thought was prevalent in Paris during Descartes'
life.

22

The prevalence of Scotism doesn't entail, however,

that Descartes knew Scotus' work.

Regardless of the depth of Descartes' familiarity with
Scotus,

there are passages in which Scotus clearly holds

something like

(b).

23

The following are smoking-gun texts:

The man is a possible being by logical potency, because
it is not repugnant and the chimera is an impossible
being by opposite impossibility because it is
repugnant ... This logical possibility could remain
separately in power by its own nature even if there
were, per impossible no omnipotence to which it would
be an object. 24
,

[Tjherefore, that is simply impossible with which esse
is incompatible per se
and which is initially of
itself such that it is incompatible with esse and
,

,

27

not due to some relationship to God, affirmative
or
negative; instead, esse would be incompatible
with it
if per— mposs i b il e God were not to exist.
Qrd i
43 q un
7)
(

.

.

.

Much of Scotus

1

view of modality and its relation to

God occurs in his criticism of Henry of Ghent.

Quod li beta l Quest i ons

,

In his

Henry argued that God's ability to do

x is prior to the possibility of x

because God can do/make

x)

;

(i.e.

,

x is possible

but the impossibility of x is

prior to God's inability to do/make x (i.e., for any x that
God cannot do, God cannot do x because x is impossible.). 25
Scotus takes the opportunity to tease apart the issues of
what God can do and what is possible.

Scotus' view is that

qua— something that God can actually produce, an essence is
first

(i.e.,

in the first instant of nature)

e sse i nte lli g i b i

1

produced in

as an object of the divine intellect and

then (in the second instant of nature)

in prsp pn.gsi hi

something able to to be actually created by God. 26

1

^ as

That is,

in order to be a possible object of God's omnipotent will,

something must be produced in esse intel

possibile in God's intellect. 27

1

gi hi

1

and esse

But the logical possibility

of a thing does not depend on this production in God's

intellect, but only on non repugnantia terminorum

28
,

This

non repugnant ia terminorum is precisely the logical

possibility of the thing regardless of its being produced in
esse intelligibile by God. 29

So,

although the esse

of the

eternal truths depends on God, their logically necessary or

possible truth does not.

In fact,

Scotus thinks that it is

precisely this logically necessary or possible truth which
28

enables God to produce them in esse

i

pQss i bi lp and Perhaps in esse actual

e.

tel

1

i

gi hi

1

essp

^

As Scotus states:

From all this it is apparent that God's
potency is not
the precise reason why something is
makeable and
producible, but along with it is required that
there be
no formal incompatibility among its parts.
(Lect I d 4 J
q.un.n. 17)
"?

Admittedly, this account of Scotus is contentious.
However,
of the

30

it seems to be the only plausible way
to make sense

'smoking gun' texts quoted above in which he
states

that modal truths would be true even if, per

God did not exist.

impn.q.gihi Ip

That is, the truth of the eternal truths

are independent of God's production of their being;
and it
is their truth which makes them able to be produced
by God

(although it is their production in the divine intellect

which makes them able to be actually created by God)
In addition to Suarez,

Descartes was

(at

Scotus is a figure with whom

least a little)

familiar and who is at

least a pr i ma—facie Doctrinal adversary.
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So,

we can feel

fairly confident in saying that these two philosophers
represent the best candidates for being Descartes' unnamed

adversary
Given that Descartes holds the Dependence Thesis, he

obviously cannot accept the position expressed by

(b)

.

However, we cannot conclude, that Descartes is therefore

committed to the Creation Doctrine.

In fact,

the great

majority of philosophers and theologians, from the
thirteenth centure through the seventeenth century, opposed
the position expressed by

this does not entail that the

(b)

29

majority of philosophers and theologians
held the Creation
Doctrine.
As Curley (1984) points out, (b) and
the Creation
Doctrine do not seem to exhaust the alternatives
open
to

Descartes.

For instance,

it may be suggested that Descartes

could hold the Dependence Thesis without holding
that the
eternal truths depend on God's will and are
freely

created.

Moreover,

the fact that Descartes exp]

Creation Doctrine with

(b)

,

iriMy contrasts

the

view that denies only the

a

Dependence Thesis, would seem to indicate that
Descartes
could have helped himself to any position on the
matter that
did not deny the Dependence Thesis. And in fact,
there in a
moderate position situated somewhere between the Creation

Doctrine and

(b)

that was widely held in the centuries

before Descartes and even later in the seventeenth century
by Leibniz.

This view holds, with Descartes, that the

Dependence Thesis is true, but it differs from Descartes

precisely in denying that the eternal truths depend on God's
will and are freely created.

This moderate alternative

holds that the eternal truths are dependent on God, but not
on God's will, but rather his intellect.

This view was so

widely held that Leibniz states that "the eternal truths,
which until the time of Descartes had been named an object
of the divine understanding,

suddenly became an object of

the will."

So,

(Theodicy

§

186)

in order to understand why

Descartes accepts the Creation Doctrine despite the

availability of a moderate alternative, we must understand
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why Descartes cannot accept the moderate
alternative.
l ocus classics
^c[uln.aS/

so,

ft

The

of this moderate position is found in

that is where we will tiepin.

A Moderate Alternative; Aquinas and Leibniz

Aquinas held the Dependence Thesis concerning the
eternal truths, but he spelled it out differently from
how

Descartes did. 32
(c)

He held that it amounted to

(c)

The eternal truths depend on God's understanding
(but not his will) in such a way that if, per
u mpossi bile
God did not exist, the eternal truths
would not be true.
,

Aquinas presents his statement of

(c)

when considering a

point made by Augustine:
It would seem that created truth is eternal. For
Augustine says that nothing is more eternal than the
rat i o of circularity and that two and three are five.
But the truth of these things is created truth.
Therefore created truth is eternal. (ST la 16.7)

Aquinas replies that "God alone is eternal"; thus, either
truths about things other than God are not eternal or they
are eternally true in God.

Because truth is essentially

mind-dependent, according to Aquinas, insofar as truth
involves the conformity of what is in the mind to the thing

being understood (ST la 16.1), the truth of

a

proposition

can be eternal only if there is an eternal mind.

As Aquinas

states
If no intellect were eternal, no truth would be
eternal.
But since the divine intellect is eternal,
truth has eternity in it alone. Nor does it follow
from this that anything other than God is eternal;
because truth in the divine intellect is God himself.
(ST la. 16.7. res)
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From this is it clear that Aquinas thinks that
eternal

truths have some sort of being in the divine
intellect; and
in virtue of being in the divine intellect and
being

understood by God, the eternal truths are true.

As Aquinas

states in reply to Augustine's point:

of

"the ret

i

circularity and that two and three are five possess
eternity
in the divine mind."

(ST la 16.7.

ad

1)

This account raises a worry expressed by Suarez:

Eternal truths are necessarily true, but being in the divine

mind cannot be sufficient, for the necessity of the eternal
truths; after all, God understands contingent truths as
well,

i.e.,

they are in the divine mind as well. 33

So,

it

seems that Aquinas must either hold that merely being in the

divine mind is not sufficient for the necessity of a truth,
or he must hold that there is no difference in the modal

status between an eternal truth and a (so-called) contingent

truth

34

Aquinas does provide an account of how necessary truths
differ from contingent truths, although it is not explicitly
stated.

In SCG 1.67,

he states the what differentiates

necessary truths from contingent truths is that God knows
the former to be necessary and the latter to be contingent.

However,

the context in which this explanation is found

concerns causal necessity and not logical or metaphysical
necessity.

35

Thus,

this answer is not particularly helpful

in differentiating the logically or metaphysically necessary

from the logically or metaphysically contingent.
32

Later,

in the seventeenth century and into
the

eighteenth century, Leibniz argued that the
eternal truths
depend on the divine understanding. In the MnnaHnin
T/

i

he

states
It is also true that God is not only
the source of

existences, but also that of essences insofar
as they
are real, that is, or the source of that
which is real
in possibility. This is because God's
understanding is
the realm of the eternal truths or that of
the ideas
on which they depend; without him there
would be
nothing real in possibles, and not only would
nothing
exist, but also nothing would be possible.
(§43, AG 218)
Thus,

Leibniz also holds the Dependence Thesis.

just as Aquinas does,

given by

However,

Leibniz understands it in the sense

This is also clear in Theodicy §184,

(c)

in which

Leibniz writes that
one must not say with some Scotists, that the eternal
truths would exist even though there were no
understanding, not even that of God.
For it is, in my
judgement, the divine understanding which gives reality
to the eternal truths, albeit God's will have no part
there n
(emphasis mine)
i

.

It should be noted that Leibniz is here discussing the esse

of the eternal truths,

not their truth.

The kind of esse

that the eternal truths have is esse -in-the-H-ivine-

understanding; and they have
divine intellect.

because they are in the

The eternal truths are not true, because

they are in the divine intellect; rather, they are true

because of the essences of the things contained as ideas in
the divine understanding, although these ideas could not

exist without God 36

What is clear is that Leibniz certainly
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thought that the eternal truths depend on
God with regard to
their ease and their truth; and God's will
has no role with
regard to either.
The advantages that Leibniz thinks he
gains from such a
view are (i) the Dependence Thesis remains
intact, (ii) it
:

preserves his account of freedom, both human and
divine, in
which one of the necessary conditions for freedom
is that

the action performed is chosen from among given

possibilities.

And (iii), because God's will plays no part

in determining which truths are necessary,

there is no way

an eternal truth can be false; the eternal truths
are simply
'given'

in the divine intellect.

So,

given that

(c)

is an alternative available to those

accepting the Dependence Thesis, why can't Descartes hold
the moderate view expressed by

(c)

In the

3

June 1630

letter to Mersenne, after stating the Creation Doctrine,

Descartes explicitly mentions two reasons for the Creation
Doctrine, reasons which eliminate the possibility of

accepting

(c)

You ask also what necessitated God to create these
truths; and I reply that he was free to make it not
true that all the radii of the circle are equal - just
as free as he was not to create the world. .You ask
what God did in order to produce them. I reply that
from all eternity he willed and understood them to be,
and by that very fact he created them... In God,
willing, understanding and creating are all the same
thing without one being prior to the other even
conceptually. (AT I 152-3; CSMK 26)
.

In this explanation,

we get a statement of Descartes'

reasons for the Creation Doctrine: First, God's freedom

requires that the Creation Doctrine is true, and second, the
34

Doctrine of Divine Simplicity requires that
the Creation is
true.
What isn't clear at this point is exactly
how divine
freedom and divine simplicity eliminate the
moderate
alternative,

(c)

from Descartes

'

consideration, and how

they require that the Creation Doctrine is
true.
we now turn in the next two chapters

35

To this,
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CHAPTER

2

THE DOCTRINE OF DIVINE SIMPLICITY
IN DESCARTES

Introduction
As we have seen in the end of Chapter
One, one of
Descartes' explicitly mentioned reasons
for holding the
Creation Doctrine is his understanding of
the Doctrine of

Divine Simplicity (DDS)

.

Stated in its simplest form, DDS

is the thesis that God is absolutely
simple,

no parts and no composition in God.

i.e.,

there are

Descartes mentions DDS

in connection with the Creation Doctrine
in several texts.

For instance,

in the

6

1

May 1630 letter to Mersenne,

Descartes writes:
In God,

willing and knowing are a single thing in such
way that by the very fact of willing something he
knows it, and it is only for this reason that such
a
thing is true. (AT I 149; CSMK 24)
a

DDS was unquestionably held by most philosophers and

theologians in the seventeenth century. Descartes inherits
DDS from a long line of philosophical and theological

predecessors including Augustine, Anselm and Aquinas; and
his account does not differ dramatically from their

accounts, although the consequences Descartes deduces from
DDS differ greatly from those of his philosophical

predecessors.

In fact,

Descartes takes DDS seriously enough

to deduce exactly what honestly ought to be deduced from it.
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In this chapter,

I

examine DDS as a reason for

Descartes- Creation Doctrine.

I

will argue that Descartes

must reject the moderate alternative,

acceptance of DDS.

(I

will argue,

the issue of Divine Freedom also

(c)

because of his

in the next chapter,
(partly)

explains

Descartes' commitment to the Creation
Doctrine
first part,

that

2

in the

.)

will examine Descartes' motivations for

I

holding DDS.

I

do this by comparing Descartes'
motivations

with those of Saint Thomas Aquinas.
reasons: first,

I

do this for two

Aquinas' account of DDS is bhe_classic

statement of the doctrine; and second, Descartes'
reasons
for holding DDS form a subset of Aquinas'
reasons.
In the
second part,

I

examine Descartes' theory of distinctions.

A

good understanding of Descartes' theory of distinctions
is
necessary for understanding his version of DDS; we
must know
how things can be distinct in order to know how
something
(e.g.,

God)

can be simple.

In the third part,

account of Descartes' version of DDS.

I

give an

The account

I

give

may initially strike some as contentious, because it is

commonly thought that Descartes introduces

a

radical and

strict notion of divine simplicity, such that there are not

even conceptual distinctions in God.

I

will show that

Descartes' texts simply do not support such a radical

version of DDS.
(c)

Finally,

I

will show that DDS eliminates

as a reasonable alternative to the Creation Doctrine.
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Reasons for DPS

:

Aquinas

Descartes' reasons for holding DDS will
become clearer
upon consideration of a classic statement
of DDS and its
motivations.
The classic statement I speak
of is that of

Thomas Aquinas in Gu mma theo l ogize la
Ge nt il es 1.18.

Anselm

Although Augustine

(£ ros]oginn

(

3.

7

and Snmma rn nrrn

De Civitate

XI. 10),

XVIII and Mono] ogi on XVI and XVII), and

others prior to Aquinas present DDS, Aquinasstatement of
DDS seems to me to be the most fully
developed account of
DDS in Descartes' predecessors.
In the Summa — heol og i ae

,

Aquinas presents his main

argument that God must be simple because he cannot
satisfy
the conditions for being composite.

There are several ways

in which something may be composite according
to Aquinas:

or
or
or

For any x, x is composite iff
(a)
x is composed of extended parts (ST la 3.1),
(b)
x is composed of form and matter (ST la 3.2),
(c)
x differs from x's nature (ST la 3.3),
(d)
x's essence differs from x's existence (ST la
3

or

(e)

or

(f)

4

there is a difference between x's genus and
differentia (ST la 3.5)
x is composed of substance and accidents (ST
la

3

3

.

6

Without going into the details of Aquinas' position, it is
sufficient to note that he argues that God is not such that
he can satisfy any of

Aquinas'
1.

(a)

(f)

4
,

We may present

initial reasoning as follows:
For any x, x can be composite iff x satisfies (a)
or (b) or (c)
.or (f)
God does not satisfy (a) or (b) or (c) ...or (f)
Therefore, God is not composite.
.

2.
3.

through

.

And with the additional premise:

42

4

x ca *not be composite,

-

/

•

,

JT.0

S

then x is simple.

(ST la

/

we arrive at Aquinas' conclusion:

Therefore, God is simple. 5

5.

In addition to this reasoning,

other reasons in favor of DDS
and relevance,

Reason

1

:

I

Aquinas provides several

In the interest of brevity

.

present only three of them:
God's aseity requires that he be absolutely

independent of everything non- identical with himself
(i.e.,
nothing else is required for God to exist), and
everything

non-identical with God is dependent on him (i.e.,
everything
besides God requires him for their existence)

.

But Aquinas

thinks that the following principle is true:
S2

.

A composite is dependent on, or posterior to
parts. (ST la 3.7. rps 6

its

l

A brief word on S2 is in order.

As Christopher Hughes

notes, Aquinas employed several different, extensionally

non-equivalent senses of dependence and the closely related
concept of p r i or i ty

.

However,

it seems to me that the

notion of priority employed by Aquinas in the present
argument against divine composition is what Hughes calls
'ontological priority'.

We may define it as follows:

x is ontological ly prior to y = df it is impossible for
y
to exist without x but it is possible for x is exist

without y.

Ontological priority is closely related to ontological

dependence in the following manner:
x is ontologically dependent on y iff y is
ontologically prior to x.

Moreover, Aquinas argues for the following:
43

S3:

If some thing C is composed of
parts Pl and p 2;
then C * Pl and C * p
(ST la 3.7.res)
2

If S2 and S3 are true,

.

then God cannot be composite because

he would then be ontologically dependent
on something non-

ldentical with himself.

Because it is metaphysically

impossible for God to depend on anything nonidentical with
himself, he cannot be a composite. As Aquinas
states,
8

"Every composite, moreover,
The first being,

components."

therefore, which is God, has no

(SCG

Reason

2

:

is subsequent to its components.

Thus, God is simple.

18)

I

Aquinas thinks that if some thing is

composite of parts p

responsible for p

x

and p 2

and p

x

2

,

a

then there is a cause which is

composing

plurality of things will remain

a

That is to say, a

C.

plurality unless caused by

something else to form a composite.
composite,

9

So,

if God is

then there is a cause of his composition.

However, God, as the first cause,

Therefore, he is not composite.

Reason
separable.

3

.

:

is essentially uncaused.

10

Every composite is potentially dissoluble or

But it is absurd to suppose that God can be

separated into constituent parts. As Aquinas states:
Every composite, furthermore, is potentially
dissoluble. This arises from the nature of
composition. .Now, what is dissoluble can not-be. This
does not befit God, since he is through himself the
necessary being.
There is, therefore, no composition
.

in God.

(SCG

I

18)

11

Aquinas is implicitly employing S3 here.

He thinks that it

belongs to the nature of a composite to be potentially
dissoluble.

12

But if God is composite, he is dissoluble;
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that is,
p 2 ,...p n
Pi,

if God is a composite C,

composed of parts

Pl

,

then C can be separated into its
constituent parts
But, according to S3, none of the
p 2 ,-..p n
parts ara
,

.

God; so,

if he is separable into parts that
are not him,

then he can fail to exist, even if the
parts exist.
is a necessary being.

hence,

Therefore, God cannot fail to exist;

he cannot be composite,

if S3 is true.

Each of these reasons, as well as the others
omitted,

But God

is sufficient,

I

have

according to Aquinas, to show that

God is not composite, and hence he is simple.

Reasons for DPS

:

13

Descartes

Although it is clear from many texts that Descartes
held a version of DDS

,

the reasons why he held it are not as

explicitly and systematically stated as Aquinas' reasons
are.

However, Descartes does present some reasons for

holding DDS, and, perhaps not surprisingly, they are all
reasons that Aquinas provides.

Descartes presents a reason for DDS not interestingly
different from Aquinas' Reason
D i scourse—on Method,

1.

For instance,

in the

Descartes states:

And as I observed that all composition is evidence of
dependence and that dependence is manifestly a defect,
I concluded that it could not be a perfection in God
to
be composed of two natures and consequently that he was
not composed of them. (AT VI 35; CSM I 128-9, emphasis
mine)

Although Descartes does not explicitly state that

a

composite is dependent on its parts in the manner stated by

45

Aquinas, he does tell us that it belongs
to the nature of a
composite to be dependent, either on its
parts or on an
efficient cause. 14 If the former, then he
is explicitly
stating Aquinas' Rea son 1
if the latter, then he is stating
something similar to Aquinas' Reason 2: All
composites are
;

causally dependent on something else.
that "if God exists,

But Descartes states

it is a contradiction that anything

else should exist which was not created by him."
188;

CSM II 132)

(AT VII

Thus, God cannot be dependent either on

parts or on an efficient cause distinct from himself.
In many texts,

Descartes presents

a

15

reason for DDS no

different from Aquinas' Reason—3.: Composites are dissoluble
or separable.

For instance,

in a passage from the Second

Replies, which may remind us as much of Anselm as of

Aquinas, Descartes states:
The very nature of a body implies many imperfections,
such as its divisibility into p^rtQ the fact that each
of its parts is different and so on; for it is selfevident that it is a greater perfection to be undivided
than to be
divided, and so on. (AT VII 138; CSM II
99, emphasis mine)

Descartes reiterates this type of thinking in Princ-iplp.g
23,

t

where he states:
There are many things such that, although we recognize
some perfection in them, we also find in them some
imperfection or limitation, and these therefore cannot
belong to God.
For example, the nature of body
includes divisibility along with extension in space,
and since being divisible is a n imperfection it is
certain that God is not a body. (AT VIII 13;CSM I 2001, emphasis mine)
,

Although these passages only claim that God is not

a

body

because bodies are divisible, we can easily see that the

46

§

same will hold for other composites.

16

That is, God cannot

be a composite because composites are
divisible; and

Descartes believes that "the insepar abi

1

i

ty of all the

attributes of God is one of the most important
perfections
which I understand him to have." (AT VII 50 CSM
II

;

emphasis mine)

Thus,

34

so far, we have a Descartes who

presents quite traditional reasons for holding DDS

^l n<^ s °f Distinctions in Descartes

As is well-established, Descartes was heavily

influenced by his education by the Jesuit scholastics at
La
Fleche, particularly with respect to his metaphysics
and

philosophical theology. 17

This is especially

apparent in

his discussion of the different types of distinctions.

18

Although Descartes follows the scholastic tradition (from
Suarez)

in holding that there are three types of

distinction, he, as usual, puts his own spin on things.

19

Descartes holds, as do Scotus, Ockham, and Suarez, that the
three types of distinction are real, of reason

conceptua l
calls,

,

r

ratinnis

]

or

and an intermediate distinction, which Descartes

following Suarez, a modal distinction. 20

The following is not intended to be an exhaustive

account of Descartes' theory of distinctions; that is well-

beyond the scope of this project.

I

simply wish to give

enough details about the theory to enable us to address the
issue of DDS.
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The Real Distinction

Although the most famous application and
discussion of
the real distinction in Descartes is
found in the well-known
argument for mind-body distinctness in the
Sixth Meditation,
Descartes presents his most fully-developed
account of the
real distinction in Principles 1.60.
He begins by

explaining which kind of things are really distinct:
Strictly speaking, a real distinct-inn exists
only
between two or more substances; and we can
perceive
that two substances are really distinct simply
from
fact that we can clearly and distinctly understand the
.I nte l li gere
one apart from the other
(AT VIII
CSM I 213)
[

]

'

As with all of Descartes' characterizations of
distinctions,
he provides a

'metaphysical' characterization and an

'epistemological guide' to the distinctions via clear and

distinct perception

(or,

and distinct perception)

in some cases,
.‘‘ 1

the lack of clear

On the metaphysical side, we

have
RD1

:

There is a real dist net on between x and
y iff x
and y are different substances. 22
1

i

RD1 is not part iculary informative because it doesn't

provide a deep analysis of the real distinction; it merely
tells us which type of things are really distinct.
Moreover, RD1 is not helpful unless we know what Descartes

means by 'substance'.

Fortunately, Descartes tells us that

"by substance we can understand nothing other than a thing

which exists in such a way as to depend on no other thing
for its existence."

(AT VIII 24;

CSM

I

210)

Spinoza would

later famously exploit this cartesian notion of substance to

48

arrive at his substance monism. 23

Descartes immediately-

recognizes such a worry; after all, this
definition of
-substance' would entail that there is
only one

substance,

namely God.

24

-substance'

But Descartes allows a looser sense
of
in which there can be finite,

substances. 25

created

Thus

X is a substance =„
either (i) x does not
anything else, or (ii) x depends only on God.depend on
;

Descartes constrasts substances with modes or
accidents and
attributes, each of which depends on something
besides
God,

namely a substance in which to 'inhere'.

Though substances

have a causal dependence on God, they are independent
of

modes or accidents.

Modes, on the other hand, are not only

causally dependent on God, they are also 'substantially
dependent

'

in that they depend on the substance in which

they inhere. 26
The manner in which we know that x is really distinct

from y is through clear and distinct perception of x apart

from y and vice versa, according to Descartes.

The fact

that we can clearly and distinctly perceive x and
y apart

entails, via the Second Meditation 'truth rule'

whatever

I

(i.e.,

clearly and distinctly perceive is true)

and y can exist apart from each other.

,

that x

This is raised

explicitly in the Sixth Meditation argument for mind-body
distinctness

:

The fact that I can clearly and
one thing apart from another is
certain that the two things are
are capable of being separated
78;CSM II 54, emphasis mine) 27
,
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distinctly understand
enough to make me
distinct, since they
at least by God (AT VII

The sg parabi

1

the Princi pi

e.g

i

ry of really distinct things is reiterated
in
•

or no matter how closely God may have
united them
mind and body], the power which he
previously
°
se P a ba t ng them or keeping one in being
f
without
the other, is something he could not lay
aside; and
1 gS whlch God has the power
to separate or to keep
P
being separate l y are really distinct. (AT VIIT
2 9 CSM I 213, emphasis mine)

U.e

i

m
.

.

,

;

Thus,

Descartes holds RD2 and RD3
RD2

There is a rea l—dist i net on between x and
y iff x
is separable from y and
y is separable from x.

.

i

where 'separability'
RD3: x is

is analyzed as follows:

s

parab l e from y iff x can really exist
without y. 28

That is,

in the case of a real distinction between x
and y,

there is a mutual

—separabi

1

j

ty between x and y.

29

in the

case of the real distinction between mind and body, both
the

mind and body would remain complete substances even if they
were separated. 30
However, there is a slight problem with RD2
true,

:

If RD2 is

then Descartes is committed to the thesis that there

is no real distinction between God and his creatures.

Because God is a necessary being and is the efficient cause
and conserver of all things, nothing can be separated from

God or exist independently. 31

So,

in the interest of

charity, we should not attribute RD2 to Descartes, but

rather RD2 * and RD2 * *
RD2 * There is a real distinction between a creatpd
x and a created y iff x is separable from y and y
is separable from x.
:
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RD2 * * There is a real distinction
between God and a
created x iff God is separable from x,
and x is
separable from all created things. 32
:

The Modal Distinction
The role played by separability is just
as pronounced

and important in Descartes' explication of
the intermediate

distinction, the modal distinction.
real distinction,

substances,

However, unlike the

in which there is mutual

separability of

in the case of the modal distinction,

there is

separability, but it is not mutual, nor is it between
substances.

As Descartes states:

1—di st i nct i on can be taken in two ways:
Firstly,
as a distinction between a mode, properly so-called,
and the substance of which it is a mode; and secondly,
as a distinction between two modes of the same
substance. (AT VIII 29;CSM I 213-14)

^

The following (uninf ormatively) captures the two types
of
modal distinction:

MD1

:

There is a modal distinction between x and
y iff
(i) x is a substance and
y is a mode of x or vice
versa, or (ii) x and y are two modes of the same
substance

Once again, Descartes gives us an epistemic guide to

recognizing the distinction in question.

distinctly perceive

a

substance apart from

We can clearly and
a

mode but not

vice versa, and we can understand one mode apart from

another mode (of the same substance)

,

but we can understand

neither without the substance of which they are both
modes.

33

As Descartes states:

[The modal distinction] applies only to incomplete
ent ities
It is sufficient for this kind of
distinction that one thing be conceived distinctly and
.

.

.
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separately from another by an abstraction
of the
eiVeS the thin9 inadeqUate1
^

V^Lo'cSM lf 8 5-6)
That is,

the mode which is only modally distinction
from its
substance will not be conceived adequately
precisely because
an adequate conception of a mode necessarily
involves the

substance of which it is

a mode.

34

What is important to notice about Descartes'

characterization of the modal distinction is the work
being
done, once again, by the notion of separability:
While
the

substance is separable from its modes,

a

mode is not

separable from the substance of which it is

a mode.

In the

example used by Descartes, although we can understand
(corporeal substance)

a

body

existing apart from its shape and

motion, we cannot understand its shape or motion existing

apart from the body.

35

We can now give a deeper analysis of the two types of

modal distinction for Descartes:
MD2

:

MD3

:

There is a modal distinction between x and
y iff
x is separable from y but y is not separable from
x (or vice versa)
There is a modal distinction between x and y iff
(i)
there is a substance S, of which x and y are
modes, (ii) x is not separable from S and y is not
separable from S, but S is separable from x and
S is separable from y, and (iii) S-with-x is
separable from S-with-y(and vice versa) 36
.

Modal distinctions, unlike real distinctions, merely require
a n.Qn-mutua]

separabi 1 i tv 37 between substance and mode
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.

The Conceptual Distinction

Descartes introduces the conceptual
distinction as
follows
conceptual distinction is a distinction
between a
S ° me
attribute of that substance without
substance is unintelligible; alternatively,
it is a distinction between two such
attributes of a'
single substance.
(AT VIII 30;CSM I 214
[A]

8 a
e
?,^
£ ?£
hich
the

^

)

Descartes distinguishes attribnt ps from modes
and accidents
The latter are inessential properties of
a substance,
and

the former are essential properties of a
substance.

38

When

speaking strictly, Descartes states that among
creatures
there are only two ('principal', as he calls them)

attributes: thought and extension, which constitute
the

essence of mind and body, respectively.

39

But when speaking

more loosely, he states that other essential properties
are

attributes

40

Thus
GDI: There is a concept ual distinction hetw^n x and
iff (i) x is a substance and y is an essential y
property of x (or vice versa) or (ii) x and
y are
essential properties of the same substance.

CD2

:

If substance S cannot exist without attributes a
and a 2 and a, cannot exist without S or a
and a,
cannot exist without S or a ,then there is a
conceptual distinction between S and a and a and
between a and a 2
1

,

2

,

x

x

1

2

.

Unlike the real and modal distinction, in which there is
some degree of separability involved,

in a conceptual

distinction this feature is lacking.

That is,

CD3

:

x and y are conceptually distinct only if x and y
are mutually- inseparable
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It

is important to note that a conceptual
distinction

between x and y is one that is, in some sense,
created by
the mind.

41

Descartes' inherits his understanding of the
modal and
conceptual distinctions is large part from Suarez.
This is
apparent from the fact that in one of Descartes'
most

sustained discussions of the modal and conceptual
distinction, he basically repeats Suarez's account
from the
Seventh Metaphys i cal D i sputation
Suarez states his account
.

as follows:

Conceptual distinctions are usually considered to be
of
two kinds. One, which has no foundation in reality
is
called 'di st i nct i o rat ion i s rat i oci nant
because it
arises e xc l us i ve l y from the reflection and activity
of
the intellect. The other which has a f ounda t on n
rea li ty is called by many distinctio raHnnia
ra t i Qc i nat ae
.For this type of conceptual distinction
can be understood as pre-existing in reality prior to
the discriminating operation of the mind, so as to be
thought of as imposing itself, as it were, on the
intellect, and to require the intellect only to
recognize it, but not to constitute it. (DM VII. 1.4,
emphasis mine)
i

.

J

i

'

'

.

.

.

.

Descartes also affirms that there are these two general
types of conceptual distinction.

distinction
rat i oc i natae

-

.

that is, a distinction made by reason
I

do not recognize any distinction made by

reason ratiocinant is
in reality."

He writes of "a conceptual

-

that is, one which has no foundation

(AT IV 349;CSMK 280)

Unfortunately, Descartes

does not explain what he means by a conceptual distinction

having a foundation or lacking one; in fact, his entire

discussion of the conceptual distinction is grossly
underdeveloped.

However,

if we can assume,

54

as

I

do,

that

Descartes' account of distinctions bears
much similarity to
Suarez's account, then we can catch a glimpse
of what

Descartes means by a 'foundation in reality'
by looking at
Suarez's explanation.
Suarez explains what he means when he
says that a di st i nct io rat onis raHnnrin.f^
,

.

has a

i

foundation in reality as follows:
^ d i stinct i o rat i on s—rat ocmatae because it
arises
not entirely from the sheer operation of the
intellect
but from an occasion offered by the thing
itself on
which the mind is ref lecting Hence the foundation
that
is held to exist in nature for this distinction
is not
a true and actual distinction between things
regarded
as distinct; for then not the foundation nf the
distinction but the dis tinction itself would precede
mental operation
Rather the foundation must be either
the eminence of the object which the mind thus
distinguishes
.or at any rate, it must be some
reference to other things which are truly distinct in
the real order and with respect to which such a
connection is excogitated or conceived. (DM VII. 1.4,
emphasis mine)
i

i

.

,

.

.

.

.

,

That is, this type of distinction is not something that

obtains in the world, but there is something in the world

which allows us to make

a

distinction.

According to Suarez,

in the case of conceptual distinctions in God,

"we partition

into concepts in line with the various effects of which that

eminent virtue is the principle, or by analogy with various

virtues which we find distinct in man, but which in an

ineffably eminent manner are found united in the absolutely
simple virtue of God."

(DM VII. 1.5)

Take,

for instance,

the

latter foundation for the conceptual distinction. What
Suarez means is that there is a conceptual distinction with
a

foundation (i.e., rationis rat iocinatae

)

if the following

obtains: there are properties or faculties, p
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: ,

p2

,

.

.

.p n

,

which are distinct in man (for instance),
but which in God
are identical.
For instance, man's goodness,
intellect,

power,

etc.,

identical.

are distinct, but in God, all of these
are

However, we can come to have different
concepts

of God's goodness,

intellect, power, etc., by considering

their distinctness in man.

In this way,

the conceptual

distinction between God's intellect and power has

a

f oundat i on in reality because there are some
things in which
.

these faculties are not identical.

In spite of Descartes'

silence on this matter, he certainly does recognize
the

difference between a di st i nct o r ationis ratiocinatae
i

d i s t met i o—rat i on i s—ratiocmantis

(al

and a

thnngh be rejects the

usefulness of the latter); as such, Suarez's explanation
is

certainly open to him

42
.

What goes completely unnoticed is that not only does

Descartes distinguish between a distinctio rationis
rat i ocinate and rationi s rati ocinant

i

s

f

but he also

implicitly distinguishes two types of the distinctio
rat i on i s—rat i oc i natae

:

(i)

those that hold between two

things that are essentially connected, such as body and

endurance (i.e., there is no possible state of affairs in

which a body exists without enduring)

;

and (ii)

hold between two things that are identical

,

those that

such as a body

and its extension or a rational animal and a man

distin ctio rationis ratiocinatae nf type
speak,

a

(i)

is,

43
.

A

so to

'greater' distinction, because a body is not

identical to its endurance even though it is

56

a

necessary

truth that every body has endurance.
rat i oci natae of type

(ii)

A distinct io

is a case in which there is a
real

identity between body and extension, but

distinction between them.

conceptual

a

There must be a conceptual

distinction between body and extension in order to
account
for the fact that

'body has extension' makes sense, but

extension has body' does not, even though body and
extension are identical and the identity relation is
symmetrical

(i.e.,

if x = y,

then xRy

<-»

yRx)

.

To reflect

the difference between these two types of conceptual

distinction, let us call conceptual distinctions that hold

between essentially connected things 'conceptual
distinct ionSi,

,

snd those that hold between identical things

'conceptual distinctions.,'.

Descartes' Account of DPS

Now that we have both Descartes' reasons for DDS and his
theory of distinctions in hand, we are in

position to see

a

what exactly Descartes' version of DDS amounts to.
book, Descartes—and Augustine,

In his

Stephen Menn states it is

commonly thought that Descartes is "proclaiming a new and
radical doctrine of God's simplicity." 44

This initially

seems to be the case, especially in the following passages:
In God willing, understanding and creating are all the
same thing without one being prior to precede the
other even conceptually ne quidem rati one
(AT I
153/CSMK 25-6)
f

f

l

!

.

It is impossible to imagine that anything is thought of
in the divine
intellect as good or true, or worthy of

57

or acta ° n or omission, prior to the
decision of
the divine will to make it so.
I am not speaking
here
of temporal priority: I mean that there
is not even anv
Y
priority of order, or nature or rations
,
a
g
they call it. (AT VII 432; CSM II 291)

n

From these, we may think that Descartes thought
that DDS
amounts to the following:
DDS1 God is simple = df
God is such that there are
no distinctions of any kind (real, modal or
conceptual) in God.
:

Many scholars have thought that Descartes held
something
like DDS1

45

And the passages quoted above lend

0

f

support to such a reading of Descartes.
However,

there are three good reasons to reject DDS1 as

an interpretation of Descartes'

account of DDS: First,

despite initial appearances, there is no textual evidence to
support DDS1 as an interpretation of Descartes on DDS.

In

neither of the passages quoted above does Descartes state
that there are no conceptual distinctions in God.

states that there is no conceptual pri ori ty

between God's intellect and will. 46

f

fnit-

He merely

p-Hng

]

But certainly x and y

can be conceptually distinct without one being conceptually
pr i or to the other.

For example,

take two of a triangle's

essential properties: triangularity and trilaterality.

It

is reasonable to suppose that even if these properties are

really identical, as those who hold that necessarily coextensive properties are identical would say, 47 they are

conceptually distinct.

However, what isn't clear is whether

there is any conceptual priority of one over the other.
seems to me that no non-question-begging definition of

58

It

'conceptual priority' can be given such that
triangularity
is conceptually prior to trilaterality

(or vice versa)

despite the fact that they are conceptually
distinct.

So,

not only does DDS1 lack direct textual
evidence, but also we
cannot even ind i rectly infer that Descartes held
DDS1

because 'no conceptual priority' does not entail
-no

conceptual distinction'
Second, Descartes repeatedly predicates a
plurality of

attributes of God.
(AT VIII

10/CSM

'omnipotent'

VIII

10

;

CSM

I

197),

I

128),

I

'infinite'

I

CSM

I

128),

understanding (AT

I

149,

215,

35

;

(AT VI 35/CSM

AT VI 35;CSM

'supremely good'

(AT VI 35; CSM

AT VI

'omniscient'

'independent'

128),

'eternal'

197),

(AT VII 21;CSM II 14,

AT VI 35; CSM
3 5,-CSM

I

Descartes states that God is 'perfect'

I

I

128),

AT

128,

(AT VII 45;CSM II 35,

(AT VII 45;CSM II 35,

AT VI

(AT VII 45; CSM II 35),

128),

'immutable'

(AT

I

146;CSMK

and that he has will and

153;CSMK 24,26).

How are we to

understand the plurality of attributes predicated of God if
there are no distinctions of any kind in God?

It

would be

very difficult.
Third, whenever Descartes characterizes his version of

DDS
is,

,

he explicitly raises the issue of separability; that

God is such that he does not have parts that are

separable

.

The following passages are representative of

Descartes' thinking on DDS. In the Third Meditation, he
states

:

59

the unity, simplici ty, or s i ve the
inspp^-rabi j t-y Q f
all the attributes of God is one of
the most important
of the perfections which I understand
him to have. And
surely the idea of the unity of all his
could not have been placed in me by any perfections
cause which did
not also provide me with the ideas of
the other
perfections; for no cause could have made me
understand
the interconnection and ins enarabi
of the
ty
perfections without at the same time making me
recognize what they were. (AT VII 50;CSM II
34
emphasis mine)
[

]

1

1

i

,

And in the Conversation with Rnrman

,

he states:

Whatever is in God is not in real
ty separate from God
himself; rather it is identical with
God himself M mo
Dens
[T] he distinction between God
himself
and his decrees is a mental one, not a real
one
reaiity the decrees could not have been separated In
from
God: he is not prior to them or distinct from
them, nor
could he have existed without them. (AT V 166;CSMK
348
emphasis mine)
i

.]

.

.

.

'

In the Third Meditation passage,

Descartes is identifying

the simplicity of God with the inseparability of his

attributes.

This is clear from the fact that Descartes

states that unity, simplicity and inseparability are said
to
be onn perfection. 48 And in the Burman passage, Descartes
is

stating that there cannot be any real distinctions in God,
but only mental distinctions,
mind,

i.e.

i.e.,

conceptual distinctions.

those created by the
That this is what

Descartes means here is clear from what follows in that
passage.

He states that there is a mental distinction

between God and his decrees, but that there is mutual

inseparability between God and his decrees.

As we've seen,

this is precisely what characterizes a conceptual

distinction.

Thus,

Descartes holds that God is simple in

the sense of having only conceptual distinctions.

60

Remember that there are two types of
rat i on i s rat ionci natae

:

di st

-i

rw-t-

-i

o

those that hold between essentially

connected things (i.e., conceptual distinction,),
and those
that hold between identical things (i.e.,
conceptual
distinction.,)

.

In the passage above

(AT VII 50;CSM II 34),

Descartes states two things: first, willing and

understanding are the same thing.

I

take this to mean

uncontroversially that they are really identical.

Second,

that neither will nor understanding is conceptually
prior to
the other.

I'll return to this issue shortly.

What we can

see here is that the type of conceptual distinction
that

holds between God's will and his understanding is what
I've

called a 'conceptual distinction^; that is, one that holds

between two things which are not merely essentially
connected, but are identical.

However,

it is consistent

with what is said in the Burman passage that there is

a

conceptual distinction, between God and his decrees. 49
So,

Descartes does not hold DDS1, but DDS2

DDS2:God is simple = df God is such that there are no
modal or real distinctions in God.
.

That there cannot be modal distinctions in God follows

trivially from Descartes' insistence that God has no modes
(i.e.,

inessential properties), but only attri hnfp.q

50
.

if

God has only attributes, then by Descartes' definition of a
modal distinction, God cannot have any modal distinctions in
him.

So,

God either has real distinctions, conceptual

distinctions or no distinctions at all.
61

As we have seen

Descartes cannot hold that there are
real distinctions in
God, because there is no separability
in God.
Yet because
Descartes allows that something may be
conceptually distinct
from its attributes and that two
attributes of the
same

thing may be conceptually distinct,
it is open to Descartes
to hold that there are conceptual
distinctions, in God 51
Moreover, the fact that DDS2 is
consistent with there
being conceptual distinctions in God
helps make some sense
.

of the
God.

'plurality' of attributes Descartes
predicates of
In fact, this was one of the standard
medieval uses of

the conceptual distinction.

52

While the divine attributes

are rea l ^ y identical with each other and
with God,

conceptually distinct,.

53

they are

This is why Menn writes that "in

fact Descartes holds that traditional
position

(with St.

Thomas and many others) that there are rational
distinctions
in God,

but no rea l distinctions or real multiplicity." 54

Because

(i)

the texts support a reading of DDS in which

there is nothing separable in God, and

(ii)

a general

consideration of the nature of Descartes' God as not having
modes eliminates the possibility of modal distinctions
in
God, and

(iii)

allowing conceptual distinctions in God

allows Descartes to predicate many things of God, DDS2 is
the correct account of Descartes' version of DDS.

A problem

remains: How then are we to understand Descartes' statements

from the 27 May 1630 letter to Mersenne (AT
6)

,

the

2

I

153;CSMK 25-

May 1644 letter to Mesland (AT IV 119,-CSMK 235)
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,

and the Sixth Replies

(AT VII

432;CSM II 291), in which he

states that God's intellect does
not have conceptual
priority over God's will? That is,
if Descartes is willing
t0 allow c onceptual distinction^
i n God, why does
he not

allow conceptual priority of intellect
over will in God?
Stephen Menn makes an interesting
suggestion on this
point.
He states:

When Descartes infers that God's act
of understanding
s no
precede his act of willing even rati one t-w-jr.
-LS not because there
is no distinction
in
God: Descartes would grant that
God's essence precedes
any aCt ° f God s
and that God's knowledge
of his own essence precedes
ratione his knowing and
llling things other than himself. Descartes'
point
ere is that God’s act of understanding
things other
than himself cannot precede his act of
willing and
creating things other than himself, since
prior to this
there would be nothing for God to understand
except
55
^ his
own essence.

or^lSy

'

On Menn's reading, God's essence has conceptual
priority

over his will and his understanding only of
things other
than God because God's understanding and willing
of things

other than himself presupposes things other than
God.
'prior'

But

(there is only conceptual priority because the

eternal truths,

for instance, while other than God (see AT

I

152/CSMK 25), are eternal as well, i.e., there is no time
at

which they are not true) to God's willing them, there is

noth i ng (other than God) for him to understand. So, with
respect to the eternal truths, there cannot be even a

conceptual priority of God's understanding of them because
there are simply no eternal truths for him to understand. 56
At the very least,

there are no eternal truths about

creatures for God to understand prior to his creation of
63

them.

This,

believe, Menn thinks is the
point of the
passage from the 27 May !630
letter to Mersenne, in which
Descartes states: "In God, willing,
understanding and
creating are all the same thing
without one being prior to
the other even conceptually
[rational " The inclusion of
'creating' here indicates that
the 'willing' and
'understanding' are intended to be
understood with respect
to things other than God,
i.e., creatures.
On the present
interpretation, the other problematic
passage from the Sixth
Replies (AT VII 432; CSM II 291)
should be read as follows:
I

.

lm P° ssidle to imagine that
anything [other than
the divine intellect as good or
t0 the decision of the divine
will to make
...there is not even any prioritv.
rat
.-L.
rtL i nnp
wne
y
^
rationnaf^
God]

is thought of

m

.

So,

.

j.

Descartes believes that there are conceptual

distinctions in God, but that there is no
conceptual
priority between his intellect and will
with respect to his
creation

DPS and the Rejection of the Moderate
Alternative

Because a conceptual distinction between x and
y is a
creation of the mind, indicating only that the
manner in

which we understand x is different from the manner
in which
we understand y,

57

despite the identity of x and

y,

Descartes still holds that whatever is real
ly true of one

conceptually distinct., thing is really true of the other. 58
For instance, whatever is really true of a body is true
of
its extension and vice versa.

So,

64

even though Descartes

holds DDS2, whatever is really
true of God's intellect
is
also really true of God's will
because they are really
Id entical
though conceptually distinct
,

2

.

We can now see exactly why
Descartes cannot accept the
Thomist ic or Leibnizian account of
the eternal truths.
On
(1)
these accounts, the eternal truths
are not objects of God's
will. (2)Thus,

The eternal truths do not depend
on God's will.
But Descartes holds DDS2

;

thus,

(3)

(4)

Despite the conceptual distinction
will and intellect, God's will = 2 between God's
God's intellect
God

=

from (1), and (2), by the transitivity
of identity:

So,

The eternal truths do not depend on
God.

Therefore
The Dependence Thesis is false.

Descartes could not accept the moderate alternative,

precisely because, when conjoined with DDS
denial of the Dependence Thesis.
is,

as we've seen,

,

(c)

,

it entails the

A denial of this thesis

exactly why he cannot accept the position

of Suarez
and Scotus
(5)

.

The moderate alternative apparently

does not fare any better. Although Descartes does
not

explicitly state this reasoning, there is nothing contained
in the argument that Descartes would not accept.

Or we can go another way.

God

s

Because Descartes holds that

intellect and will are identical, and neither is

conceptually prior to the other, he holds the following:
x is an object of the divine intellect iff x is an
object of the divine will.
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From

(5)

and

(c)

we can deduce

(6)

The eternal truths are objects
of the divine will.
So, <and here is the rub)
either (c) entails a denial of
the
Dependence Thesis or it entails that
the eternal truths
depend on God's will (by the identity
of God's intellect and
will)
If the former, then it is
clear why Descartes
(6)

.

rejects

(c)

wants, and

if the latter,
(c)

Descartes gets exactly what he

doesn't fundamentally differ from
the

Creation Doctrine.

Consideration of DDS by itself, however,
does not
entail the Creation Doctrine. Although
DDS entails that the
eternal truths depend on God will (and
intellect)

,

it does

not enable Descartes to move from this
to the Free Creation
Thesis.
That is to say, it is conceivable that the
eternal
truths depend on God's will, but he is not
free with respect
to their creation.
Thus, to make the move from the

dependence of the eternal truths on God's will to
their free
creation, we must now examine Descartes' account
of God's
freedom with respect to the creation of the eternal
truths.
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Endnotes
'AT VI1 4 32;

CSM II 291, AT VIII 14; CSM

201.

I

As we'll see, DDS entails that
the
epend on God's will, but consideration eternal
of divine freedom
Is that the eternal truths are
tree ly created by God.
3

See Hughes

(1989)

pp

.

3-10.

4

Aquinas' arguments against God's
satisfying any of
I
a
Aquinas on this pSint L^Hughes

(a)

°f

,

7

°f
extended parts
^Tof
aid
matter; nor does he differ from his own
nature from his existence; nor can one nature; nor his
genus and difference; nor substance and distinguish in him
claa then that there is no way in which accidents. It is
God is composite
ltS/
P
and he must be altogether simple."

ToT

,

J;

*

As early as 4252-1256, Aquinas presented
the argument
based on the dependence of composites on
their parts in his
Scr i pt um super ibros flpntenf niri urn I.8.iv: "Every
composite
is posterior to its components
since the simpler exists in
f°r
anyth n 9 if added to it for the composition
of a
ff. rd
a
n ut nothin
J
9 ls prior to the first.
Therefore, since
ni
^
God is the first principle, he is not composite."
i

1

.

.

_

:

‘

Hughes distinguishes 'ontological priority',
'existential priority', 'causal priority', and
mereological
priority
(pp. 30-33) Hughes states that "if the argument
from the posteriority of composita to divine
incomposition
is to succeed, there must be a way of being
posterior to
one's parts such that (i) every composite being is
posterior
to its parts in that way; and (ii) God could
not be
posterior to His parts in that way." (p. 34) Hughes
argues
that there is not a single sense of posteriority
which can
serve in both (i) and (ii).
His argument is persuasive.
This does not affect the present discussion, however,
because I am not interested in critically evaluating
Aquinas' arguments here.
'

.

Cf

.

Adams

(1987)

p.

905,

and Morris

(1985)

p.

101.

Similar reasoning is found in Anselm's Mono! og-j on 17
"A composite requires, for its existence, its components and
owes its being what it is to them.
It is what it is through
them.
They, however, are not what they are through it.
A
composite, therefore, just is not supreme.
If, then, the
supreme nature is a composite of many goods, what belongs to
a composite necessarily belongs to it also.
But truth's
;

67

whole and already manifest neces
by clear reason this falsehood's sity destroys and overthrows
blasphemy
(Cf
Adams
(1987) p. 904-5)
.

10sCG

18:

"Every composition, likewise need^
iS com P ositi ™. it is made
u^of a
plurality,
plurality and a plurality cannot
be fitted into a unitv
e x cept by some composer.
If, then, God were composite Y
he
would have a composer. He could
not compose Mmself knee
thing is its own cause, because it
would be
S
1Ch 1S im P oss:i-ble Now, the composer prior to
'
is the
kf
T cause of the
efficiont
composite.
Thus, God would have an
efficient cause.
Thus, too, he would
-which was proved above." (Cf. Adams not be the first cause
p. 905,
PotenM
I

andVV^

.

^

*

lcf
Anselm: "every composite thing of
necessity can
i'n
be actually
or conceptually divided into parts."
On
Xncarnat on—of—the Word V, in Anselm (1998)

L

.

i

12

13

Cf.

Hughes (1989) pp

See Adams

(1987)

p.

.

37-38.

905.

14See AT VI 35-6; CSM I 128-29, AT
VII 185; CSM II 130.
his would especially be the case if
Descartes held, as he
S
V6
that created thin gs have Lemporal parts,
such
thSt the
th^ ?h
that
things require God’s constant conservation
in
order
to persist over time. See AT VII 109-110;
CSM II 78-9 AT
Ai
VIII 13; CSM I 200.
'

'

15

See AT VII 78-80,

235-237; CSM II 54-5,

164-66.

16

For example, the composite that is the living
being is composed of mind and body; and the lesson human
to be
learned from the Sixth Meditation argument for the
real
distinction of mind and body is that the mind and body
that
compose a human being are separable from each other.
On a
related note: I take no definite stance on whether a
human
being (a union of mind and body) is a substance. I am
inclined to believe that that it is not a substance because
a human being does not satisfy the conditions for
being a
substance, i.e., that it is not dependent on anything else
or is only dependent on God.
The composite that is the
human being is composed of two substances; so, it would be
ontologically dependent on those substances. Thus, it is not
a substance itself.
_

See, for instance, Alanen (1985) and (1986), Gilson
(1913), Normore (1986), Wells (1961), (1965), (1982).
For
the curriculum at La Fleche, see Rochemonteix (1889) and
Garber (1992)
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Theories of distinctions were emoloveH in t-ha
^
tbe midd le
y d
ages primarily to address issuer
.

22? ---- z&xSBr-'s.
-

19

See Alanen

(1986)

p.

223 - 4

.

20

See Alanen 1986), p. 226, Cross
.
(1999), Wells
and T7
Woiter (1990) ch. 1 Scotus
'formal
distinction- and Henry of Ghent's
intentional
dist nnh „ n
are p e rhap s the most famous
examples of the intermediate°
distinction.
See Wolter (1990) and Adams (1987?
,r,
fiq
(196S)

,

'

.

'

i

i

^

in

F ° r lnstance

D

•

n

k nd ° f

M vS?

28-29?

'

in the discussion of the
distinctions
"
We Can P ercieve that...",
modal distinction can be recognized
1 diStinCti ° n 15 recognized.'
"

SMlS^

!

.

2

e
rt
iff rS noticaabl y from Suarez who
did
not rl ^ict re^ d?^
? nS t0 being between
substances.
Suarez also
SuLeTal
o held that there is a real
form and matter, substantial form and distinction between
active potency and
quantity and substance. See DM 7.1.1 and
Dutton (1993) p

In the Eth i cs
Spinoza defines 'substance' in a verv
cartesian manner: "by substance I understand
what is in
and is conceived p er se that is, that
whose concept do^T
not require the concept of another thing,
from which it must
be formed." (El.d3)
,

,

Of course,
_

Spinoza.

this is a worry for Descartes, but not for

25

See Er i nc i pl es I 51: "In the case of all other
substances, we perceive that they can exist only
with the
help of God's concurrence ... In the case of created
thinqs
some are of such a nature that they cannot exist
without
other things, while some need only the ordinary
concurrence
of God
order to exist. We make this distinction by
calling the latter 'substances' and that former
'qualities'
or 'attibutes' of those substances." (AT VIII
24; CSM I 210)
And when we call a created substance self -subsistent
we do
not rule out the divine concurrence which it needs
in order
to subsist.
We mean only that it is the kind of thing that
can exist without any other created thing; and this is
something that cannot be said about the modes of things,
like shape and number." (AT III 429; CSMK 193-94)
.

m

_

26

27

Cf.

AT VII 185; CSM II 130.

Cf.

AT VII 169-170, 227; CSM II 119-120, 160.
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Cf

.

AT VII 220-2; CSM II 155-156.

29

csn “.”‘p 2

Lmf"i

by

«"=«a
t

fr ° m th SS ° f DUnS Scotus and
Ockham, who only
th^°?h
2
Y
that
there needs
to be non-mutual separability
for a
distinction to hold.
For instance,
see^to think
a person's form is really
distinct from its matter and
p ® rs ° n s sensory soul is really distinct from
its
Ua
(1987) P
17
and
Roze
mond
iiyyaj
a998^DD
3 9
pp. 3-9,
and Dutton (1993)
w °lter (1990) thinks that Suarez
is in
„
Scotus
and Ockham with respect to this issue:agreement with
"For [Scotus
Ockham and Suarez]
the real distinction is that which
S be Ween
be the y substances or some
a
? accident
l ndlVidUalS
individual
or property.
it [i.e., a real
distinction] invariably implies the possibility
of
separating one really distinct thing from
another to the
S
at least may exist apart from the
other "^p
28
el Phasis mine)
em
p ; 28
A problem arises: Alanen
thinks that Descartes "used a theory of
distinctions ... largely taken over from Suarez
n. 223
(1986
c
Gilson 1913, p. 87)
But if Wolter is right then
Descartes' account of the real distinction does
not closely
Y
resemble that of Suarez because (Wolters) Suarez only
requires a non-mutual separability for a real
distinction
whereas Descartes as we've seen, requires mutual
separability for a real distinction.
I think that Wolter is
simply mistaken about Suarez.
In DM 7.1 and 7.2, Suarez
states that in cases of non-mutual separability,
there is
only a modal distinction, but not a real distinction.
However, Suarez does join Ockham and Scotus in believing
thatfan individual's matter and form are really distinct (DM

held
id
real
that

Ly
•

.

,

'

h

d

,

'

.

,
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Cf

.

AT III 567; CSMK 214, and Wells (1965)

p.

3.

Cf AT VI 35-6; CSM I 129: "their being must depend
on God's power in such a way that they could not subsist
for
a single moment without him. "
This point is noticed by
Marilyn Adams, but with respect to Ockham. See Adams (1987)
.

p.

18.

32

See AT VII 188; CSM II 132.

33

In the case of a modal distinction between two modes,
ml and m2, of the same substance S, we can conceive of £
w i th m l. and not m 2 and £ with m2 and not mi
but we cannot
conceive either ml or m2 without S. Cf AT VIII 29-30; CSM I
;

.

213-214, AT VII 78; CSM II 54.
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Cf

5-6

.

AT VIII 355; CSM

I

and Wells

301,

(1965)

p.

.

3

AT VIII

2

9-30

;

CSM

213-214.

I

''Condition (iii) simply means that it is
possible for
to exist with x and without
y and vice versa
Cf
AT iV
tv
34 9; CSMK 279-280.
S

37

38

39

See Wells

p.

5

,

11

.

See AT IV 348-9; CSMK 279-280, AT VIII
26; CSM

See AT VIII 25; CSM
Cf

231

(1965)

.

I

I

211.

210.

AT IV 349-50; CSMK 280-281, and Alanen (1986)

p.

.

41

See AT IV 349; CSMK 280.

'"There
is no reason to think that Descartes would
have explained 'the foundation' of the dist-inetin rafinn-j
^
rat i oc i natae any differently from Suarez.
Not only is
Descartes' division of the conceptual distinction exactly
like Suarez's, he even employs the exact same example
(Peter's being identical to himself) to illustrate the
d i st i nct i q—rat i on i s—rat locmant s
See Suarez, DM VII. 1.5
and Descartes, AT IV 350; CSMK 280-1.
i

.

"For Descartes' claim that extension is body, see
Principles I 63 (AT VIII 30-31; CSM I 215.
44

Menn (1998) p. 348.

"Alanen, Cronin, and perhaps Curley.
46

I thank Lex Newman for bringing this crucial point
to
my attention.
47

For instance, David Lewis, in section 1.5 of Lewis
It should be noted that Lewis holds that this would
not be true on some understandings of what properties are.
(1986)

.

48

The Latin reads: " Nam contra, unitas. simpl 1 ci tss
s i ve i nsepara b ili tas e orum omnium quae in Deo sunt, nna
ex praecioui perf ectionibus quas in eo esse intelligo

f

.

49

The Butman passage is problematic because it later
asserts that "although [God's] actions were completely
indifferent, they were also completely necessary." This
seems to contradict the spirit of the Creation Doctrine.
For instance, in the 2 May 1644 letter to Mesland, Descartes
states: "And even though encore que God has willed that
some truths should be necessary, this does not mean that he
[

l
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willed them necessarily." (AT IV
118)
dismissing the Burma passage, as I'm Without simolv
tempted to do *1
tWO
iC
y t0
witg
the Creation
uoctrme.
So°?°ine
A we'll
"m? see in the next chapter
(D As
the
Creation Doctrine only requires that
God's willinq of the
a
Uth iS
det * rmined
anything'ind^enden^of
Go^s win
So
S
an°^
°' as
lon
9 the necessity of God's willing
V:
9
n d n the BuoHn passage has
nothing to do with
TnS
a
) a
independent
determinations of God's will the Creation
°“
Doctrine is unscathed.
(2)
Descartes »y
„p
committing a fallacy.
Earlier in the RnrLn passage
States: "he necessarily made the decrees^
did
since he necessarily willed what was
best, even thouqh it'
S
in
What W3S beSt " (AT
166;
LSMK 348)
CSMK°348)
if Descartes does think that God
wills
necessarily, then he is reasoningly
fallaciously from
necessarily, if God wills x, then x is the
best' and 'x is
best to 'necessarily, God wills x'.
any case DescartP^
probably. should not have said what he did,
or perhaps Burman
merely misreported Descartes' statements.
On a different note, the Burman passage
also
contradicts Descartes' early statement that the
eternal
truths are not connected to God's essence.
(AT I 152; CSMK
2 5)

—tent

m

^

.

.

t

^

?fV

'

f

m

AT VIII 26; CSM I 211.
This seems to commit
Descartes to the view that God has no properties
contingently.
So, even the property of creating Adam
would
be. essential to God, i.e., it is not possible
for God to
exist without creating Adam.
This is problematic.
solution is to distinguish between God's intrinsic The
properties, all of which are essential properties (i.e.,
attributes)
and his relational properties, some of which
are inessential.
.

,

Cf AT VII 383
CSM II 263.
Interestingly enough
this is the account given by Spinoza in his Cogi t-at-a
Metaphysi ca appendices to his Renat nps Cp-m-pc
Pr i nc r p i orum —Ph il osophiae
There Spinoza states that
;

,

i

,

.

it is self-evident that component parts are prior at
least by nature to the composite whole, then of
necessity those substances from whose coalescence and
union God is composed will be prior by nature, and each
can be conceived through itself without being
attributed to God. Again, because they are necessarily
distinct from one another in reality, then necessarily
each of them can exist through itself without the help
of the others ... Hence we can clearly conclude that all
the distinctions we make between God's attributes are
nothing other than distinctions of reason, and that
they are not distinct from one another in reality
(CM
II

5)
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52

(1960)
(

54

See Adams

(1987)

p.

19

.

Thl ® S contrary to the
interpretations of Cronin
in
and Alanen (1985) p. 183.
;J-

Menn (1998) p. 348.

55.

Menn (1998) p. 348-9.

Except perhaps eternal truths such
as 'God exists'
e
h
r° blem ° f
S °° Pe ° f the C
Doc tr Le aIone he?e

^

57

See Adams

(1987)

p.

19

^ion

'

.

hat is
in extensional contexts, if x and
__
are
J
Y
conceptually
distinct,, then Fx is true iff Fy is ytrue onlv
'
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CHAPTER

3

DIVINE FREEDOM OF INDIFFERENCE AND THE
ETERNAL TRUTHS

Introduction
From even a superficial examination of
Descartes'

discussion of the eternal truths we can see that
Descartes
thought that God's freedom and the Creation
Doctrine are
intimately related. For instance, in

June 1630 letter to

3

Mersenne, Descartes writes that "[God] was free
to make it
not true that all the radii of the circle are
equal - just
as free as he was not to create the world."

CSMK 26)

(AT

I

152-3;

And in the Sixth Replies, he states:

It is self -contradictory to suppose that the
will of
God was not indifferent from eternity with respect
to
everything. .because [quia] it is impossible to imagine
that anything is thought of in the divine intellect
as
good or true, or worthy or belief or action or
omission, prior to the decision of the divine will to
make it so. (AT VII 431-32/CSM II 291)
.

Descartes

also discusses divine freedom and the eternal

truths in the

2

May 1644 letter to Mesland, in which he

states
[T] he power of God cannot have any limits ... [this]
shows us that God cannot have been determined to make
it true that contradictories cannot be true together,
and therefore that he could have done the opposite
(AT
IV 118; CSMK 235)

Although Descartes does not as say much about divine freedom
as one would like,

it is quite clear that he believes that

God's freedom consists in a liberty of

i

ndi ffprpnrp

1

This

account raises problems for any interpreter of Descartes,
most obviously because Descartes simply does not provide any

74

explicit,

sustained, or detailed account of
divine
indifference.
Moreover, another problem arises:
Descartes
insistence that God's freedom consists in
indifference is

prima facie peculiar because it seems to be
at odds with
Descartes' statements about human freedom
in the Fourth
Meditation
There is no need for me to be impelled
both
order to be free... [T] he indifference I feel ways in
when there
is no reason impelling [impel] it] me
in one direction
rather than another is the lowest grade of
freedom
[i nf i mas gradns libert atis
it is evidence not of any
Y
perfection of freedom, but rather of a defect
knowledge or a kind of negation. (AT VII 57-8 in
CSM II
.

]

;

;

Even leaving aside the oddness of this passage
with respect
to Descartes'

account of divine freedom, this passage is at

odds with Descartes' insistence,

in places,

indifference belongs to human freedom. 2

that

How can Descartes

consistently hold FI, F2 and F3?:
FI

Indifference is not required for human freedom,
in fact, indifference is the lowest grade of
human freedom.
and,

F2

Indifference belongs to human freedom.

F3

Indifference is the essence of divine freedom.

How can Descartes hold that something deficient for us both
sometimes belongs to our freedom and is the essence of the

freedom of the most perfect being?
In this chapter,

I

will do two things:

why Descartes holds FI, F2
each with the others.

And

,

and F3
(ii)

,

,

I

(i)

I

will show

and how he reconciles

will argue that

Descartes believes that a proper understanding of divine
freedom entails the Creation Doctrine.
75

In the first part,

I

Will discuss two different senses
of 'indifference- found
in
Descartes' writings: The Scholastic
Sense and another sense
introduced by, and peculiar to, Descartes.
We shall see
that the term 'indifference' in FI
has a different sense
from the sense it has in F2
in the second part, I will
address the issue of why Descartes thinks
that F3 is true
despite the fact that human indifference
is 'the lowest
grade of freedom'. Finally, I will show
how the Creation
Doctrine is entailed by Descartes' account
of divine
.

freedom

Different Senses of 'Indifference

1

The first step in a solution to the problem
generated

by Descartes' acceptance of FI, F2

,

and F3

is to notice

,

that there are different senses of indifference
in play in

Descartes' writings.

Because Descartes, as we know, was

anxious to find favor with the Jesuits, he sometimes

employed the scholastic notion of indifference, accepted
by
the Jesuits.

This sense of indifference is particularly

prevalent in 16th-century scholastics like Luis de Molina,
in his C oncord i a

indifference.

Molina defined freedom in terms of

,

He states:

That agent is said to be free who, all the requisites
for acting having been posited, can act or not act, or
so perform one action that he is still able to do the
contrary.
Concord
Dis 2)
i

(

Let us call this

for short)

'

f

scholastic- indifference

and define it as follows:
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(
'

'

s-indif ference,

SI:

An agent A is s- indifferent with
respect to an action
a -d f
given all the requisites for doing a,
A could
have done a and A could have refrained
from doing a,
and A could have done some other action beside
a.
.

And,

as I've stated,

indifference.

Molina defined freedom in terms of s-

Thus, on his account

An agent A is free with respect to an
action a
s - indi f f erent with respect to a.
It is s-indif ference,

time by later Scholastics,"
in the

= df

a is

"given currency for the first
4

that Leibniz would later oppose

'Conversation with Steno'

(1677).

As Leibniz states:

This notion of freedom - that is, the power of
acting
or not acting, all the requisites for acting
having
been posited, and all things being equal both in the
object and in the agent, is an impossible chimera,
which is contrary to the first principle that I stated
(VE II.

p.

302)

Not only does Leibniz think that s- indifference never

actually occurs in human free actions, he thinks that it is
iiriposs i b] e that any free action feature s-indif ference

For

.

an agent to be s- indifferent with respect to an action a,

according to Leibniz, would require a violation of the
Principle of Sufficient Reason.

The sufficient reason for

an action would be contained in 'all the requisites for

acting', and given that there is a sufficient reason

contained in 'all the requisites for acting' the action
follows.

Because the Principle of Sufficient Reason is

necessary truth, an action cannot be s-indif f erent

a

5

Descartes discusses s- indifference in several texts,
most noticeably in the

which he states:

9

February 1645 letter to Mesland, in

"Perhaps others mean by 'indifference'
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a

positive faculty of determining oneself to
one or other of
two contraries. .. I do not deny that the
will has this
positive faculty."

(AT IV 173;CSMK 245)

supnse that this

no

Mesland

It should come as

is stated in a letter to a Jesuit,

S- indifference

.

6

,

as opposed to the other sense of

indifference, to be discussed shortly,

is a positive power

or ability belonging to the will; it is the
ability to

determine oneself to an action.
Sometimes, however, Descartes introduces his own
sense
of indifference.

the indifference
[impe
58

;

it

]

In the Fourth Meditation,
I

he writes of

feel when there is hq reason impelling

me in one direction rather than another,

"

(AT VII

CSM II 40, emphasis mine), and states that in some
cases

"my intellect has not come upon any persuasive reason
in

favor of one alternative rather than the other.

obviously implies that

I

am indifferent as to whether

should assent or deny either alternative."
41,

emphasis mine)

And,

This
I

(AT VII 59;CSM II

in the Sixth Replies,

he states:

"He is never indifferent except when he does not know which

of the two alternatives is the better or truer."

432-3 CSM II 291-92)
;

Finally,

letter to Mesland, he states:

in the

9

(AT VII

February 1645

indifference

'

seems to me

strictly to mean that state of the will when it is not
impelled [impellitur] one way rather than another by any

perception of truth or goodness."

(AT IV 173,-CSMK 245)

I

take it that Descartes here means that an agent is

indifferent in his peculiar

sense when their will is not
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impelled by any reason for acting.
indifference

'

Let us call this type of

cartesian- indifference

(or

'

1

c- indifference

'

and define it as follows:
Cl:

An agent A is c-indif ferent with respect to an
action
a = df (i) It is not the
case that A has any reason to
do a or any alternatives to a, or (ii) the
reasons for
and against doing a are evenly balanced.
.

8

In contrast to s - indifference

,

which is a power, c-

indifference is a st ate in which an agent is not impelled
by
any reason to perform an action; it is, as Beyssade
states,

"the s tate of hesitation or wavering because of ignorance
or

insufficient knowledge."

9

In fact,

Descartes explicitly

contrasts c- indifference with s-indif ference

10

And it is

c-indif ference which Descartes characterizes as the lowest

grade of freedom.

11

As Descartes states in the

9

February

1645 letter to Mesland:
[I] ndif ference
in this context seems to me strictly
to mean that state of the will when it is not impelled
one way rather than another by any peception of truth
or goodness. This is the sense in which I took it when
I said that the lowest grade of freedom is that by
which we determine ourselves to things to which we are
indifferent. (AT IV 173/CSMK 245)
'

So,

differentiating between s-indif ference and c-

indifference shows how Descartes can hold that there is

a

sense in which indifference may be present in human free

actions although there is a sense in which it is the lowest
grade of human freedom.

12

C- indifference is the lowest

grade of human freedom precisely because it is contrary to
the highest grade of human freedom,
to a clear and distinct perception.
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i.e.,

spontaneous assent

As Descartes states:

[T] he more I am inclined (properdin)
in one
direction. .so much more freely do I
choose that.. For
if I always saw clearly what was
true and
that case, although I would be completely good... in
free vet I
could never be indif f erent (AT VII
57-8/CSM II^O)
.

.

Although this text seems to decide the matter
whether
s-mdif ference is required for human freedom, exactly
what

Descartes' view of human freedom is depends
greatly on the
interpretation of a sentence from the Fourth
Meditation

immediately preceding the quotation above.

This is

difficult business, to say the least. In particular,
the
"
passage,
Neque en i m opus est m e in utramque partem
posse

,

Hi-

s im

liber ,"

(AT VII 57;CSM II 40)

of an easy translation into English.
(1)

may be translated as

There is no need for me to be able to go both ways
in order to be free.

In this case,

Descartes is denying that s-indif ference is

(3)
essential
to human freedom. 13

Cottingham, et al
(2)

It

does not admit

.

On the other hand,

translated this sentence as:

In order to be free,
incl ned both ways

there is no need for me to be

i

^

similar to

that another reasonable translation, and one very
(2

)

,

is

There is no need for me to be impel ed both ways,
in order to be free. 14
1

We can see that much rests on the translation:

are accurate translations,

If

(2)

or

(3)

then Descartes is denying that c-

indifference is essential to human freedom, while remaining
silent about whether s-indif ference is essential.
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15

If

(1)

is accurate,

then Descartes is denying that sindifference

is essential,

while remaining silent about whether c-

indifference is essential.
Despite the difficulty in translating this
sentence,
believe that (2) and (3) are more plausible
translations
than
(a

(1)

,

which has Descartes denying that s-indif ference

positive power)

because

(2)

I

and

is essential to human freedom,

precisely

make Descartes' view in the Fourth

(3)

Meditation consistent with what he states in the

9

February

1645 letter to Mesland, namely that c- indifference
is the

lowest grade of freedom.

On translations

and

(2)

(3)

the

,

reference to indifference (i.e., c-indif ference) as the
lowest grade of freedom in 1645 simply reiterates what is

already Descartes' stated view in the Med
Translations

(2)

and

i

tat

i

on .q of 1641

also make the 1641 Latin text

(3)

consistent with the 1647 French text

(the latter includes

reference to 'indifference' in its 'counterpart' to the
sentence from the Latin text, whereas the Latin does not)

Contrary to the interpretation of Beyssade,
°f

'

nd i fferent

'

17

16
.

the insertion

in 1647 does not provide evidence that

Descartes' views concerning freedom changed between 1641 and
1647;

it is quite reasonable to think that Descartes

introduces the term

'

indifferent

'

in the French edition

simply to make "his thoughts clearer"
fact

that it is indifference

discussion,

(i.e.,

(AT IX 3)

about the

c-indif ference) under

as is stated later in that same passage.

in the passage,

Descartes discusses the
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"

indifference

Later
...

when

I'm not impelled by any reason is
the lowest grade of
freedom," and earlier he states that
"there is no need for
me to be impelled both ways, in
order to be free."

agree with Beyssade that neither sindifference nor
c- indifference is essential to
human freedom according to
Descartes; but I disagree that in the Latin
text it is sI

mdif f erence

that Descartes is denying is essential
to human

freedom, whereas in the French it is

c- indifference that

Descartes is denying is required for human
freedom. 18
We should notice at this point what
differentiating

between s-indif ference and c-indiff erence actually
accomplishes: Differentiating between the two is
quite

helpful in reconciling FI and F2

.

That is, there is no

inconsistency in Descartes holding FI* and F2*:
FI*

C-indif ference is not required for human freedom.

F2 *

S-indifference belongs to human freedom. 19

However, distinguishing s-indifference and c- indifference

does nothing to help the situation between

FI and F3

because the sense of indifference involved with both is cindif ference

.

So,

we'll have to look elsewhere to settle

this issue.

Why C-indif ference is Not Essential to Human Freedom
In the 21 April 1641 letter to Mersenne,

writes,

"I

wrote that indifference in our

ca.qp

Descartes
is rather a

defect than a perfection of freedom; but it does not follow
that the same is the case with God."
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(AT III 360;CSMK 179,

emphasis mine)

Unfortunately, Descartes doesn't ey u.u
p
1y

tell us why this is the case.

However,

there are some

implicitly stated reasons, as we'll now see.
The authors of the Sixth Objections
objected that
it is an article of faith [da
fide] that God
eternity indifferent as to whether he should was from
create one
world, or innumerable worlds, or none at
all
and if
mdifferonce cannot be a proper part of human freedom
neither will it find a place in divine freedom,
since'
the essences of things are ... indivisible and
immutable.
Therefore indifference is involved in God's freedom
of'
choice no less than it is in the case of human
freedom
of choice. (AT VII 417;CSM II 281)

Descartes'

reply indicates many things about his strategy

for reconciliation of FI and F3

I

.

particular objection at length, and

quote the reply to this
I

number the sections in

order to make reference easier.
[l] As for the freedom of the will, the way
in which it
exists in God is quite different from the way in which
it exists in us. [2] It is self -contradictory to
suppose that the will of God was not indifferent from
eternity with respect to everything which has happened
or will ever happen; for it is impossible to imagine
that anything is thought of in the divine intellect as
good or true... prior to the decision of the divine will
to make it so.
[3] But as for man.
it is evident that
he will embrace what is good and true all the more
willingly and hence more freely, in proportion as he
sees it clearly. [4]
He (i.e., man) is never
indifferent except when he does not know which of the
two alternatives is the better or truer, or at least
when he does not see this clearly enough to rule out
any possibility of doubt. [5] Hence the indifference
which belongs to conveni
human freedom is very
different from that which belongs to divine
freedom.
Indifference does not belong to the
[6]
essence of human freedom indi f f erent a non perrinet
essent i am humanae—libertat is
since not only are we
free when ignorance of what is right makes us
indifferent, but we are also free - indeed at our
freest - when a clear perception impels us to pursue
some object. (AT VII 431-433/CSM II 291-292)
.

.

.

.

,

l

r

.

.

f

i

]
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,

Each of the numbered sections in this
passage contains
helpful information concerning Descartes'
views of freedom,

both human and divine.

and

[3]

[

for instance,

6 ],

constitute

strong evidence that Descartes held that
indifference (both
c- indifference and s-indif ference) is
not essential to human
freedom. That is, there are cases in which a
human
agent

will be free, in fact freer
is.

the less indifferent he or she

,

What is required for the freest human actions
is

spontaneity
should be noticed that

It

indifference, s-indif ference
This,

[5]

does state that a type of

'belongs'

,

in conjunction with Descartes'

to human freedom.

statement in the

9

February 1645 letter to the Jesuit, Mesland, in which he
states that humans are s-indif ferent

,

and Pr nri pi pb
i

i

§41

in which Descartes seems to identify freedom with s-

indif ference

(AT VIII 20;

that Descartes, despite

[

CSM
6

]

,

206)

I

held that s-indif ference is

essential to human free actions.
that,

in

[5]

and

[

6 ],

would seem to indicate

What should be noticed is

Descartes says two very different

things: First, s- indifference 'belongs'

freedom;

pert inet

second,
]

r

conveni

)

to human

s-indif ference does not belong [non

to the essence of human freedom.

Why the

difference? The answer is that Descartes certainly believes
that there are free human actions in which s-indif ference is

present, and,

in this sense,

s-

indifference may belong to

free human actions; however, what Descartes is denying is
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that s-indifference is es sential

to free human actions. 20

This should come as no suprise; after
all, Descartes, as we
have seen, repeatedly states that the
freest human actions
are those in which indifference (of
both varieties) is

missing

21

More important to the present task of
reconciling FI
and F3 are [1]
[2]
and [5]
[4]
[l] and [5] both clearly
show that Descartes believes that there
cannot be a uniform
account of human and divine freedom.
There are at least two
obvious reasons why Descartes cannot hold a uniform
account.
,

First,

,

,

as Descartes states:

"no essence can belong

univocally to both God and his creatures."
II

292)

(AT VII 433,-CSM

That is, not only does the proposition 'x is free'

mean something different depending on whether we
substitute
the name of a creature or of God for 'x',

mean something different.

it cannni

fail

to

The predicates of God and

creatures are non-univocal. 22

because of the non-

So,

univocity of divine and human predicates, Descartes is
committed to the impossibility of a uniform account of
divine and human freedom.

Thus,

someth ng must distinguish
i

human freedom from divine freedom.
Second,

even if we denied the non-univocity of divine

and human predicates, Descartes' model of the structure of
free human actions cannot accomodate divine free acts

because of the Doctrine of Divine Simplicity (DDS

)

.

As

Descartes states with respect to human free action: "it is
clear by the natural light that the perception of the

85

intellect must
will."

[debere]

(AT VII

6 0;

precede the det ermination of the

CSM II 41)

‘ 3

The priority of the

intellect need not be temporal priority,
but perhaps only
'priority of nature' or conceptual priority.
However, as
we've seen, Descartes thinks that "in God,
willing [and]

understanding.

.

.are all the same thing without one being

prior to the other even conceptually

f

ne quidem

..
;

(AT

I

153 CSMK 25-6);
;

and "there is not even any priority of

order, or nature, or of ratione rat
it."

(AT VII 432; CSM II 291)

Thus,

i

as they call

n<-i

because of Descartes'

commitment to DDS, in which there is no conceptual
priority

between God's intellect and will, there simply cannot
be

a

uniform account of freedom, which would accomodate both
human and divine free actions.
[2]

illustrates that God's freedom requires c-

indif f erence

.

This is a point to which

I

will return

shortly
[4]

is the key to understanding why Descartes believes

FI and F3 are both true.

Just to clarify,

FI and F3 should

be rephrased as follows:

[4]

FI*

c-indif ference is not essential to human freedom.

F3*

c-indif ference is essential to divine freedom.

shows that,

in discussing human indifference here,

Descartes intends to be discussing c-indif ference

24

This

will be clear when we discuss the necessary and sufficient

conditions for being able to be c- indifferent

.

In

[4],

Descartes states that humans can be indifferent if (and only

86

if)

they either lack knowledge or they
lack clear

perception.

This indicates that a state of not-being-

impelled is being discussed rather than a
power of
25
choosing.
That is, Descartes is referring
to c-

indifference and not to s-indif f erence
We can begin to see why Descartes held
that humans need

not be c-indif ferent with respect to an
action a in order
to be free with respect to a by noticing
that he held that

certain conditions must hold for an agent to be
cindif ferent.
^>CI:

Descartes held the following:

It:
s possible for a finite agent A to be
cI
indifferent iff

<

(i)

A lacks relevant information concerning
course of action,

(ii)

A s perception is not sufficiently clear and
distinct

a

ox
1

ox
(

iii

)

A acts without sufficient reason, (i.e., A
acts with no reason, or with fewer reasons
than ought to suffice for the action.)

Descartes expresses conditions
Meditation:

"[indifference,

(i)

i.e.,

and (ii)

in the Fourth

C- indifference]

is

evidence not of any perfection of freedom, but rather of
defect in knowledge
true and good,

I

...

For if

I

a

always saw clearly what was

should never have to deliberate about the

right judgment or choice."

(AT VII 58;CSM II 40)

the Fourth Meditation, he states:

Again in

"this indifference

[i.e.,

c-indif ference] does not merely apply to cases where the

intellect is wholly ignorant, but extends in general to

87

every case where the intellect does
not have suffirH^. ly
Cl^ar knowledge." (AT VI I 59;CSM II 41,
emphasis mine)
Descartes states condition (iii)
letter to Mesland:

"I

in the

2

May 1644

did not say that a person was

indifferent only if he lacked knowledge, but
rather, that he
is more indifferent the fewer reasons
he knows which
impel

him to choose one side rather than another."

(AT IV 115;CSMK

This point is slightly altered, but retains
the same
spirit, in the 9 February 1645 letter to
Mesland:

indifference' in this context seems to me strictly
to mean
that state of the will when it is not impelled
one way

rather than another by any perception of truth or
goodness."
(AT IV 173/CSMK 245, emphasis mine)

Now,

for Descartes,

(i)

-

(iii)

Oci are indicative

of

of a pr i vation or deficiency on the part of an agent.

Descartes uses the term 'privation' frequently in the Fourth
Meditation, and in the 1647 French edition of the

Meditations, he insists that he is using the term according
to its scholastic usage.

(AT IX 48)

distinguished between a negation
[

pr i vat i o

]

.

F

26

The scholastics

negat o
i

j

and a pri

vvi on

A negation is simply a lack of something; so,

for instance, my lack of wings is a negation. However,

privations have normal. 1 ve import.

'Privation', according to

Descartes' scholastic usage, may be defined as follows:
F is a privation in some thing S = df
F is a lack of
property P and S is such that it ought to have P. 27
.
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a

So,

whereas my lack of wings is

to lack feet or reason,

That

(i)

-

(iii)

I

of

a

mere negation, if

i

were

would have a privation. 28

OCI are indicative of

a

privation,

according to Decartes, is clear from
Descartes' insistence
that the lack of knowledge involved
in c- indifference is
described in the Fourth Meditation as in rngnit-inn^
'

d efectum

That this is the case is also clear
from

'

.

Descartes' account of error in terms of
privation in the
same Meditation: "it is undoubtedly an
imperfection in me to
misuse [aonJaene_ULtar] that freedom and make
judgements
about matters which I do not fully understand."
(AT VII
61; CSM II 42)

As

I

have argued elsewhere,

ideas ought to be
If this is true,

distinct is
have,

or,

states:

a

Descartes believes that

(in some strong sense)

clear and distinct.

then an idea which is not clear and

privative idea, one which we ought not to

at the very least,

"If,

29

however,

I

judgment in cases where

ought not to act upon. As he

simply refrain from making
I

a

do not percieve the truth with

sufficient clarity and distinctness, then it is clear that
am behaving correctly and avoiding error."
II 41)

30

(AT VII 59;

CSM

It is also indicative of a privation in that we

misuse our faculties (i.e., use them as we ought not to)
when we have an act of will without sufficient reason for
the act of will.
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I

Thus,

if

(i)

(iii)

_

agent can be c-indif f erent

exhaust the ways in which
,

mdifferent only by having

finite

a

then an agent can be ca privation.

This,

I

believe,

is

why Descartes wrote to Mersenne
that "indifference in our
case is rather a defect [defaut
than a perfection of
freedom." (AT III 360) But Descartes
thinks that freedom is
a perfection.
it is only ... freedom of choice,
which I
experience within me to be so great that
the idea of any
greater faculty is beyond my grasp; so
much
]

so that it is

above all in virtue of the will that

bear

m

S

a

understand myself to

some way the image and likeness of
God."

emphasis mine
'*'

I

31
)

(AT VII 57

He reiterates this in the Prinripipc

..

.

,

it

supreme perfect i on in man that he acts voluntarily,

that is,

freely."

(AT VIII 18,

emphasis mine)

And in the

Fourth Meditation, it is clear that Descartes
thinks that it
ought to be the case that humans act freely.
Take the following three propositions:
(A)

Freedom is

(B)

A finite agent A can be c-indif ferent only if a

a

perfection.

has a privation.

(C)

C-Indif ference is necessary for human freedom.

If Descartes holds
(D)

(A)

-

(C)

then he is committed to

(D)

A finite agent A can have the perfection of
freedom only if A has a privation.

Although Descartes does believe that created agents are
essentially li m i ted

32
,

it does not follow that he believes

that we are essentially privative

in fact,

denies that we are essentially privative
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33
.

he explicitly

Because

Descartes would not hold
(A)

-

(A)

and

he must give up one or more
of

(D)

But we have already seen that
Descartes holds

(C)
(B)

so,

Descartes must reject

(C)

That is,

Descartes cannot hold that c- indifference
is necessary for
human freedom.
But the fact that c- indifference is
not
necessary for human freedom entails nothing
about whether cmdif f erence is necessary for divine freedom
because, as

we've seen, Descartes believes that human
freedom is quite
dissimilar from divine freedom
[1] and [5]).
We must now
see why Descartes believes that c-indif
ference is required
for divine freedom.
(

Why C-ind ifference is Essential to Divine
Freedom
At the start of this section, we should notice
not why

Descartes holds that God's freedom requires
c-indifference,
but simply t hat he does.

In

passage, Descartes states:

[2],

from the Sixth Replies

"It is self -contradictory to

suppose that the will of God was not indifferent from

eternity ... for it is impossible to imagine that anything
is
thought of in the divine intellect as good or true.

.

.prior

to the decision of the divine will to make it so." And
later
in the Sixth Replies,

Descartes characterizes God

indifference in terms of
VII 435; CSM II 294)

condition

(i)

a

Thus,

lack of reasons for willing.

Descartes' God satisfies

of the criteria for being c- indifferent

hence, he is c- indifferent
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(AT

Moreover, Descartes would hold that
God is free iff God
is c-indif ferent
That Descartes believes that
.

c-

indifference is a necessary condition for
divine freedom in
beyond doubt; but it is as clear that
he holds that
c-

mdif f erence

is sufficient for divine freedom.

This can be

shown if we consider that Descartes
holds that divine
freedom is simply a complete lack of
determination with
respect to God's will. 34 This can happen
only if God is cindifferent.
But, moreover, if God is c-indif ferent
there
is a complete lack of determination
of God's will;
,

that is,

there will be

no.

reason for God's willing things. Hence, c-

indifference is necessary and sufficient for divine
freedom.
We may now turn to why Descartes holds that
God is c-

indif ferent.

Remember that Descartes thinks that the

eternal truths are freely created by God. Descartes
believes
that God's free creation of the eternal truths
requires that

God's choice not be determined or impelled in any way
by

anything independent of God's will.
inquiry, Descartes states:

create these

[eternal]

Concerning Mersenne

'

"you ask what necessitated God to

truths; and

I

reply that he was free

to make it not true that all the radii of the circle are

equal
(AT

I

-

just as freed as he was not to create the world."

152 CSMK 25)
;

Descartes states two important ideas in

this passage: First, that God was not necessitated to create
the eternal truths,

creation.

i.e.,

he was free with respect to their

Second, he implicitly explains that this freedom

involves the ability to have done otherwise.
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This is clear

from the fact that Descartes thinks
that God could have
willed both of the following:
That it is false that all the radii
of the circle
are equal
R:

W.

But,

That it is false that the world exists.

as we know,

God did not will either of these

propositions to be true; in fact, the radii
of the circle
are equal, and the world does exist.
Because Descartes
believes that the truth of any proposition
depends on God's
will,

he holds that the truth of the
propositions that ail

hh e radii of the
,

c i rcle

are equal and that the world

though differing in modal status, are equally
the result of
God's will.
So,
given that this is true, and that

Descartes believes that God could have willed R and

W,

Descartes holds that God's freedom requires the power
to
have done other than he has in fact done.
That is,

God's

freedom requires something like the positive power of sindif f erence
GF:

Thus,

.

God is free with respect to a case of willing only
if he could have refrained from willing and he
could have willed something else.

In this respect,

Descartes is in agreement with the authors

of the Sixth Objections

(AT III 360))

.

However, Descartes

believes that an omniscient and perfect being could not have
the power to do otherwise unless some particular condition
is satisfied.

I

will return to this shortly.
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Remember that

I

previously listed some necessary and

sufficient conditions for being c- indifferent

.

I

left out

one condition:
(iv)

There is nothing present to A's intellect
prior to
A's willing.

As we have seen in our discussion of
DDS

,

there is nothing

true prior to God's will which could serve
as a reason for
divine willing.
The reason I previously omitted (iv) is
that in that context we were concerned only
with human

freedom,

and Descartes holds that humans cannot possibly

satisfy condition (iv). As he states:

"As for man,

since he

finds that the nature of all goodness and truth is
already

determined by God. and his will cannot tend towards
anything
else,

it is evident that he will embrace what is good
and

true all the more willingly, and hence more freely,

proportion as he sees it more clearly."

in

(AT VII 432)

Clearly, however, Descartes must believe that God

satisfies

(iv)

;

after all, as we've seen, Descartes holds

that God is c- indifferent
c

,

but he cannot be

indifferent in virtue of satisfying

(i)

or

(ii)

or (iii)

because they are indications not only of human privation but
also of divine imperfection.
to hold that God satisfies

Moreover, Descartes is forced

(iv)

because Descartes is

committed to GF and to the following:
(v)

God can have the power to will otherwise only if
God is c-indif ferent
(that is, only if nothing
impels his will)
.

Because God could not refrain from willing what is true if
truths were present to his intellect prior to his will, he
94

must be c-indifferent if

mdif ferent

(GP)

is true; and he can only be
c-

in virtue of satifying

(iv)

.

But,

we know that

Descartes believes that
God has the ability to will otherwise.

(vi)

Therefore
(

vii

So,

God is c-indifferent.

)

we have seen that humans would require
a privation

to be c-indifferent. But God would not
be free with respect
to creation unless he were c-indifferent.

isn

Moreover,

it

clear that S-indif f erence is required for human

t

freedom,

and it certainly isn't the case that human
S-

indifference requires human C- indifference
I

have shown that Descartes cannot allow c- indifference

to be required for human freedom; that Descartes
is

committed to divine freedom requiring c- indifference
that there is no inconsistency involved with
(c)

(a)

,

and

;

(b)

,

and

.

Divine Freedom and the Eternal Truths

Although there is clearly an important relationship
between the eternal truths and divine freedom, there are

only a few texts in which Descartes discusses this
relationship.

This,

however, should not bother us, given

the scarcity of texts in which Descartes discusses either

the eternal truths or divine freedom and the scarcity of

texts in which Descartes explains why he holds the Creation

Doctrine.

In every text in which Descartes discusses the
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reasons why he holds the Creation Doctrine,
he mentions,
either implicitly or explictly, the issue
of divine freedom.
So,

relatively speaking, Descartes discusses the

relationship between the eternal truths and
divine freedom
quite frequently.
The texts in which Descartes presents his
most

sustained discussion (although not nearly as
sustained as
one would like) of divine freedom as a reason
for
the

Creation Doctrine are found in the Sixth Replies and
the
May 1644 letter to Mesland. In each of these texts,

2

Descartes presents an argument, albeit an argument
grossly
lacking sufficient detail, that his account of divine
freedom requires that the Creation Doctrine be true. Because
I

am confining myself to exegetical history of philosophy,

I

will not be concerned with the soundness of Descartes'
arguments, but only in presenting his arguments as

accurately as possible.

There will, of course, be those who

think that Descartes' arguments are unsound.

I

invite them

to take up the matter with Descartes.
I

will begin by presenting the relevant texts.

I

will

then extract Descartes' arguments, supplementing them when

necessary with premises Descartes provides elsewhere.
Finally,

I

will present Descartes' implicit justification of

the more controversial premises.
It is

interesting to note that Descartes actually

provides two arguments for the Creation Doctrine based on
divine freedom. One, found in both the Sixth Replies and the
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May 1644 letter to Mesland, argues for
the Creation
Doctrine pure l y on the basis of divine freedom.
2

Another,

which

will now briefly discuss before moving to
the other
argument, depends also on considertat ion of DDS
Descartes
states
I

.

is self -contradictory to suppose that the
will of
God was not indifferent from eternity ... because
[quia]
it is impossible to imagine that anything
is
thought of in the divine intellect as good or true
prior to the decision of the divine will to make
it so
(AT VII 431-32; CSM II 291)
It

In this passage,

Descartes is arguing that God is

indifferent because he is simple.

We would not be wrong

then in supposing that DDS is the more fundamental

explanation of the Creation Doctrine for Descartes. Because,
as we have seen in the previous chapter,

there can be

nothing in the divine intellect which is not also an object
of the divine will

(in virtue of their identity)

,

there can

be nothing in the divine intellect prior to the divine will.

But if there can be nothing in the divine intellect prior to
the divine will,

what he wills.

there can be no reason for God's willing
Thus,

God is c- indifferent with respect to

everything in virtue of satisfying condition

(i)

of Cl. And

if God is c-indif ferent with respect to everything,

is free with respect to everything.

then he

But the eternal truths

are something. So, God is free with respect to them.

Therefore,

if there are eternal truths,

willed by God.

Therefore,

they are freely

if God is simple and free,

eternal truths are freely created.
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the

The previous argument rests heavily
on DDS as well as
divine freedom.
Descartes' second, and more interesting

argument is based purely on divine freedom.

In fact,

this argument Descartes disregards DDS
altogether.

in

He seems

to be arguing against a hypothetical
opponent who objects to

Descartes' heavy reliance on DDS. So, Descartes,

in order to

defeat even this opponent will argue that even
if, per

mposs i b il e

-i

,

God were not simple and there were truths
in

the divine intellect prior to the divine will,
God would not
be free. Hence the moderate position earlier
attributed to

Aquinas and Leibniz, cannot achieve

conception of God's freedom.

a

truly worthy

Let us now turn to Descartes'

words on the subject:
If anyone will attend to the immeasurable greatness
of
God he will find it manifestly clear that there can be
nothing whatsoever which does not depend on him. This
applies not just to everything that subsists, but to
all order, every law, and every foundation of
something's being true and good.
If this were not so,
then. .God would not have been completely indifferent'
with respect to the creation of what he did in fact
create.
If some reason for something's being good had
existed prior to his preordination, this would have
determined God to prefer those things it was best to
do. (AT VII 435; CSM II 293-94, emphas is mine) 36
.

In this passage,

Descartes begins with a reiteratat ion

of the Dependence Thesis: Everything depends on God.

Notice

that Descartes does not mention DDS in this context even

though he could in order to establish once again the

dependence of the eternal truths on God's will without
reference to divine freedom.

Descartes wishes to show that

even ignoring DDS, divine freedom entails the Creation

Doctrine
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After stating the Dependence Thesis,
Descartes presents
a bsduct. i o—ad

absurdnm in which the contradiction is

generated by a hypothetical denial of the
Dependence Thesis
("If b h i s (i.e., the Dependence Thesis)
were not so...").
Descartes argues that God would not have been
indifferent
(

c

-

indifferent

his will.

)

if there could be something independent
of

Moreover,

if God were not c- indifferent

,

then his

will would have been determined to will particular
things.
But if God would have been determined to will
particular
things, his will would not have been free.

free," as Descartes states elsewhere.
Hence,

(AT

"But his will is
I

146;

CSMK 23)

the hypothetical denial of the Dependence Thesis is

false. Therefore,

the Dependence Thesis is true.

But if the

Dependence Thesis is true and God's will is free, then the
Free Creation Thesis

created by God)
I

(i.e.

the eternal truths are freely

is true.

realize that a step in this argument requires some

justification.

37

The controversial premise is the following:

If God were not c-indif f erent
have been determined.

,

then his will would

Descartes does not provide any justification for this
premise, but we can speculate about why he believed it was
true. Why would God be determined to will exactly those

things that were true or good prior to his will if there
were such things?

Presumably, God could not fail to know

which things were true or good prior to his will in virtue
of his omniscience.

Presumably, God could not fail to will

those things which are true or good in virtue of his
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veracity and goodness

38
.

Therefore,

if there were eternal

truths prior to God's will, God would have
been determined
to will those truths.
He would not have had the ability
to
will otherwise with respect to those truths.
We have seen in this chapter and the
previous chapter

exactly why Descartes holds the Creation Doctrine
and
rejects the moderate alternative account. The
Creation
Doctrine rests on two important and widely-held
theological
assumptions: God is simple, and God's will is free.
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CHAPTER

4

THE CREATION DOCTRINE AND MODALITY

Introduction
Because the Creation Doctrine is a thesis
concerning
the eternal truths,

and the eternal truths are so-called

’necessary truths', we would expect the Creation
Doctrine to
have implications for the modal status of propositions.
This aspect of the Creation Doctrine has received much

scholarly attention. For instance, some philosophers have
taken Creation Doctrine to involve
any necessay truths at all.

1

a

denial that there are

Others have taken a more

moderate approach to the implications of the Creation
Doctrine for modality: There are necessary truths, but they
are only contingently necessary,

i.e.,

they are not

necessarily necessary. 2
In this chapter,

I

will make a start toward an adequate

and sympathetic understanding of the Creation Doctrine's

consequences for modality.

In particular,

I

will show how

the following claims, both of which were held by Descartes,
are not inconsistent with one another:
(1)

The eternal truths are freely created by God.

(2)

The eternal truths are genuinely necessary.

As we have already seen in earlier chapters, Descartes'

acceptance of
a

(1)

is uncontroversial

;

in fact,

it is merely

concise statement of essence of the Creation Doctrine.

However, his commitment to

(2)
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is more controversial.

I

believe the controversy surrounding
because Descartes' acceptance of
That is,

(

1

(2)

)

arises precisely

is so uncontroversial

some have thought that his acceptance of

eliminates any possibility of accepting

(2)

(l)

will show

I

that this view is mistaken.
First,

necessary'

,

a

comment on

I

intend to make a stronger claim than some

(2)

is in order.

By 'genuinely

scholars who hold that Descartes' eternal truths are

necessary only in the sense that they are merely ca
necessary'

,

1

1

pH

are only contingently necessary, or are only

necessary in the sense that we cannot conceive otherwise.
I

3

mean to make the claim that, for Descartes, modality is

a

mind- independent and objective feature of the world, rather

than merely a feature of our minds.
In the first section,

I

will discuss two prominent

interpretations of the Creation Doctrine and its
consequences for modality: Universal Possibilism
Limited Possibilism

[LP]

4
.

[UP]

and

Both UP and LP have the same

noble motivation: Both try to understand the modal

consequences of a particular statement Descartes makes in
the

2

May 1644 letter to Mesland:

"God cannot have been

determined to make it true that contradictories cannot be
true together, and therefore that he coni

opposite."

(AT IV 118;

have done the

CSMK 235, emphasis mine)

5

UP and LP

are attempts to understand the sense in which God could have

willed that an eternal truth be false and the implications
this 'could' has for the modal status of propositions.
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This

IS not an easy task;

in fact,

Janet Broughton has stated

that "there is no good sense we can make
of this 'could';" 6

Harry Frankfurt has stated "What is troublesome

[is]

understanding the 'could';" 7 and Lilli Alanen
has stated
"How the

'could'

have willed or done otherwise should be

accounted for is not very clear."

8

Although both UP and LP

make strong attempts to understand the implications
of the
'could',

I

reject both on the same ground: Other problems

aside, both UP and LP presuppose something explicitly

disallowed by the Creation Doctrine.

Hence they cannot be

correct interpretations of Descartes.
section,

I

In the second

show this by contrasting the Creation Doctrine

with Leibniz's account of the eternal truths.
section,

I

a sense in

truth

P,

In the third

will present an interpretation in which there is

which it is true to say that for any eternal

God could have willed not-P but not to say that

not-P is possible.

By doing this, we will see that

Descartes' acceptance of

acceptance of

(2)

So,

(1)

is not inconsistent with his

my argument in this chapter will

have the relatively weak conclusion that

inconsistent.

In the fourth section,

I

(1)

and

(2)

are not

will show how my

interpretation preserves Descartes' idea that conceivability
is a reliable guide to modality,

at least in the case of

clear and distinct perceptions. In the next chapter,
make the positive case for Descartes acceptance of
(

2

)

.
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I

(1)

will
and

Universal Pos sibil ism
The first interpretation

will examine states that

I

Descartes is committed to UP.

will refer to those who

(I

attribute UP to Descartes as 'UPers'.)

controversial

proposition

(to say the least)

P,

it

is

UP is the strong and

thesis that for any

possible that

P

.

Essentially, UP is a

denial that there are any necessary
truths at all.
UP is correctly (but with qualifications)
called 'the
standard interpretation' by Curley
Although Descartes
scholars are apprehensive about attributing
UP to Descartes,
those with less familiarity with Descartes
take UP to be
9

.

uncont rovers ially true.

That is,

it is not uncommon find

non-specialists attributing UP to Descartes

10
.

Nevertheless, there have been only a few Descartes
scholars
who have been willing to attribute UP to Descartes 11
.

The most prominent UPer is Harry Frankfurt

seminal article,

.

In his

"Descartes on the Creation of the Eternal

Truths," Frankfurt argues that Descartes held that
the

eternal truths are "inherently as contingent as any other

propositions."

His reasoning is based on the important

and troublesome passage from the
Me si and quoted earlier that

opposite."

"

2

[God]

May 1644 letter to
could have done the

Moreover, in the 27 May 1630 letter to Mersenne,

Descartes states that God "was free to make it not true that
all the radii of the circle are equal."

(AT

I

152; CSMK 25)

From these passages it seems that Descartes thinks that

necessary condition of

(1)

is

(3)
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:

a

(3)

For a ny eternal truth
that not-P is true.

God could have willed

P,

And because the "assertion that some
state of affairs can be
brought about ordinarily entails that that
state of affairs
is logically possible," 11 Frankfurt thinks
that (3)
(ordinarily)
(4)

entails

(4)

For any eternal truth

But Frankfurt argues that if
truth,

it is possible that not-

P,

(4)

is true,

then an eternal

despite all appearances and our inability to conceive

of things otherwise,

is not a necessary truth.

We can

generalize this result, and we get the UP thesis: For any
p roposi t ion P it is possible that P

reasoning as follows.
truths such that
U1
U2

.

.

.

We may spell out the

Take P as representative of eternal

P is a

necessary truth if anything is.

God could have willed that not-P is true. (3)
If God could have willed that not-P is true, then
it is possible that God wills that not-P is'
true 14
It is possible that God wills that not-P is true,
(from U1 and U2)
If it is possible that God wills that not-P is
true, then it is possible that not-P is true.
Therefore, it is possible that not-P is true.
(from U3 and U4
.

U3

.

U4

.

U5

.

Curley recaps the reasoning behind UP: "Take any
contradiction you like, God could have made it true.
is could have been.

Hence,

Hence,

it is possible,

even if false.

anything is possible, there are no necessary

truths." 15

Thus,

if Descartes really holds UP,

cannot consistently hold both

(1)
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and

(2)

Hence

then he

Epistemic Necessity
Despite this interpretation, which commits
Descartes to
UP, Frankfurt does recognize that
Descartes at least makes a
distinction between truths such as (i) it is m pn...^hi 0 e„
i

bhe same th i ng to bp and not to be at thp samp

truths such as
seen,

(ii)

^have

body

a

r

Mmp

However, as we have

if Frankfurt is correct and Descartes'

Creation

Doctrine entails UP, then the distinction between

(n) cannot be one of genuine modality; that
true,

then both

xea l y necessar

(i)

i 1

,

and

y true

is,

(i)

and

if UP is

may be true, but neither is

(ii)
.

and

According to Frankfurt

,

the

eternal truths are merely those truths whose negation
we
cannot conceive.

This is what distinguishes what we take

to be the modal status of

(i)

and

(ii)

.

The necessity of the

eternal truths, for Frankfurt's Descartes, is simply a

characteristic of our finite minds and their inability to
fully understand God's infinite power.

As Frankfurt states:

[T] his inability to conceive the truth of a
contradiction is, Descartes suggests, merely a
contingent characteristic of our finite minds... That
our minds cannot conceive such things signifies nothing
beyond itself, however, except that God has freely
chosen to create us like that.

The inconceivability of [an eternal truth's] falsity,
which we demonstrate by the use of innate principles of
reason, is not inherent in them. It is properly to be
understood only as relative to the character of our
minds... So we cannot presume that what we determine to
be logically necessary coincides with the ultimate
conditions of reality or of truth. 17

no

Frankfurt supports this view with alleged
textual evidence
from Descartes- 29 July 1648 letter to
Arnauld, in which
Descartes states
But I do not think that we should ever say
of anything
that it cannot be brought about by God.
For since
every basis of truth and goodness depends on
his
omnipotence, I would not dare to say that God
cannot
make a mountain without a valley, or bring it
about
that 1 and 2 are not 3. I merely say that he
has given
me such a mind that I cannot conceive a mountain
without a valley, or a sum of 1 and 2 which is not
such things involve a contradiction in my conception3;
(AT V 224; CSMK 358-9)

Further alleged evidence for an epistemic or conceptualist
account of modality is found in the Sixth Replies:
Again, there is no need to ask how God could have
brought it about from eternity that it was not true
that twice four make eight, and so on; for I admit
this is unintelligible to us
I also understand that
it would have
been easy for God to ordain certain
things such that we men cannot understand the
possibility of their being otherwise than they are
(AT
VII 436; CSM II 294)
.

.

.

And even in the 15 April 1630 letter to Mersenne, which
contains Descartes' first words on the subject of the

Creation Doctrine, he states:

"In general we can assert that

God can do everything that is within our grasp but not that
he cannot do what is beyond our grasp.

It

would be rash to

think that our imagination reaches as far as his power."
I

146;

(AT

CSMK 23)

All of this, Frankfurt takes it, supports the idea that

what we call -necessary-

is simply what we cannot conceive

to be otherwise; but this inability to conceive its falsity

has no bearing on genuine modality, on what,

really possible.

m

in fact,

is

Several years after Frankfurt'

s

paper was published,

Alvin Plant inga loaned his support to the
idea that the
Creation Doctrine entails UP. Although he
suggests that
Descartes wasn't clear about whether the Creation
Doctrine
entails UP or 'limited possibilism' (which will
be examined
shortly)

Plantinga holds that "there is good reason to

,

think... that

[Descartes]

was prepared to bite the bullet and

accept the consequence that there are no necessary
truths." 18

Plantinga also cites the 27 May 1630 letter to

Mersenne, the

2

May 1644 letter to Mesland, and the Sixth

Replies as evidence in favor of UP.

Unlike Frankfurt who

holds that it is primarily God's omnipotence which
requires
UP to be true,

Plantinga believes that considerations of

God's a se i ty entails UP:

"[Descartes] believes that God is

the sovereign on whom everything depends,

including the

eternal truths." 19

Plantinga also supports Frankfurt's view that the
reason why we call so-called eternal truths 'necessary
truths'

is due to a limitation in our powers of conception

and not to anything inherent in the proposition.
We are so constructed, by God, that we cannot
entertain [the proposition that God has created
Descartes, but Desc a rte s has not been created or hold
it before our minds without thinking it quite
impossible - not just false but impossible. The fact
is, however, that it is not impossible; and if we want
to know the truth here, we should not hold it before
our minds... To paraphrase Raskolnikov, if God does not
exist everything is possible; according to Descartes,
the same holds if God does exist. 20
]

This epistemic necessity is required simply to reconcile the

Creation Doctrine (when considered as entailing UP) with the
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fact that there are propositions
which we cannot help but
think are necessary or impossible.

What is clear is that UP in conjunction
with merely
epistemic necessity would entail, as
Frankfurt thinks it
does,

that the genuine range of possibilities
is

inaccessible to us and that our judgments of
necessity and
impossibility are, strictly speaking, false.
Take,

for

instance, N1
N1

It

:

N 1 is fa lse,

is necessary that

7+

if it is understood,

inclined to understand it, as Nl*
Nl*

9=4

as we would normally be
:

xt is not possible that 2 + 2=4 is false,
(where the
modality in question is taken to be a mindindependent feature of the world)

:

However, UPers who employ the notion of epistemic
necessity
to explain the difference between eternal truths
such and

contingent' truths would hold that Nl is true when prnpprl

understood as Nl**:
Nl**: One cannot conceive that 2+?=4 is false.
In a recent paper,

Johnathan Bennett has gone even

farther and argued that for Descartes all t-herp

moda li ty

is

conceivab il

i

ty
.

21

-i.q

t-o

That is, he argues that the

.

Creation Doctrine provides the following conceptualist
analyses

(CAM)

CAM1

:

CAM2

:

of the metaphysical modalities:

P is

possible

P is

necessary

not -P

And so on.

23

a human can conceive that P

= df

= df

no human can conceive that

.

Bennett's account differs from UPers like

Frankfurt and Plantinga in so far as Bennett's Descartes
113

22
.

does not hold that there is an asymmetry
between genuine
possibility (i.e., what God could do) and
conceivability
nor does he hold that the former is
somehow inaccessible to
our finite minds.
Bennett states that "what we can conceive
provides all the content we are entitled to
give to our
modal statements," and "our modal concepts
should be
;

understood or analyzed in terms of what does or
does not lie
within the compass of our ways of thinking;" 24
and more
bluntly: "He made it necessarily true that 2+2=4
by making
us unable to to conceive otherwise." 25 Bennett's
primary
textual evidence for his conceptualist interpretation
of

Descartes comes from the Second Replies:
If by
possible' you mean what everyone commonly means,
namely whatever does not conflict with our human
concepts, then it is manifest that the nature of God,
as I have described it, is possible in this
sense.
Alternatively, you may well be imagining
[f ung i t i s
some other
kind of possibility which
relates to the object itself; but unless this
matches the first sort of possibility it can never be
known by the human intellect, and so it... will
undermine the whole of human knowledge. (AT VII ISO151; CSM II 107)
.

.

"6

]

So,

Bennett's conceptualism differs from Frankfurt and

Plant inga

'

s

UP-plus- epistemic-necessity-approach in that

the former holds that there is some sort of necessity in the

eternal truths albeit only a conceptual necessity based on
our limitation of conception; the latter holds that there is

genuine modality (i.e., everything is possible), but we call
certain propositions

-

eternal truths

-

'necessary' because

our finite minds cannot conceive the possibility of their

being otherwise.
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As

I

will later argue,

the textual evidence for

Bennett's CAM from the Second Replies is
consistent with the
falsity of CAM. All Descartes states is
that our conceptual
capacities had better 'match up' with or be a
reliable
indicator of 'possibility which relates to the
object
itself.'
This should come as no surprise to anyone
with any
familiarity with Descartes. God would be a deceiver
if he

were to create our minds in such a way that
our (clear and
distinct) perceptions of necessity and possibility
did not

provide accurate representations of the truth.

But this

does not entail or even make probable the conceptual

analysis.

Analogously, we would be reasoning fallaciously

if we took the fact that a good workman can make
a

thermometer accurately represent the temperature to entail
that the reading of the thermometer

i

the temperature

I

.

return to this in section IV.

Problems with Universal Possibilism
There are several problems with UP as an interpretation
of Descartes'

Creation Doctrine, not the least of which is

the fact that Descartes does hold

For instance,

(2)

in the

Fifth Meditation discussion of true and immutable essences,

Descartes holds that there are propositions about triangles
and God which are necessarily true and which are "not

invented by me or dependent on my mind."
45;

cf

.

AT VII 65- 69; CSM II 45-48)

27

(AT VII 64;

Moreover,

May 1644 letter to Mesland, Descartes writes:
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CSM II

in the

2

"even though

encore qne

[.

]

necessary..."

God has willed that some truths should
be
(AT IV 118;

28

CSMK 235)

And in The Wn.lH

written a decade before the Meditations and
roughly around
the time of the Creation Doctrine letters
to
Mersenne,

Descartes characterizes the laws of nature as
truths such
that "if God had created many worlds, they
would be

as true

in each of them as in this one."

D i scourse on Method

,

(AT XI 47;

he reiterates this:

CSM

97)

I

in the

tried to

"I

demonstrate all those laws about which we could have
any
doubt,

and to show that they are such that, even if God

created many worlds, there could not be any in which
they
failed to be observed."

(AT VI 43;

CSM

I

132)

29

Moreover,

Curley points out that the necessity of the laws of nature
is required by Descartes'

a priori

physics,-

30

and Van den

Brink is quick to remind us that "the initial reason

Descartes gave for [the creation doctrine, in the first
letter of 1630 to Mersenne] was precisely that it formed the

foundation of his physics." 31
Furthermore, Curley points out that systems t

i

r

considerations alone are sufficient to show at least that
Descartes ought not to have held UP.

By systematic

considerations, Curley has in mind constraints on the

interpretation of Descartes' Creation Doctrine imposed by
virtue of the fact that certain fundamental views are
essential to Descartes' philosophical project.

Among the

systematic reasons against UP, Curley lists the following:
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II

P Probl em

1

:

Even if he is commited to the view
that

all of the essences of creatures and
the eternal truths

concerning such essences are contingent,
Descartes never
entertains, nor would he entertain the
idea that
the

propositions b hat God exists and God is pnwprfni
are
possibly false. 32
UP Prob l em

2

:

I

have already alluded to the fact that

Descartes' version of the ontological argument
requires the
existence of true and immutable essences that
included

properties that
or not."

and

I

"I

now clearly recognize whether

(AT VII 64;

agree,

CSM II 45)

I

want to

Curley takes this to imply,

that Descartes thought that the necessity
found

in the propositions concerning true and immutable
essences
is something that

vice versa;
[God]

itself upon our minds and not

and among them is that "it is necessary that

has existed from eternity and will abide for eternity.

(AT VII 68;

CSM II 47)

UP Prob l em—3.:
rule'

'forces'

(i.e.,

If UP is true,

that everything

perceive is true) is false.

I

then Descartes'

'truth

clearly and distinctly

The reason for this is that

Descartes believes that not only do we sometimes clearly and

distinctly perceive the truth of a certain proposition, but
sometimes we clearly and distinctly perceive the necessary
or possible truth of a proposition.

34

So,

Descartes holds

the following:
(A)

I clearly and distinctly perceive that
it
a
necessary that a tr i ang l e 's t hree angles equal two
right angles.
-i
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and,

by the truth rule,
(B)

It is

equal

necessary that a triangle's
ri ght angles

—two

But if UP is true,
(C)

It

then

is true,

(C)

true,

two right ^ngiPQ

then

(B)

is false;

the entailment from

entailment from

(A)

of the truth rule.

true.

is true:

(C)

is possible th at a tr i ang le's three analog Ho

not equal
If

entails

(A)

to

(A)

(B)

is false.

(A)

is

But the

is simply a substitution instance

(B)

Thus,

to

and granting that

the truth rule is false,

This should trouble any UPer.

if UP is

After all, the truth

rule is the crucial epistemic principle in the Medi
a work that is primarily epistemological.

If the Creation

Doctrine jeopardizes Descartes' truth rule, we must either
reject the truth rule

(at

too great a cost to Descartes)

reject the Creation Doctrine

Descartes clearly held it)

,

(which we cannot do because

or reject UP as an

interpretation of the Creation Doctrine.

I,

of course,

believe that the last choice is the correct one.
rejected,

UP must be

if not for the systematic reasons Curley states,

for the reason that it does not make sense internal
IIP

Problem

4:

35

1

The truth rule would be rendered

useless. Descartes actively employs our powers of conception

and their relation to possibility in his Sixth Meditation

argument for the real distinction between mind and body:
I know that everything which I clearly and distinctly
understand is capable of being created by God so as to
correspond exactly with my understanding of it...[0]n
the one hand I have a clear and distinct idea of
myself in so far as I am simply a thinking, non-extended
thing; and on the other hand I have a distinct idea of

118

bod y in so far as this is simply an extended,
hinking thing. And accordingly, it is certain nonthat I
am really distinct from my body and can
exist without
36
it. (AT VII 7 8 CSM II 54)
,

;

From a clear and distinct perception of
P is

P,

we can infer that

possible; that is, we have a clear and distinct

perception of our mind existing apart from body, and
so we
know that there is a real distinction between them.
This

argument is merely an application of the important truth
rule previously discussed.
out,

But,

as Bennett correctly points

Descartes would be seriously understating his position

in the real distinction argument if he in fact held UP.

37

There would be no need for the truth rule in this argument
if UP is true because,

only what

then not

clearly and distinctly perceive is possible, but

I

also whatever
possible.

if everything is possible,

I

perceive confusedly and obscurely is

We can formulate this objection as follows:

(a)

If Descartes held UP, then the real distinction
argument does not require the truth rule.

(b)

The real distinction argument does require the
truth rule.

(c)

Therefore,
UP.

38

it is not the case that Descartes held

We can see that this objection can be formulated using any
of Descartes'

important arguments that rely on the truth

rule
Thus,

there is a reason why Van den Brink calls UP 'the

extreme reading' of Descartes' Creation Doctrine.
a

If UP is

correct interpretation of the Creation Doctrine, then it

is a disaster for the cogito,

the truth rule,
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a

priori

physics,

the ontological argument,

the argument for the real

distmtion of mind and body, and even the argument
that God
is not a deceiver

(after all, God would be a deceiver if
he

has given us minds that are not reliable
indicators of modal
truth even when we clearly and distinctly
understand

something to be necessary or impossible.)

39

in other words,

almost every positive step made in the Meditations
is

undermined by the Creation Doctrine if it entails
UP.
all these reasons,

For

and another to be discussed shortly, we

should reject UP unless we are absolutely forced to
it.

Limited Possibilism
The second interpretation of Descartes' Creation

Doctrine and its implications for modality, which attributes
limited possibilism'
attempt to understand

consistently hold

(1)

[LP]
(3)

and

to Descartes,

is primarily an

in such a way that Descartes can
(2)

That is,

it acknowledges

that Descartes held that the eternal truths are necessary

even though they are freely created by God. 40

The LP thesis

is the relatively weaker thesis that for any prnposi

—

-Lt

s

poss i b l e—Lhat—E is possible

.

LPers,

1

i

nn P

such as Peter

Geach 41 and Edwin Curley, 42 attribute LP to Descartes

primarily on the basis of the following important passage
from the

2

May 1644 letter to Mesland:

[T] he power of God cannot have any limits, and... our
mind is finite and so created as to be able to conceive
as possible the things which God has wished to be in
fact possible, but not be able to conceive as possible
things which God could have made possible, but which he
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nevertheless wished to make impossible ...
though [en core qne God has willed that And even
some truths
be nece ssary, this does not mean
that he willed
em necessarily; for it is one thing
to will that thev
be necessary, and quite another to
will this
necessarily, or to be necessitated to will
it
(at tv
IV
118- 119; CSMK 235)
]

LPers take Descartes to be making an
important scope

distinction here between LP1 and LP2

LP2
LP1,

:

God wills that necessarily 2+2=4

:

Necessarily, God wills that 2+2=4

according to Curley (and presumably, Geach)

,

is true,

as is stated in the letter to Mesland
quoted above.

However, LP2 is false, as the same passage and our
earlier

discussion of divine freedom indicates.

We have seen that

avoidance of any determination of God's will is one of
the

primary motivations for the Creation Doctrine;

so,

clearly

Descartes cannot hold LP2
LPers take the passage from the Mesland letter to show
that Descartes' eternal truths are necessary, but they are
onl Y cont i ngent 1 y necessary because it is not necessary that
.

God will them.

As Geach states:

[the eternal truths] are necessary in our world, and in
giving us our mental endowments God gave us the right
sort of clear and distinct ideas to see the necessity.
But though they are necessary, they are not
necessarily necessary; God could have freely chosen to
make a different sort of world, in which other things
would have been necessary truths. 43
So,

LP is not,

like UP,

necessary truths; it is

a denial that there are any
a

denial that the necessary eternal

truths are necessarily necessary
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.

This is the most

significant advantage of LP over UP.

LP interprets

entailing the relatively more congenial
(4*)

For any eternal truth
is possible.

(3)

as

(4*)

it is possible that not-P

P,

although LPers hold that the eternal truths
are not
necessarily necessary, they do hold that they
are necessary.
So,

Thus,

if Descartes'

Creation Doctrine entails only LP, then

he can consistently hold both

states,

(1)

and

As Curley

(2)

"Descartes wants to allow that there are some

propositions which are in fact impossible, but which
might
have been possible, and that others are in fact
necessary,
but might, nevertheless, not have been necessary," 44
and
is consistent with holding that there are some

[TP]

necessary truths, whereas

denies this." 45

[UP]

Although Geach was the first to suggest that Descartes'
Creation Doctrine involves LP

Curley is responsible for the

,

development of the idea and he has formulated an argument to
show that Descartes is an LPer.

Curley wishes to show how

even a contingent act of willing can have a necessary truth
as its object.

wills that _',

Let
'a'

'W'

and

denote the two-place relation
'

p
'

are variables ranging over

agents and propositions respectively, and

referring to God.

C2

.

C3

.

C4

.

Vp

(p

<-»

0~Wap)

Wgp)
assumption

P

p —

'

g
'

is a constant

Curley's argument is as follows:

VaVp (Wap —

Cl

WgDp

'

from C2
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C5

.

C6

.

C?

'

WgDp

->

O'Wgdp

from Cl

O WgDp

from C3

O Dp

.

C9.

C4

,

C5

from principle that
->

C8

,

Vp (Dp —» 0~Dp)

Vp ~DOp

(p -> q )^

(

o~q

O-p)

from C3-C7

(or equivalently,

Vp OOp)

Cl is the crucial premise in this argument.

fromcs.

It simply

states a pxi ma facie commonsense view that in
any genuinely

contingent act of willing it is possible that the
agent
refrains from willing what they in fact willed. And
C2 is
simply a statement of God's omnipotence. The rest
of the

argument basically follows from those two premises.

Curley

took this to show that even in the realm of contingent
acts
of will,

necessary truths may be the objects of those acts.

But their necessity is only contingent precisely because
of
the contingency of what God in fact wills.

Before

I

examine the problems that plague LP as an

interpretation of Descartes' Creation Doctrine, it is
interesting to note, as both Plantinga and Curley do, that
LP is independently more plausible than UP as a general

thesis about modality regardless of whether it is correct as
an interpretation of Descartes.

modal logic in which
actual world

@,

(

P &

There are some systems of

00~P) can

be true.

Take the

and two other possible worlds wl and w2

systems in which there is some limitation on the

123

.

In

accessibility relation among worlds, Dp is
true iff
true at all worlds accessible to

Suppose that Dp is true at
are accessible to @.

@,

@,

p is

the actual world.

but that only wl and itself

This means that P is true at @ and wl

But suppose that w2 is accessible to wl but
not to @.
is true at w2

,

if ~p

then 0~P is true at wl; and because <X>~P

simply means that there is some world accessible
to @ in

which 0~P is true and wl is accessible to
at @ even though

DP

is also true at @.

accessibility relation is intran si five
both be true; that is, in systems like
will work.

6

But as Curley notes,

@,

So,

,

00~P

is true

as long as the

(dp & OO'P) can
K,

D,

T,

and B it

attributing this type of

reasoning to Descartes would be ridiculous and
anachronistic. Descartes did not have our notion of possible
worlds;

fortiori he did not have the notion of

accessibility relations.

But simply taken on its own LP has

the advantage of relative plausibility over UP.

Problems with Limited Possibilism

LP Prob l em
frankly,

1

:

LP seems to place unwarranted and,

absurd constraints on God's power.

quite

It is

reasonable to suppose that Descartes held a Thomistic view
of God's omnipotence,

at least with respect to mere

necessary conditions for omnipotence.
T:

God is omnipotent only if God can bring about any
broadly logically possible state of affairs.
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Evidence that Descartes held T can be
found in

^

ElQctramma qnodH^rry

We should note that even though the
rule 'Whatever we
can conceive of can exist ', is my own,
it is true only
so long as we are dealing with a
conception which is
clear and distinct, a conception which
embraces the
possibility of the thing in question, since
God can
bring about whatever we clearly perceive
to be
possible. (AT VIII 351-352; CSM I 299)

This is reiterated in the 31 December 1640
letter

Mersenne:

to

"[Pjossible existence is contained in everything

which we clearly understand, because from the
fact that we
clearly understand something it follows that it
can be

created by God."

(AT III 274;

CSMK 166)

If God could not

bring about a possible state of affairs, then he
would not
be omnipotent.

This seems to be a very plausible condition

on God's omnipotence.
be omnipotent,

that is,

for his omnipotence.

truth

P.

But if LP is true,

then God would not

if T provides a necessary condition

Here is the reason: Take any eternal

According to LP, it—is not possible that nof-P

although it is p ossible that not-p is possihlp

Without

looking too far beneath the surface, we may see that LP

already places restrictions on God
will that not-P is true.

'

s

power,

i

.

However, prima facie

e

,

,

He cannot

Descartes

does not think that this is an unreasonable contraint, as
the quotation from the letter to More above makes clear.

The implication of LP that there are some necessary eternal

truths makes it the case that God cannot bring about the

negation of

P,

despite his ability to bring about the
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posfi i b i 1

1

t~

,

y of the negation of

p.

So,

an LPer would hold

the following proposition:
LP3:

For any eternal truth P, God could have
made
—l-S—possible that nnt -P true

-iL

t-W

.

And God is omnipotent, so, let's suppose
that He chooses to
will that ih i s poss i b l e t h^f nor-P is true.
So, according
to LP, God can perform the incredibly
difficult task
.

of

willing

a

necessary truth to be possibly false, but (and

here is the rub)

he cannot perform the relatively simple

task of willing a possibly false proposition to
be actually
false.

This, of course, violates T; and it is agreed
on all

hands that T is a weak condition for omnipotence. 47
L P Probl em

2

:

LP also makes the Creation Doctrine

something much weaker than the doctrine Descartes actually
held.

Descartes, as we have seen, held that there are no

limitations on which eternal truths God could have created.
God is responsible not only for the modal status of a

proposition but also for its actual truth value. It is LP

1

s

neglect of this consideration that leads to another
objection.

Recently, James Van Cleve has argued

(successfully, according to Curley 48

)

that from quite

similar reasoning and the idea that not just the modal
status but also the truth of any proposition is willed by
God,

we can show that LP is reducible to UP; hence,

LP is

not a genuine alternative to the extreme and implausible UP.

Van Cleve asks us to consider the following argument, which
is quite similar to Curley's LP Argument with the main
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difference being that Van Cleve substitutes
V2 for Curley's
C2

:

VI

.

V2

.

V3

.

V4

.

V5

.

V6

.

V7

.

V8

.

V9

.

VaVp (Wap —
Vp (Dp 3

0~Wap)

[p ->

Wgp]

)

p
p —

Assumption

Wgp

from C2 and V3

Wgp —> <0~Wgp

from VI

O ~Wgp

from V3-V5

o~p

from V4

Vp (Dp 3 0~p)
Vp ~Dp

,

V6

from V3-V7

(or equivalently,

Vp Op)

from V8

Van Cleve strangely provides a passage from the
letter to Mersenne as textual evidence for V2

eternal truths,

I

:

6

May 1630

"As for the

say once more that they are true or

possible only because he knows them as true or possible
God willing and knowing are a single thing..."

CSMK 24)

(AT

I

... In

149;

Although Descartes would certainly accept V2

this passage does not seem to suggest V2 but rather V2* and
V2 * *

So,

:

—» Wgp)

V2*:

Vp

V2**:

Vp(Op —» WgOp)

(p

the textual evidence for V2 is weak, what's more, V2 is

not necessary for Van Cleve

'

argument.

He can use the more

textually-supported V2* in conjunction with an
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uncontroverial principle stating that Dp
case. Van Cleve

'

s

-> p

in

.

any

argument makes its point: the Creation

Doctrine entails UP if Curley 's Cl is true and
God is the
cause of the truth of any proposition.

The Real Problem with Possibilisms

Unfortunately for LPers, LP

(as an

interpretation of

Descartes's Creation Doctrine), even if it can be
defended
against the problems raised in the previous section,
is
still plagued by the same major problem as UP (as an

interpretation of Descartes' Creation Doctrine)

understand

(3)

to entail the possibi

truths being otherwise.

1

i

:

Both

ty of the eternal

But the thrust of the Creation

Doctrine is that noth i ng is possible prior to God's willing
it to be so.

49

Although Descartes' Creation Doctrine, as we have seen
in Chapter One,

may be seen as a reaction to the late

medieval and early-modern scholastic debate concerning the
eternal truths and whether they are true independently of
God,

50

the real problem with LP and UP can be illustrated

most effectively by contrasting Descartes' Creation Doctrine

with Leibniz's view of the eternal truths and their relation
to God.

Leibniz holds, just as strongly as Descartes, that

the eternal truths and the essences of creatures depend on
God.

In fact,

in section 44 of the Monadologv

f

Leibniz goes

so far as to give an argument for the existence of God based

on the fact that the eternal truths depend on Him.
128

However,

an important point on which they disagree
is the nature of
this dependence.
Both believe in the relatively weak
thesis
that the eternal truths would not be true
if, p Pr
i mpossi hi le God did not exist.
But Leibniz believes that
the eternal truths exist in and depend on
God's
,

understanding but not God's will. 51
God's understanding is the realm of eternal
truths. .without him there would be nothing real
in
possibles, and not only would nothing exist, but
also
nothing would be possible. .However, we should not
imagine, as some do, that since the eternal truths
depend on God, they are arbitrary and depend on
his
will, as Descartes appears to have held
[N] ecessary
truths depend soley on his understanding, and are
its
internal object. 52
.

.

.

And in the Theodicy

,

.

.

he states

One must not say with some Scotists, that the eternal
truths would exist even though there were no
understanding, not even that of God. For it is, in my
judgment, the divine understanding which gives reality
to the eternal truths, albeit God will have no part
therein. (§184)

These very truths can have no existence without an
understanding to take cognizance of them; for they
would not exist if there were no divine understanding
wherein they are realized, so to speak. (§ 189)
As we have seen, Descartes, despite holding that the eternal

truths depend on God, cannot accept that they depend on his

understanding but not his will. The reason, as we have seen,
is that Descartes holds a version of the Doctrine of Divine

Simplicity; and hence the divine understanding and the

divine will are identical though conceptually distinct.,. So,

holding that the eternal truths are the object of God's

understanding but not his will is not an option open to
Descartes
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Furthermore, and more importantly for the
present
discussion, Descartes, unlike Leibniz, does
not allow that

anything is true prior to God's decision to make
it true. 53
Take any eternal truth P willed by God to be
(necessarily)

true.

Descartes thinks that God could have willed not-P
to
be true; that is, he does hold that (3) is
true.
However,
we cannot infer from

that not-P is possible

(3)

,

and here is

A prominent feature (indeed the characteristic

why:

feature)

of the Creation Doctrine is that

^

God wi

1

1

—i_L

s

to be—true

;

a

pmpneiMnn

.

G

and Descartes believes

that this holds equally for modal propositions

propositions with a modal operator)

i

(i.e.,

As he states in the

2

May 1644 letter to Mesland, we can "conceive as possible
the
things which God has wished to be in fact possible,
118;

CSMK 235); and more explicitly in Principles

states:

"

(AT IV

he

§24,

I

"God alone is the true cause of everything which is

or. can be

.

"

(AT VIII 14;

CSM

I

201,

emphasis mine)

God is

the cause of everything that actually or possibly exists and
of everything that is actually or possibly true.

But it is

not the case that God ever willed that it is possible that

QQt-P or that

it

is possible that not-P is possible

.

We

know Descartes believes this because he believed that the
eternal truths are willed to be (necessarily) true from
eternity,
true.

54

i.e.,

So,

there is no time at which they are not

because God never willed that

that not-P or that it

.is

it

is possi bl

possible that not-P is possible

,

those propositions are not true, nor were they ever true. 55
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Thus,

Descartes' Creation Doctrine entails
neither UP nor LP
because to do so would require that there
be true modal

propositions prior to God's creative will;
and that is
clearly not allowed by the Creation Doctrine.

Thus, we must

look for a way to understand

(3)

Creation Doctrine, that is, in

a

within the confines of the
way that doesn't presuppose

possibilities independent of God's will, as Leibniz
does.
We can also now see that Cl in Curley's
LP Argument, VI
in Van Cleve s Argument are false.

These premises may be

'

true only if the domain of the quantifier is
restricted to

finite created agents.
of his p ersonal

Doctrine:
a

But Descartes is explicit about one

motivations concerning the Creation

want people to get used to speaking of God in

"I

manner worthier,

I

think,

than the common and almost

universal way of imagining him as
146;

CSMK 23

56
)

a

finite being."

(AT

I

Although finite agents may require

possibilities in order to have freedom of volition, God,
being infinite and absolutely independent of all things,
does not require this.

Understanding the 'Could' in Terms of Indifference
I

understand that there may be some confusion, and it

is warranted.

After all it is not obvious how we are

supposed to understand

(3)

without presupposing

possibilities, and yet we must have an adequate grasp of the
sense of the 'could' in

Creation Doctrine.

(3)

in order to make sense of the

We usually think that the fact that an
131

agent could have willed a states of affairs
a entails that
there are possible alternatives among which
is a.
that this is ordinarily the case

57
,

I

admit

but we cannot forget

that we are talking about God here; and as we
have already
seen,

divine freedom is different from human freedom
for
Descartes. Descartes states the difference in a
familiar

passage from the Sixth Replies:
As for the freedom of the will, the way in which
it
exists in God is quite different from the way in
which
it exists in us. It is self -contradictory
to suppose
that the will of God was not indifferent from
eternity
with respect to everything which has happened or
will
ever happen; for it is impossible to imagine that
anything is thought of in the divine intellect as good
or true or worthy of belief or action or omission,
prior to the decision of the divine will to make it so.
I am not speaking here of temporal
priority: I mean
that there is not even any priority of order, or
nature, or of 'rationally determined reason' rat nnp
rat i oci nata
as they call it, such that God's idea of
the good i mpe ll ed him to choose one thing rather than
another. For example, God did not will... that the three
angles of a triangle should be equal to two right
angles because he recognized that it could not be
otherwise, and so on. On the contrary,
.it is because
he willed that the three angles of a triangle should
necessarily equal two right angles that this is true
and cannot be otherwise. .Thus, the supreme
indifference to be found in God is the supreme
indication of his omnipotence (AT VII 431-2; CSM II
291, my emphasis)
,

f

-j

]

.

.

.

.

Absolute indifference (i.e., c- indifference
condition of divine freedom.

)

is a necessary

According to Descartes, unless

God was c- indifferent in his willing, he would have been
i mpe ll ed

or determined

(by virtue of his omniscience and

simplicity) to will exactly those things that are true
(and/or good)

58
.

But Descartes thinks that the only way

God's will could be c- indifferent is if there can be nothing
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true prior to his decision to make it
true. Because God, by
his very nature, would know what is
true if there were

anything true independent of his will, his
will would not be
c-indif f erent and hence not (divinely) free.
If we concentrate on the fact that
Descartes'

Creation

Doctrine is not a thesis about modality, as
UPers and LPers
have thought, but rather a thesis about the
dependence
of

the eternal truths on God's independent and
indifferent
will,

we can finally see how to understand

that Descartes can consistently hold

(3)

and

(1)

in such a way

(2)

I

propose

that the following is the way that Descartes
intended

to

(3)

be understood:
(3*)

(3*)

,

For any eternal truth P, it is not the case that
there were any independent factors preventing God
from willing not-P or impelling him to will p.

as we have seen in the previous chapter, will be

trivially true in virtue of the fact that there is nothing
prior to or independent of God's will;

a

fnrHnri

there is

nothing independent of God's will which would prevent or
impel him.
(3*)

has the advantage that it doesn't entail anything

about the possibility (or possible possibility) of not-P.
Thus,

it satisfies the Creation Doctrine constraint that

even possibilities require God's willing them to be so.
this advantage is worthless if

Descartes actually believed.
by strong textual evidence.

Sixth Replies above,

I

(3*)

But

is not something that

Fortunately,

(3*)

is supported

In the long quotation from the

emphasized Descartes' statement that
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God's will cannot be impelled or
determined by something
independent of his will; and it is in this
lack of

determination that God's indifferent freedom
consists.
Evidence for (3*) is also found in the

1630 letters to

Mersenne and the 1644 letter to Mesland,
where Descartes
states that God was not necessitated nor
was he determined
to will what he in fact willed. 59
Even the passages
(incorrectly)

used by Frankfurt to support the UP

interpretation of the Creation Doctrine support
example:

"

[T]

(3*)

.

For

he power of God cannot have any limits...
God

cannot have been determi ned to make it true
that

contradictories cannot be true together..."
235,

(AT IV 118;

CSMK

my emphasis)
It

is also clear that Descartes is concerned
with

i ndependent limits on God's willing.

60

in the Fifth

Replies, Descartes states that God can have limits sel f-

i mposed by his willing certain propositions to be

necessarily true:

"But just as the poets suppose that the

Fates were originally established by Jupiter, but that after

they were established he bound himself to abide by them, so
I

do not think that the essences of things, and the

mathematical truths which we can know concerning them, are
independent of God."

(AT VII

3

80

;

CSM II 261)

Prima

this passage is in stark contrast with what Descartes states
in the 15 April 1630 letter to Mersenne,

and as such it may

appear to some that Descartes is being inconsistent with his
metaphors.

The passage is as follows:
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"Indeed to say that

these

[eternal]

truths are independent of God is to talk
of

him as if he were Jupiter or Saturn and to
subject him to
the Styx and the Fates." (AT I 145; CSMK
23)
In this
passage, Descartes explicitly contrasts the fact
that God is

independent of all things with the fact that the gods
of the
ancients were subject to independent factors.
Descartes
seems to be stating that God is radically dissimilar
from

Jupiter and Saturn.

But what he is actually doing in these

two passages is stating that they are dissimilar in so
far
as the gods of the ancients are constrained by ('subject
to')

things externa

—and

]

independent of them; whereas in the

Fifth Replies passage quoted above, Descartes is stating
that God is similar to Jupiter in that both act in

accordance with self - imposed restrictions.

This is

consistent with God's creation being absolutely indifferent,
and with the Creation Doctrine.
In addition to the textual evidence for

the

(3*)

restrictions that the Creation Doctrine imposes on an

interpretation of

(3)

that we cannot employ unwilled

(e.g.,

possibilities in our interpretation) means that there is an
extreme scarcity of interpretive options.
so much in its favor
(1)

(i.e.,

Because

(3*)

has

it allows Descartes to hold both

and (2), and it is well-supported by the text), and

there is no clear alternative interpretation of

(3)

we can help ourselves, we would be wise to accept
the correct interpretation of

(3)
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to which

(3*)

as

B rief Remark s on Descartes'

Modal Epis temoloov
and th e Conceptual Analysis of Modality

Some people may still be confused.

Descartes is saying

that there are things that God could
have willed even though
these things are not possible; and this
strikes us as

incomprehensible.

61

After all, we may wonder how any agent,

human or divine, could have willed something
that was notpossible
But Descartes is quick to point out that
our
inability to conceive the lack of any external
limitations
on God's will should come as no surprise.
In many passages,
Descartes emphasizes the incomprehensibility of
God's will.
.

For instance,

in the Sixth Replies,

he states:

"There is no

need to ask how God could have brought it about
from

eternity that it was not true that twice four make
eight,
and so on; for
(AT VII 436;

I

admit that this is unintelligible to us.

CSM II 294)

Mesland, he states:

"

[E]

And in the

2

May 1644 letter to

ven if this be true [i.e., that God

could have willed otherwise]

,

we should not try to

comprehend it, since our nature is incapable of doing so.
(AT IV 118;

CSMK 235)

It is

precisely the fact that God

created everyth i ng (except himself, of course) with absolute

indifference and without preexisting possibilities that
makes him "a being who is infinite and beyond our
grasp.

.

.whose power surpasses the bounds of human

understanding."

(AT

I

150;

CSMK 24-5)
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62

But how then does Descartes account
for the fact that
we do not have epistemic access to what
God could have

willed without making God out to be

a

deceiver?

A problem

with UP is that it entails an asymmetry
between what is
conceivable and what is possible; i.e.
the range
of

;

possibilities is much broader than the range of
what is
conceivable by our finite minds. As Wilson states

"[the

Creation Doctrine] seems to lead to the conclusion
that God
C(“ uld have made true what we
cannot comprehend as
>

possible." 63

This poses problems for UP because Descartes

does seem to think that

(clear and distinct)

is a reliable guide to modality.

64

conceivability

This is a problem for UP

but not for my interpretation of the Creation Doctrine.

On

my interpretation, Descartes can certainly hold that

whatever is possible is, in principle, conceivable and vice
versa despite the truth of each of the following:
(5)

God could have willed that

(6)

Humans cannot conceive that

(7)

Humans cannot conceive that 2+2=5 is possibly
true

is
?+?=

true.

is

65

true.

If UP or LP is true then we encounter the problem that

conceivability
of

(6)

and

(7)

ife

not a reliable guide to modality because

and the fact that Upers take

that it is possible that 2+2=5

f

and LPers take

that—Li— s poss i b l e—that—2+2 = 5 is possible

interpretation, even though
(8)
(8)

(5)

is true,

.

(8)

to entail

(5)

(5)

to entail

However, on my
is also true:

It is not possible that 2+2=5 is true.

is true for the reason previously stated that
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(9)

It is possible that ?+?=r

(9)

was never willed by God to be true; and that is
a necessary

condition for the truth of any proposition according
to the
Creation Doctrine. Thus, the truth of (8) accounts
for the

reason why
I

and

(6)

(7)

are true, despite the truth of

(5)

now return to consideration of Bennett's CAM.

According to this view, conceivability is not merely
reliable guide to modality, as

I

a

believe Descartes held,

rather conceivability exhausts all there is to modality.

Bennett thinks that the following passage clearly shows that

Descartes held CAM:
If by

possible you mean what everyone commonly means,
namely 'whatever does not conflict with our human
concepts', then it is manifest that the nature of God,
as I have described it, is possible in this
sense .. .Alternatively, you may well be imagining
f i ng i t i s
some other kind of possibility which relates
to the object itself; but unless this matches the first
sort of possibility it can never be known by the human
intellect ... (AT VII 150; CSM II 107)
1

[

]

In this passage,

the

Bennett thinks that "Descartes is treating

'possibility which relates to the object itself as

contrivance,

something faked up for the purposes of

argument." 66

In fact Bennett thinks that the use of

1

fingitis

1

a

ought to be translated, not as 'imagining' but

rather as 'inventing'.

This translation does not seem

warranted without begging the question.
CAM Problem
evidence.

1

There is a lack of strong textual

Bennett surely has the burden of proof on his

shoulders in this case.

So,

he has to show us that CAM is a

correct interpretation of the Creation Doctrine.

138

But does

this text, which Bennett claims to be the best
piece of

evidence in favor of CAM, show that CAM is a correct

interpretation of the Creation Doctrine? The answer is

'no'

Nowhere in this text does Descartes say that all there
is to
modality is conceivability or that modality simply
concerns
human concepts.

He merely states that this is what

everyone commonly understands
i nts ll g i 1

.

1

s]

by 'possible'

.

'

f

ut vulgo omnas

But there is no reason to

think that Descartes has become a champion of the vulgar

man's understanding of deep metaphysical theses.
Furthermore, as

I

have already mentioned, Descartes is

stating only that this vulgar notion of possibility in terms
of conceivability must be a reliable indicator of modal

truths or we would constantly be deceived in our perceptions
of modal truths.

So,

Bennett does not establish his

position through any strong textual evidence. 67
CAM—Problem—

dependent.

_i

If CAM is true,

then modality is mind-

But Descartes explicitly denies,

Meditation, that it depends on his mind.
45)

in the Fifth

(AT VII 64;

CSM II

Bennett could reply that Descartes certainly does not

think that the necessary truth of

2 + 2=4

depends on

hi s

mind;

but Descartes does think that it depends on soma mind.q nr

other
this,

.

Bennett's response does not help his cause.

To see

imagine the following situation: In 1641 everyone in

the universe is annihilated by God except Descartes.
all,

(After

God would only to have willed (from eternity) that in

1641 his conserving power would be removed in order to
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annihilate everyone.)

That is, we are stipulating that

Descartes is the only finite mind in existence.
case,

In this

CAM would be committed to one of the following:
CAMa:

The eternal truths depend on Descartes' mind.

CAMb:

There are no eternal truths.

Clearly,

CAMb is

ail

—bon; there simply

is no reason for a

CAM-supporter to assert CAMb simply on the basis that the

majority of the population is annihilated.
left with CAMa.

But then we are

Despite its oddness, CAMa does not directly

contradict Descartes' statement from the Fifth Meditation
(i.e.

that the eternal truths do not depend on his mind)

because that passage is embedded in a context quite

different from the imaginary one we are presently
considering.
CAMa:

However, notice the absurd consequences of

If Descartes is annihilated,

then there will be no

eternal truths. That the eternal truths would be true at one

moment and not only not true at another but also non-

existent in any way simply because Descartes is annihilated,
strikes me as too great an absurdity to attribute to
Descartes.

But

absurdity.

Therefore, CAM, as an interpretation of

Descartes,

I

believe that CAM is committed to this

is absurd,

especially given my alternative

interpretation which makes sense of the CAM-texts without
these absurd consequences.
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CAM Prob l em

3

:

Descartes believes that the eternal

truths are e terna ll y true

Excluding his use of

'

,

but our minds are not eternal.

eternal

in

'

'

eternal truths

Descartes has two different senses of 'eternal'. 68
x is eternal, =df x is outside of time or timeless.
x is eternal., =df

x exists at all times.

69

70

Although Descartes is vague about whether the eternal truths
are eternal,, he certainly believes that they are eternal.. 71

On the other hand, the human mind is clearly not

(refs?)

eternal,

Nor is the human mind eternal 2

as Descartes seems to have,

.

Even supposing,

that a mind, once created,

exists at every time afterward, a mind has not existed since
the beginning of time.

Thus,

if CAM is a correct

interpretation of Descartes, he is committed to the
following: Something eternal., depends on something non-

eternal 2

.

But,

when we consider what 'dependence' is, the

previous statement is contradictory. Remember that
Descartes' concept of dependence is the following:
x depends on y =df
it is not possible for x to exist
without y and it is possible for y to exist without x.
.

But if the eternal truths are eternal.,,

time at which they are not true.

eternal 2
So,

;

hence,

But the human mind in not

there is a time at which it did not exist.

there is a time at which the eternal truths are true end

there is no human mind. But,
a

then there is no

if the eternal truths depend on

human mind, then there cannot be

a time at

which the

eternal truths are true but no human mind exists.
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Contradiction.
CAM

I

don't see a way out of this problem for

72
.

We have seen that the fact that Descartes

1

God could

have willed otherwise with respect to the eternal
truths

does not entail that the eternal truths are possibly
false
or that there are other possible eternal truths.

This

^li^ir^stes UP and LP from consideration as correct

interpretations of Descartes' Creation Doctrine and its
implications for modality.

My interpretation of the 'could'

allows Descartes to hold two important theses, which he in
fact held; and my interpretation pays close attention to
the

consideration of divine freedom as
Doctrine.

a

reason for the Creation

Moreover, my interpretation allows Descartes to

maintain that conceivability is

a

reliable guide to

modality, and that God is not a deceiver, despite the fact
that we cannot conceive some of the things God could have
done.

We cannot conceive them precisely because they are

not possible.
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perhaps
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do not
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According to Larry Nolan (1997) and Vereeniov
Chappell (1997), this constitutes evidence
that the eternal
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the objective sense, thus supporting
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Rather than an endorsement of CAM in this passage
Descartes is merely denying that eternal truths have
formal
being; that is, the eternal truths do not exist in
the way
that real tables, chairs and God exist. Even if we
think
that objective being and formal being exhaust the
types of
being something can have, we still can deny that CAM
is true
by holding that the eternal truths exist objectively
in
Someone may object (i)that Descartes holds that whatever God
is’
God is indentical with God, (ii) that God's ideas in
the
obj ect ive sense, are 'in' God, (iii) but Descartes
explicitly denies that the eternal truths are 'attached to
God's essence'
(iv) so, the eternal truths cannot be ideas
in the divine mind.
Fine, but we get the same problem with
other things then. For instance, God wills tables and chair
and by the identity of his will and intellect, God
understands tables and chair.
But this does not mean that
tables and chairs are 'attached to God's essence'
So, the
divine-objective-being take is open to Descartes.
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.

disagree with Chappell on this issue, arguing against him
satisfactorily would require a detailed excursion into
Descartes' ontology, something which I don't have time to
pursue here
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CHAPTER

5

THE NECESSITY OF THE ETERNAL TRUTHS

Introduction
In the previous chapter,

I

argued that Descartes is not

inconsistent in holding that the eternal truths are
both
freely created and genuinely necessary; hence
Descartes'

Creation Doctrine does not entail bizarre modal
theses.
Because Descartes did hold that the eternal truths
are

necessarily true, what is now needed is an account of
the

necess i ty of the eternal truths; that

is,

Descartes needs to

provide an explanation of how an eternal truth
both freely created
false)

(so,

in some sense,

and necessarily true

(so,

P

P

could be

could have been

not-possibly-false)

Descartes provide such an account?

I

.

Does

believe that he does,

although he doesn't spend a significant amount of time
explaining the necessity of the eternal truths. As

a result,

Descartes' account, as it is explici tlv stated in his

writings

,

is grossly underdeveloped and requires some

piecing together.

1

To make matters worse,

scholars have

likewise been vague and brief in their treatment of the

problem

2

Despite the absence of a satisfactory treatment, two

interpretations of Descartes' justification or explanation
of the necessity of the eternal truths have been prominent
in the secondary literature:
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The PQtent i^ de i ab solu te et
Interpretation (henceforth, 'the Pnfpnt
Interpretation'

(a)

.

3

The Immutability Interpretation

(b)

Although

-i

a

4

find both of these interpretations to be

I

admirable attempts to deal with

particularly sticky issue,

a

will argue that neither is correct as an
interpretation of
Descartes' explanation of the necessity of the
eternal
I

truths
In the first section of this chapter,

the Potent i
.

a

Interpretation.

I

begin with

of the distinction between potent ia dei

(henceforth 'the distinction').

I

will discuss

a

short history

absolute pt nrdinata

then look at a

I

seventeenth-century account of the distinction found in
Spinoza's "Cogitata Metaphysica"
D es Cartes Pri nci

i orum

(appendices to his Renat j

Ph il osophise

)

,

and the manner in

which his account differs from the medieval accounts.
reason

I

The

look at Spinoza's writings on the distinction is

that a recent commentator 5 has claimed that Spinoza is

giving a correct account of Descartes' usage of the

distinction to explain the necessity of the eternal truths.
I

then discuss Descartes' alleged understanding of the

distinction and its alleged use in his explanation of the

necessity of the eternal truths.

I

will argue that the

Potent i a Interpretation is incorrect as an interpretation of
Descartes' explanation of the necessity of the eternal

truths for two reasons: First, there is simply no evidence
that Descartes was employing the distinction.
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Second,

the

Potent

Interpretation is not interestingly different
from
the better-supported Immutability Interpretation;
as
.

i

a

such,

it will be susceptible to the same
objection

with respect to the latter.
Interpretation, and

I

I

I

will consider

then examine the Immutability

argue that it is not sufficient to

explain the ne cess i ty of the eternal truths; it merely
explains their immutability, and immutability is neither
identical with, nor does it entail, necessity.

Furthermore,

if we supplement the Immutability Interpretation
in such a

way that would enable it to account for the necessity
of the
eternal truths, we commit Descartes to necessitarianism.

Because Descartes is not a necessitarian, the supplemented

version cannot be correct.

Thus,

the Immutability

Interpretation is either too weak to sufficiently and

satisfactorily account for the necessity of the eternal
truths or it is too strong insofar as it commits Descartes
to conclusions he did not hold and should not shold.

Potentia dei absoluta et ordinata
In recent years,

there have been several attempts to

explain the necessity of the eternal truths in Descartes by

consideration of the well-known medieval distinction between
two ways of understanding and speaking of God's power
(henceforth,

absoluta,

'the distinction ').

6

The first, potentia dpi

is God's power considered as absolute;

second, potentia dei

ordinata

f

and the

is God's power considered

with respect to the order he has established by his decree
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7
.

This is the most general way of understanding
the

distinction and one on which all parties will
agree.
However, as we'll see, there are more
specific ways of

understanding the content of the distinction,
ways on which
there is some disagreement.
Those who appeal to this distinction in their

interpretation of Descartes argue that in the texts
in which
Descartes states that God could have created other
eternal
truths than he actual did or made the eternal
truths false,
Descartes is referring to potent i a del absolute

However,

in the texts in which Descartes states that the
created

eternal truths are nonetheless necessary in such a way
that
even God cannot falsify them, Descartes is referring
to
PQ.tentia dei

ordinats

.

In this section,

detail.

I

I

will examine this interpretation in

will first give a brief history of the

distinction and its development and applications in the 11th
through 14th-centuries

.

I

will attempt to clarify the

content of the distinction and the relevant issues to which
it was applied.

I

will then examine Descartes' alleged use

of the distinction as an explanation of the necessity of the

eternal truths.

A Short History of the Distinction
The history

I

present is short, and there are many

philosophers and theologians excluded from discussion.
There are two reasons for this: First, a detailed history of
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the distinction would constitute a book by
itself.

8

i

simply do not have the time or the required expertise
to
write such a history.
Secondly, and more importantly,
I

am

interested almost exclusively in the philosophical and
theological content of the distinction; that is, what
the

distinction amounts to and which types of issues it is
intended to address.

Thus,

I

will concentrate on some of

the most important philosophical and theological figures
of
the eleventh century through the fourteenth century: Peter

Damian, Thomas Aquinas, and John Duns Scotus

.

Each of these

philosophers played a pivotal role in the development or
refinement of the distinction.

An Eleventh-Century Antecedent: Peter Damian

Although the terminology of
crd i nata
century,

'

9

1

potent a absolute
i

Pt-

was not in use until the early thirteenth
the groundwork for the distinction was

established in the eleventh century.

In 1067,

Peter Damian

wrote a letter to Abbot Desiderius concerning their

discussion at the Abbey of Monte Cassino.

The topic of

their discussion was St. Jerome's statement that although
God is omnipotent, there are certain things that he cannot
do,

for instance,

restore a virgin after her fall

r

Peas possit, sus.citare virginem non potest post ruinam

Damian states:
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nmnG

rnm

10
l

.

This view... has never been able to satisfy
me.
For I
pay attention to what is said not to by whom
it is
s ld
It: seems to ° much a dishonor
that an inability
f*
should
be ascribed to him who can do all things. 11
-

,

Desiderius shared Damian's concern about attributing
an
inability to God, and thus attempted to understand
the fact
that there are things God cannot do without
attributing an

inability to God.

Desiderius thus held that we should

understand God's power only as the ability to do what he
wills. That is:
PI:

God is able to F

P2

God is unable to F

= df

God wills to

F.

and
:

In this way,

= df

God does not will to F

Desiderius can say that there are things that

God cannot do but not because of an inability in God.
any statement,
of God,

So,

in which an apparent inability is predicated

should be understood as predicating

a

lack of

volition on God's part, not an inability.
Damian's response to Desiderius is the foundation of
the distinction which would later be more fully developed

concerning p otentia absoluta et ordinal
Desiderius that an attribution of any
false.

i

.

nahi

He agrees with
1

i

ty to God is

However, he objects to Desiderius' characterization

of God's power as co-extensive with his volition.

Surely,

Damian points out, God's volition does not exhaust his
capacity, ability, or power; there are many things which
though, God does not will them, God could have willed
them.

12

As Damian states:
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To this [i.e., P2
I say,
if God can do nothing he does
not want to, but he does nothing except what
he
therefore he can do nothing at all that he does wants
not
do. .. It follows therefore, that whatever God
does not
do, he is altogether incapable of doing.
segni tnrergo ut qujcqu i d D eus non facit, facere omnino nnn
]

_

—

.

possit.]

r

According to Damian, if Desiderius' position, as expressed
by PI and P2 is true, then it follows that P3 is true:
P3

:

God cannot do anything except what he wills to do.

Damian found P3 to be absurd and blasphemous.

Surely,

there

are alternatives possible to God, even if they are not

actualized.

14

As Courtenay states:

"God can do more than he

actually wills to do; divine capacity exceeds divine
volition." 15

So,

the lesson to be learned from Damian's

discussion of divine power is that there are possibilities
open to God's power despite the fact that God chooses not to
will them. God can do more than he does, and he can do other
than he does.
In Damian's letter,

we see an early sketch of one of

the fundamental features of the distinction as it is

developed and used in the thirteenth and fourteenth
centuries: We can consider God's power in abstraction from
his will

this way,

(or his actual willing),

in itself,

and considered

there are things which God could do though he does

not will to do them.

That is, there are other ways God

could have created the world and the truths concerning it
The distinction will later be employed to explain the

contingency of the created order; and we get more than
hint of this in Damian: God's creative will is not
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a

determined to will what it does will.

Thus,

as early as the

eleventh century, philosophers were laying
the foundation
for the yet unnamed distinction in order
to address the

lssue u trum Peus nos,sit facsr- e

qi:ae

non

fanh

16

T he Disti nc tion in the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth "Centu ries ~
"

Aquinas and Scotus

The thirteenth century saw the increasing
development

and refinement of the distinction
the century,

17
.

the distinction found a fully developed

formulation in St. Thomas Aquinas.
Summa Theologian
£ acere—

In the latter half of

,

In an article in the

not suprisingly titled,

non—f ac i t

"
,

8

"

TJtrnm Hpur

Aquinas addresses the same issue

that concerned Damian and Desiderius two centuries earlier:

Can God do what he does not actually do?

And,

sense in which he cannot, what is this sense?

if there is a

Aquinas

states
What is attributed to his power considered in itself
secundum cons i rieratae se
God is said to be able to
do with his potentia absol nta
And this
covers ... everything in which an aspect of being can be
salvaged [cmne illud in quo potest salvari ratio
ent i s
As for what lies within his power as
carrying out the command of his just will, he is said
to be able to do it by his potentia ordinate
(ST la
25.5, res
[

]

,

.

]

.

.

)

From this passage, we can see that there are several factors

involved in Aquinas' account of the distinction.

The first

concerns the manner in which potentia absolute is to be
understood, namely as God's power considered in itself, in

abstraction from other 'features' of his nature and his
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actual decrees.

Aquinas

Thus, we can attribute the
following to

:

A1
''

i^itself

^

abS ° luta =«

1

God

'

P™er

s

considered

However, we may also understand the
distinction in terms of
the oaope of pa tent a absolute and
potent^ nHinv,
i

Potent

.

i

a

de

i

.

absolute

according to Aquinas, extends to

,

'everything in which an aspect of being
can be salvaged',
i.e.,

it extends to everything possible,

judged to be possible
Ch ab i tudine

...

terminornm

]

:

from the implication of the terms

possible when the predicate is

compatible with the subject."
A2

:

(ST la 25.3)

God can do x de potent
possible

Thus, Aquinas'

where "something is

i

19

Thus

a

iff x

is

use of the distinction also emphasizes non-

necessity of the created order: it was initially
open to God
to will any possible order.
Aquinas' understanding of potent

i

a

orriinata

,

on the

other hand, emphasizes both God's actual decrees and his
nature.

The feature of God's nature that is most relevant,

though it goes unmentioned in the passage from ST 25.5, is
God’s immutability.

As Aquinas states elsewhere:

supposition that he does will

a

"

the

[0]

thing it cannot be unwilled,

since his will cannot be changed."

(ST la 19.3. res

20
)

if

God were not immutable, then there would be nothing

preventing him from acting contrary to his decrees; and
hence the scope of his potentia ordinata would be the same
as the scope of his potentia absolute
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.

But

I

take it that

the point of the distinction,

m

ST 25.5,

as it is employed by Aquinas

is to allow a sense in which there
are some

things that God could do de potentia

potentia ordineta

.

but not de

That is, the scope of the former is

greater than the scope of the latter.
A3:

Thus,

God does x da potentia ordinal iff (f) x
is
consistent with God's actual decrees and (ii)
x is
consistent with God's nature. 21

For instance,

initially it was open to God to will any

possible state of affairs da

pate nt

i

a

absolute

And he

atill could will any possible state of affairs de nt- P nH^
P
a bso l uta
However, suppose that God has willed that state
.

affairs
true)

.

S

obtains (and thus that a proposition P is

On the supposition that God wills S

(and that

P)

,

and that God is immutable, he cannot de potentia ordinate
will that S does not obtain (and that P is false)

.

As

Aquinas states:
[W] hatever God could [do] he can [do], for his
power is
not decreased, as neither is his essence.
But he
cannot now not will what he is posited as having
willed, because his will cannot be changed. (SCG I 83)

Thus,

we can see that Aquinas

'

use of the distinction

emphasizes two important things: First, there is almost

a

total lack of determination of God's potentia absnlnfa

God

-

could have willed anything possible, and as such, there is
sense in which God could have willed other than he in fact
has.

Second, there is a sense in which God cannot will

anything other than he in fact has, when we consider his

potentia ordinata, which takes into consideration his

immutability
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a

Although Scotus uses the distinction to address
some of the
same issues as Aquinas, his understanding_of
the distinction
differs from Aquinas' in at least four ways.
The
first is

that Scotus explicitly applies the distinction
to any moral

agent

-

divine or human.

22

The second difference is that

Scotus employs analogies from the law and the legal
terms
de facto

'

and

'

d e jure

potent i a ordinate

.,

'

to describe potent a absnlnt-a and
i

respectively.

He states:

In every agent that acts by intellect and will
and is
able to act in conformity with the right law and
nevertheless does not necessarily act in conformity
with the right law, p otentia ordinate must be
distinguished from po tentia absolute
The reason is
that it can act in conformity with the right law, and
then it acts according to its potentia ordinatn (for it
is ordered insofar as it is a principle of carrying
out
some things in conformity with the right law) and it
can act outside that law or contrary to it, and in this
there is potent a —absol u ta that exceeds potent n
ord i nata
Therefore, not only in God but in every free
agent which can act according to the dictates of the
right law and outside such a law or contrary to it potent l a—ord i nata —e_t absol n ta must be distinguished.
Therefore, the jurists say that someone can to this de
daoLto -i.e., with respect to potentia absolute - or da
~ i.e.,
with respect to power ordered according to
the law. 23
i

,

i

.

Like Aquinas, he holds that God's potentia absolute is

simply his ability to will anything short of a
contradiction.

As Scotus states:

"For God can do anything

that does not include a contradiction or act in any way that

does not include a contradiction...; and then he is said to
be acting according to his potentia absolute

Scotus also holds A2

.

24
.

Thus,

That is, potentia absolute extends to

everything in which there is

non,

repugnantia terminorum

.

The third difference is that, unlike Aquinas, who holds
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that God, by his potentia absolute, can will any
possible

state of affairs or set of states of affairs, Scotus
states
that God's potent i a ord i nata is his power to do whatever
is
.

consistent with the genera]
decree.

As such,

laws instituted by divine

this power extends to acts directly

prescribed by the laws and also to acts not contrary to the
laws

25
.

The fourth and most glaring difference between Aquinas

and Scotus on the distinction is the role played by God's

immutability.

Aquinas thinks that God's immutability

guarantees that God's actual decrees will never be violated,
not even by God; thus,

God's potent i a ord i nata

immutability restricts the scope of
.

However, Scotus does not seem to

consider God's immutability to be important with respect to
his laws/decrees.

In fact,

for Scotus there is a sense in

which God's potentia absolute is the same as his potent
ordinata

26

i

The potentia absolute of a finite agent, who is

not a lawgiver,

is her ability to act contrary to the law;

as such there are inordinate acts available to such an agent
de potentia absoluta but not de potentia ordinata

.

However,

Scotus believes that in the case of a lawgiver, especially
the divine lawgiver,

the scope of his potentia absoluta is

the same as his potentia ordinata at a time.

He believes

this because it is impossible for a lawgiver to act contrary
to the laws.

As Marilyn Adams states,

"Scotus has in mind

the principle of Roman law according to which illegal action
is impossible for the absolute ruler
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."

27

By 'acting

contrary to the law-, the lawgiver would
thereby establish
new law.
That is, the lawgiver can change the laws

a

so that

any action they perform is in accordance with
the law.
This might seem strange to someone like
Aquinas for
whom the scope of God's potent a absoluta is

not the same as

i

the scope of his pot ent i

a

ord i nata because God is immutable

and cannot change his decrees ex post fartn

But,

for

Scotus, God never anta de po tent ia absoln^ but
not da
p otent i a ordinata because he can change the laws so that his

actions are in accordance with them.

action

a,

ord i nata

.

if God were to do a,

28

So,

for any possible

a would be done de pnfpnt-ia

The following texts from Scotus illustrate this

line of thought:

For example, [God] established that no one should be
glorified unless he first receives grace. When [God's]
action is ordered according to this law, he acts
according to his potent i a —ordinata
And he cannot act
otherwise except by ordaining and establishing another
l aw - wh i ch he—can do, since he contingently
willed
that every sinner should be damned. Thus by doing the
contrary, he establishes another law, according to
which he acts in an orderly fashion 29
.

.

[W] hen the law and the rightness of the law are within
the power of the agent is such a way that it is right
only because it is established; then the agent can, by
its liberty, ordain otherwise than the right law says.
Nevertheless it is consistent with this that it acts in
an orderly fashion, since it can establish another
right law according to which it acts in an orderly
30

fashion

.

And in that case its potentia absoluta does not
absolutely exceed its potentia ordinata since it would
be ordered according to another law, just as according
to the earlier law. Nevertheless, it exceeds the
potentia ordinata precisely according to the earlier
law, against which or outside which it produces 31
.

.

Thus,

according to Scotus,
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The scope of God's potent a absolute would
exceed
scope of his potent i a ordinate iff (i) there
is a
t at which there is a right law
L and an action a
which is not in accordance with L, (ii) there
is
another time t* at which there is a right law L*
L^L*) and an action a which is in accordance
with
iii
does a at t*, and (iv) God's doing a is
considered relative to L and t.
,

(

the
time

i

(where
L*

)

Only with respect to a different law would God's pnfpnti,
abso l ute exceed his potentia ordinate. What is clear is
that

immutability does not play a role in differentiating between
potent i a dei—absoluta et ordinata

32
.

We must be careful to remember, as Ockham has warned,

that the distinction is not between two distinct powers in

God (that would be to deny his simplicity)

,

but rather

between two different ways of considering God's power.

As

Ockham states:
This distinction should not be understood to mean that
in God there are really two powers, one of which is
ordained and the other of which is absolute. For with
respect to things outside himself there is in God a
single power, which in every way is God himself 33
.

So,

when we say that the scope of God's potentia absoluta is

greater than that of his potentia ordinata we are saying
something like the following: if there were a being as
powerful as God but who lacked the other 'features' of God's
nature

(for instance,

his immutability)

,

the scope of his

potentia absolute could be the same as the scope of his
potentia ordinata

.

However, when we consider God's nature

and not merely his power in abstraction, we see that even

though God has the power or capacity to change
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a truth,

he

cannot because of his immutability.

God cannot do these

things because they are incompatible with his
essential

perfection

Distinction in the Seventeenth Century; Spinoza
Four centuries later, Spinoza discussed the distinction
in his Cog i tata —Metaphysics

34
.

He states:

We thus divide God's power into ordinate and ab.gnliva
We speak of abso l ut a —potent a de 1 when we consider
his
omnipotence without attending to his decree; his
potent i a ond i na t
when we regard his decrees. (CM II
i

.

[

9

l

,

)

first glance, Spinoza's understanding of the distinction
is not interestingly different from Aquinas'

understanding.

and Scotus

However, Spinoza is quick to point out in

another passage that his take on the distinction is
different from the philosophers of the middle ages, and that
"although we want to retain the same distinction in God's

power as is commonly adopted by philosophers, we are

nevertheless constrained to expound it in a different way."
(CM II 9)

Where Aquinas and Scotus restrict potential Hpi

abso l uta to what is absolutely possible, Spinoza claims that
this account is false and impious:
[F] or many speak of [God's power] without proper piety
and not according to truth. They say that ... some things
are possible, some things impossible, and some things
necessary, and that God's omnipotence [i.e., his
potentia absol uta is concerned only with the possible
Deique omnipotentiam tantum circa possibilia locum
habere
We, however, who have already shown that all
things depend absolutely on God's decree, say that
God is omnipotent. (CM II 9)
l

[

1

.
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On the version of the distinction
presented by Spinoza,
patent a de i absolute is not restricted to
the realm of the
absolute possibles; but rather, because even
the essences of
things (and hence, the necessary truths
concerning them)
i

depend on his decree, there is nothing God
cannot do do
36
potent ia ahsnln^
Despite this difference between Spinoza and
the
medievals, Spinoza's presentation of the
distinction shares
several features with some medieval accounts.
First,

Spinoza joins Aquinas in holding that potentia dei ahaoln^
is God's power considered in abstraction
from his decrees

and other features of his nature,

immutability.

in particular,

his

This is clear in the following passage:

But having understood that he has decreed some
things
from the mere freedom of his will [i.e., de potent
^
abso l nt a
and then that he is immutable, we say now
that he cannot act against his own decrees, and that
this is impossible simply because it is opposed to the
perfection of God. (CM II 9, my gloss)
-i

]

.

,

That is, potent

i

.

a

—de i—absolute

is God's power considered

apart from his immutability, and in this sense, there is

nothing that God cannot will.
supposition,

37

However, on the

that God wills certain things to obtain, he

cannot de potentia ordinate act contrary to his will or

change his will; hence there are things that God can do de
potent i a abso l uta which he cannot do de potent-is ordinste
However, as

I

have already mentioned,

it is not that this is

true because there are two distinct powers in God; nor is it
true because God's potentia ordinate is a diminished version
of his potentia absolute.

Rather,

164

it is because of our

consideration of his power with respect to
other essential
features of his nature, such as his
immutability.
Once again, we see that the same issues
are addressed
in Spinoza *s presentation of the
distinction: (i) There is a
lack of any determination of God's potent a a h«ni„i- a
G od
could have willed anything, so, a. fortiori
God could have
willed other than he in fact has.
(ii)
But there is a
i

.

r

sense in which God cannot will anything other
than he in
fact has, when we consider his potentia nrdinata

36

Descartes' Alleged Use of the Distinction

Descartes

'

Creation Doctrine may be seen as a response

to two different,

though closely related, questions

inherited from his medieval predecessors:

'What is the

relationship between God and the eternal truths?' and 'Could
God have willed things other than those he actually
willed?'.

We have already seen Descartes' answer to the

first inherited question: The relationship is one of causal

dependence of the eternal truths on God's indifferent will.
The answer to the second question, according to those who

hold the Potentia Interpretation, is 'yes and no'
if we consider potentia dei absolute

potent i a de i—ordinata

•

;

'no',

:

'Yes,

if we consider

What is of particular interest to

Descartes is the question whether God could have willed that
the eternal truths are false, even though they are

necessarily true.
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Although an important issue to be addressed
is whether
Descartes in fact employs the distinction at all
in his

,

explanation of the necessity of the eternal truths,
it is
quite likely that he would have been familiar
with the
distinction.

The author

(s)

of the Second Objections and the

authors of the Sixth Objections brought the distinction
to
Descartes' attention. 39 The Jesuit Coimbrans wrote
of the

distinction in a traditional manner, and Descartes was
familiar with their commentaries. 40

whom we know Descartes was familiar,
i n ct

—dao—

Moreover, Suarez, with
41

wrote of the

ion in D i sputat i on—XXX and in Tract at ns de
eg i slators

(1612)

42
,

Moreover,

T.pg-ihiip

in one text,

Descartes makes reference to potentia absolnta

(at VII

154;

CSM II 109) So, there is reason to think that Descartes was

familiar with the distinction.
In a recent article,

James Petrik has given the most

fully developed interpretation of Descartes' explanation of
the necessity of the eternal truths in terms of the

distinction.

43

Petrik understandably notices that the

tension in Descartes' Creation Doctrine concerns whether God
could have created a world in which the eternal truths that

actually obtain do not obtain.

More precisely, he attempts

to understand how Descartes reconciles the following two

theses
Thesis of the Transworld Validity of the Eternal Truths
[TTV]
The eternal truths would obtain in any world
that God created.
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Thesis of Divine Indifference [TDI
God could have
created different eternal truths than the ones he in
fact created.
]

In effect,

he has the same concern that

:

I

do;

that is,

how

can Descartes hold both that the eternal truths are
freely

created and yet genuinely necessary; and what is Descartes'

explanation of the necessity of the eternal truths given
that they are freely created.
TDI

Petrik claims that TTV and

can be reconciled with one another if one approaches

them with Descartes' version of the Medieval distinction

between potentia
Petrik

's

ordinal-, a

and potentia ahsnlm-a

interpretation, he claims, has its source in

Spinoza's Coaitata Metaphysics
discussed.

" 44

,

texts we've already

The issue of whether Spinoza is actually

interpreting Descartes, stating his own theses, or doing
something else in the texts on which Petrik 's interpretation
relies will be discussed shortly.
One thing is clear, however. If Descartes is employing
the distinction, he does so with a different understanding
of what the distinction amounts to from Aquinas and Scotus

These philosophers, as we have seen,
A2

:

held A2

God can do x by his potentia absoluta iff x is
possible

However, as we've seen in earlier chapters, Descartes holds
that even something's modal status depends on God's will.
Thus,
So,

there are no possibles independent of God's will. 45

Descartes would have to understand the scope of potent

dei absoluta as Spinoza has stated:
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i

DP.

There is nothing that God cannot do de nntent-ia
^
absolute
h

.

Despite the differences between DP and A1

,

Descartes' DP

follows the scholastic tradition insofar as
it emphasizes
the lack of determination in God's will.
the Creation Doctrine,

This is crucial to

as we've seen previous chapters.

goes even further, however,

It

in not restricting notPut-i* Hoj

absolute to what is possible. 46
However,

there is every reason to think that if

Descartes is implicitly using the distinction, he does
so

with

a

partly-thomistic understanding of pntpnt-is

o rd i nata

,

Hp-i

emphasizing God's actual decrees and immutability,

as given by A3; and with a partly- scot istic understanding,

emphasizing God's role as lawgiver/king.

As Descartes

states
It will be said that if God had established these
truths he could change them as a king changes his laws.
To this the answer is: Yes he can, if his will can
change. 'But I understand them [i.e., the eternal
truths] to be eternal and immutable.
I make the same
judgement about God. (AT I 145-146; CSMK 23)
'

And in the Conv ersation with Burman

,

he states:

Concerning the decrees of God which have already been
enacted, it is clear that God is immutable with regard
to these, and, from the metaphysical point of view, it
is impossible to conceive of the matter otherwise. (AT
V 166; CSMK 348)
So,

although initially there is nothing God cannot do de

potent i a—absoluta

,

given that he makes certain decrees and

that he is immutable, he cannot change his decrees de

potentia ordinata

.
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So,

how is the distinction put to use by Descartes
in

order to reconcile TTV and TDI ?

Petrik believes that the

way to reconcile TTV and TDI is by noticing that in
the

passages in which Descartes is presenting TTV and

emphasizing the necessity of the eternal truths,
is considering potent i a de i ordinata

.

Descartes

And in the passages

in which he is presenting TDI and emphasizing the lack
of

determination in God's indifferent will, Descartes is
considering potentia dei absolute

Thus, our

(1)

and

(2)

would be understood as follows:
(1*)

The eternal truths are freely created by God de
potentia absoluta
.

(2*)

The eternal truths are necessary via God's
potentia ordinata
.

As Petrik states

When we attend to the fact that the eternal truths are
dependent upon God's indifferent will, and we set aside
the actual decrees that God has enacted, we are
considering God's power absolutely.
From this
standpoint we can say that God was not necessitated to
create our eternal truths and that he could have done
otherwise.
When we attend, on the other hand, to the
order that God has in fact decreed, and we attend to
the
that God is immutable, then we are considering
God's power as ordained. From this standpoint we can
say that the eternal truths will never be violated,
even by God. 47
Margaret Osier reiterates this line of thought:
Descartes' argument reflects the traditional discourse
about the absolute and ordained power of God.
By his
absolute power, God freely created the eternal truths,
just as he freely created the other creatures... [but]
his own nature prevents him from changing what he once
created freely. 48

Blake Dutton also argues along these lines:
[A] lthough God's will is free and indifferent, it is
also immutable and cannot change with respect to that
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which it has ordained ... And so, even though it was not
within God's power when consider ed in rplvinn t-n hie
ord i nat i on to have created world in which the truths
which hold in this world do not hold, it was perfectly
1 1 within that power to have done so when rnnsi
ptpH
in itself 49
.

Thus,

if Petrik's Potent ia Interpretation is correct,

Descartes can have his freely-created necessary truths.

Problems with the Potentia Interpretation
In order to see what is wrong with the Potent

Interpretation,
First,

i

let us review what it has in its favor.

it is reasonable to think that Descartes was familiar

with the distinction. Second, There are texts (AT
CSMK 23, AT V 166; CSMK 348)

I

145-146;

in which Descartes seems to

discuss somethin g like the distinction, despite not

mentioning the distinction explicitly.

Third,

a very smart

person, Spinoza, presents the Potentia Interpretation as the

correct way to understand Descartes' explanation of the

necessity of the eternal truths.
Now that we have the 'evidence' in favor of the
Potentia Interpretation laid out in front of us, we can see
just how weak the case for this interpretation really is.

Against the first considertation, we must notice that the
fact that Descartes was familiar with the distinction does

not entail anything about whether he employed the

distinction.

After all, there are many things with which

Descartes was familiar, which he did not employ in any

capacity (final causes in physics, for instance).
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The second consideration is rather weak as well,

if

Descartes were employing the distinction, why doesn't
he
state that he is? In fact, the only text in which
Descartes

mentions potent

.

i

a

—abso l ute

is not a text concerning the

eternal truths (AT VII 154; CSM II 109). So, there is no
direct textual evidence for the Potent

i

Interpretation.

a

Petrik anticipates this objection, and answers that the

reason Descartes does not explicitly mention the distinction
in his explanation of the necessity of the eternal truths
is

that he understood the distinction in a different manner

from his scholastic predecessors; hence, any mention of the

terminology of distinction would be liable to mislead his

contemporary readers.

Petrik

's

reply would perhaps be

convincing if we did not know that Descartes was not bashful
about borrowing other scholastic terminology and putting his

own spin on them. Moreover, given that Descartes actively
sought the approval of the seventeenth-century Schoolmen, it
is particularly strange that he did not employ their

language, especially when such an opportunity presented
itself.

The bottom line is that Petrik'

s

reply is not

convincing
The third consideration,
three.

is perhaps the weakest of the

If the reason to attribute the distinction to

Descartes is that Spinoza discusses the distinction in the
Cogitata Metaphysics

,

then we should not feel confident

about attributing it to Descartes.

It simply is not clear

that Spinoza is stating or interpreting Descartes' positions
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ln the CoglLaLa. Met aphyaica
.

Although there are places in

.

this work in which Spinoza presents ideas which
are clearly
not his own and which may properly be attributed
to

Descartes, there are just as many passages in which
Spinoza

presents clearly Spinozistic and decidedly un-cartesian
ideas.

In fact,

in the paragraph preceeding Spinoza's

discussion of potent i a dei absolut a et ordinate

,

Spinoza

states a paradigmat ically Spinozistic thesis about modality:
For if men clearly understood the whole order of nature
[t otem ord i nem naturae
they would find all things to
be equally necessary as are the things treated in
mathematics.
But because this is beyond the reach of
human knowledge, certain things are judged by us as
possible and not as necessary. (CM II 9) 50
]

So,

,

we should not put much weight in the idea that Spinoza's

Cog i tata Metaphys i ca are interpretations of Descartes. 51

Even granting that Spinoza is interpretating Descartes does
not guarantee that his interpretation is correct. Yes,

Spinoza is smart, but he is not infallible.

Now that we have seen the lack of evidence in favor of
the Potentia Interpretation, we can consider the uselessness
of this interpretation. The Potentia Interpretation

'reduces'

to,

what

Interpretation'

.

I

call,

'the Immutability

To see this, we simply need to ask whether

there is anything in the Potentia Interpretation with

explanatory value concerning the necessity of the eternal
truths, besides consideration of God's immutability.

answer is 'no'.

The

The reason why God cannot change the truths

he has established is not something 'in'

the truths.

It

only God's immutability that prevents any change in his
172

is

decrees; and it is the fact that God's decree
s cannot be
changed (even by God)
that gives support to

the Pnt-pnf j a

,

Interpretation as an interpretation of Descartes
on the
necessity of the eternal truths 52 Moreover, as
I

.

mentioned the texts that allegedly support the

have just

Pnfpnt-

-i

a

Interpretation never mention the distinction; they
appeal
exclusively to God's immutability.
Therefore, because of the lack of any compelling

evidence in favor of the Potent i a Interpretation, and
the
fact that it is God's immutability that does all the
work in
the Potent i a Interpretation and the fact that the

Immutability Interpretation is much simpler than the

P otent i a— Interpretation

(as

we'll see)

,

we should see what

can be said in favor of the Immutability Interpretation.

The Immutability Interpretation

According to the Immutability Interpretation, the
eternal truths are necessarily true because they are willed
by God's immutable will.
any,

Before we examine the role

,

if

that God's immutability actually plays in Descartes'

explanation of the necessity of the eternal truths, it will
be helpful to have a working account of what God's

immutability is.

To be immutable is not merely to be

unchanging, but rather to be unable to change. That is:
II:

We must,

x is immutable iff x is essentially unchanging 53

however, recognize that there are irrelevant

extrinsic and relational properties that
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a

thing may acquire

or lose without any re a l change in the
thing; that is, there
are so-called 'Cambridge changes' that
something may undergo
without thereby being mutable.
For example if x is five
feet tall at t and x is five foot five at
some later time
t',

then x has really changed; but if x is not
an uncle at

t

and x is an uncle at some later time t', then
x has not

really changed in virtue of acquiring this property.
idea is that there are some properties which
are,

Edward Wierenga
^ ^van t

Wierenga,

,

'

and Nicholas Wolterstorf f

s

and others which are not

54
.

'

s

The

to use

term,

'change-

According to

this distinction has roots in Anselm, and there is

an intuitive sense of which properties are change-relevant

and which are not

.

As Anselm states

Suppose that there are some accidents which, when taken
on by a substance, do not entail any change in that
substance.
Being subject to such accidents would not
negate the immutability of a nature. We may indeed
divide all accidents into two kinds. There are those
whose presence or absence implies some change in the
subject: e.g. all colors. Others cause no change in
that of which they are predicated: e.g. some relations.
Take someone who is going to be born next year. At the
moment I am not taller than him, or smaller than him;
nor the same height as, or lose, all these relations,
without my changing at all, insofar as he grows and
changes through different qualities.
Some accidents,
then, bring mutability with them in some respect.
And
other accidents do not take away immutability in any
respect whatsoever 55
.

Despite the difficulty in providing a precise, non-question-

begging definition of a change-relevant property, we have
good enough intuitive sense of what it is.

For example,

intrinsic properties such as being red and be ng
i

ball are change - relevant

;

a

s

i

x feet

and relational properties such as

being an uncle and being worshipped by Saint Paul are
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change- irrelevant. “

with an intuitive sense of the

distinction between change-relevant and
change-irrelevant
properties, Wierenga proposes the following
analysis of
be ing unchanging
:

12:

X is unchanging iff there are no times

t, and t
and change-relevant property P such
that
x has "p
at t and x lacks P at t 57
2
x

.

And immutability, according to

II,

is the property of being

essential] y unchanging.

Although Descartes does not give an account of
immutability, there is no reason to think that
he held a
different account of immutability from that given
by 11
.

fact,

in

Descartes' God would trivially satisfy 12 in virtue
of

being either simple or eternal (in Boethius' and
Aquinas'
sense of

'

eternal

'

)

.

Descartes

God is eternal in the

'

relevant sense, and he is simple.

Hence he would satisfy

Those who hold the Immutability Interpretation do so
ly on the basis of one passage from Descartes'

correspondence, and to a lesser degree, passages from the

Conversat i on with Burman
t ent i a

Interpretation.

the same texts used to support the

,

I

quote them again to refresh our

memories
It will be said that if God had established these
truths [i.e., the eternal truths] he could change them
as a king changes his laws To this the answer is
Yes, he can, if his will can change. 'But I understand
them to be eternal and immutable
I make the same
judgement about God. 'But his will is free.' Yes, but
his power is incomprehensible. (AT I 145-146; CSMK 23)
_

.

.

'

Concerning the decrees of God which have already been
it is clear that God is immutable with respect

enacted,
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to these,

and from the metaphysical point of
view it
°° nCeiVe
tter ° th «wise. (AT
V 166 ;°?!mK 348)

“

S

On the basis of these passages, Edwin Curley
has stated that
"[God's] creation of them [i.e., the eternal
truths]
is a

genuine act of will

(not necessitated)

,

and yet it does

provide a foundation of their necessity, because
his will is
immutable." 59 That is, God is free with respect
to
the

creation of the eternal truths, but, given that he
creates
them,

the immutability of his will explains why they
are

necessary. This line of thought has been reiterated
by

Stephen Menn,

Steven Nadler,

61

and Margaret Osier.

62

Additional evidence for the Immutability Interpretation
is given by those scholars who understand Descartes'

nature, discussed in the Principles ^nd The Wnrl

eternal truths.

laws of

to be

After all, Descartes' foundation for these

laws is God's immutability; 63

these two rules

[i.e.,

as he states:

laws of nature]

"it is that

follow manifestly

from the mere fact that God is immutable and that, acting

always in the same way, he always produces the same effect."
(AT XI 43;

truths,

CSM

I

96)

So,

if the laws of nature are eternal

and laws of nature are explained by God's

immutability, then it is prima facie reasonable to think
that God's immutability is sufficient to explain the

necessity of the eternal truths.

Although few scholars attempt to offer a real argument
for the Immutability Interpretation based on the passages

from the 15 April 1630 letter to Mersenne and the
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C Qversat iQn with Burman

64

.

Argument

we can attempt one here.

I

offer

as a first -shot.

1

Argument

1

1.

God wills the eternal truths.

2.

God's will is immutable.

3.

Therefore,

As it stands,
1

,

the eternal truths are immutable.

it isn't clear that the conclusion of Argument

follows from the premises.

not exp li c i

What is needed is a principle,

stated by Descartes, establishing that there

tl

is a transfer of immutability from God's will to its
effect.

Transfer of Immutability Principle: For any x, if x is
willed by an omnipotent and immutable will, then x is
immutable 65
Descartes seems to advocate the Transfer of Immutability
Principle in The World:
in the same way,
43/

CSM

I

96

66
)

"God is immutable and always acting

he always produces the same effect."

And in the Principl es

,

he states:

(AT XI

"For we

understand that God's perfection involves not only his being
immutable in himself, but also his operating in

a

that is always utterly constant and immutable."

(AT VIII 61)

I

manner

grant that this textual evidence is not particularly

compelling.

However, because the Immutability

Interpretation requires the Transfer of Immutability
Principle to get off the ground, we should grant it simply
to see how far it can take the interpretation.
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Inserting the Transfer of Immutability Principle
into
Argument 1, we get Argument 1*:

Argument 1*
1.

God wills the eternal truths.

2.

God's will is immutable.

3.

For any

x,

if x is willed by an omnipotent and

immutable will, then x is immutable.
Therefore, the eternal truths are immutable.

4.

Descartes, as the passages quoted above make clear, held

premise

2.

Likewise,

Premise

1

is something that Descartes

held; in fact it is merely a concise statement of the

Creation Doctrine. 67

So far, we have a very cartesian

argument grounded firmly in Descartes' texts.

However, we

should notice that Argument 1* doesn't establish the

necessity of the eternal truths; it only establishes their
immutability

68

And,

.

by Descartes' time, several

philosophers, including Robert Grosseteste, Ockham, and Duns
Scotus, had established that something can be immutable

without also being necessary (although whatever is necessary
is also immutable)

.

So,

if supporters of the Immutability

Interpretation wish to establish their conclusion (i.e.,
that God's immutability explains the necessity of the

eternal truths)

,

Argument 1* needs to be supplemented by

another principle.

Immutability-Necessity Principle:
then x is necessary.

For any x,

if x is

immutable,

Adding the Immutability-Necessity Principle to Argument

1*,

we get the desired conclusion that the eternal truths are
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necessary. However, we should be apprehensive about

attributing the Immutability-Necessity Principle to
Descartes

Providence and Contingency: A Problem for the
Immutability Interpretation
If Descartes did hold the Immutability-Necessity

Principle and the Transfer of Immutability Principle, he

would be committed to disastrous consequences. One of the
things that a theory of modality should provide is an

account of the difference between necessary truths and

contingent truths.

Despite the fact that Descartes rarely

uses the term 'contingent',

69

it is clear that he believed

that there are some propositions that, while true, are not

necessarily so, i.e., they are contingent.

For example, the

propositions that Descartes had a body, that the wax smells
like flowers, etc., are contingent for Descartes. But

Descartes holds that not only eternal truths, but ail
things

,

including contingent truths, are the effect of God's

immutable will. As Descartes states:

"if God exists,

it is a

contradiction that anything else should exist which was not
created by him."

(AT VII 188;

CSM II 132)

70

And in the

6

October 1645 letter to Elizabeth, he states:
[A] 11 the reasons that prove that God exists and is the
first and immutable cause of all effects that do not
depend on human free will prove similarly, I think,
that he is also the cause of all the effects that do so
depend. .and he would not be supremely perfect if
anything could happen in the world without coming
entirely from him. (AT IV 314) 71
.

179

Thus,

from a premise stating that God wills
contingent
truths, we get, via the Transfer of
Immutability Principle,
the conclusion that contingent truths
are immutable. And via
the Immutability-Necessity Principle, we
get the further

conclusion that contingent truths are necessary.

This

should strike us as problematic because Descartes
clearly
wishes to distinguish eternal truths from contingent

truths.

Descartes' discussion of providence and petitionary

prayer is relevant here.

In the

6

October 1645 letter to

Elizabeth, Descartes states

When your highness speaks of the particular providence
°f .God as being the foundation of theology, I do
not
think that you have in mind some change in God's
decrees occasioned by actions that depend on our free
will.
No such change is theologically tenable; and
when we are told to pray to God, that is not so that we
should inform him of our needs, or that we should try
to get him to change anything in the order established
from al
tern i ty bv his provident
.but simply to
obtain whatever he has, from all eternity, willed to
obta i ned —by our—prayers (AT IV 315-16, my emphasis)
1

_

—

.

—
.

In the Conversat i on—with—Burman

,

he reiterates this line of

thought
[W]
have to say that God is indeed quite immutable,
and that he has decreed from eternity either to grant
me a particular request or not to grant it.
Coupled
with this decree, however, he has made a similtaneous
decree that the granting of my request shall be in
virtue of my prayers ner meas preces
and at a time
when, in addition, I am leading an upright life. (AT V
166, my emphasis)
f

l

f

As these passages show, Descartes held that even contingent

propositions made true by virtue of 'prayer-response' are
willed from eternity by God's immutable will.
let's say that

I

am starving to death,
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I

For instance,

am leading an

upright life, and
from God. Thus,
(a)

I

(a)

pray for a sandwich which

I

then receive

is true.

Dan receives a sandwich.

absurd to think that Descartes held that

(a)

is

immutably true, despite the fact that it is willed
from all
eternity by an immutable will. After all, before my
prayer,

(a)

was false and after my prayer,

(a)

was true. So,

Descartes does think that there are genuine changes in
the
world; as Descartes states,

"there are some changes whose

occurence is guaranteed either by our own plain experience
or by divine revelation,

and either our perception or our

faith shows us that these take place without any change in
the creator."

(AT VIII 61)How can he hold this,

the Transfer of Immutability Principle?

if he holds

Notice in the

Burman passage quoted above, there is reference made to a
time at which my prayer is answered; and in the letter to

Elizabeth, there is an implicit assumption that we receive
an answer to our prayers at a certain time.

72

We can

reasonably assume that God immutably wills from eternity
that,

at a certain time,

immutably true is
(a*)

So,

(a)

is true.

Thus, what is

(a*)

Dan receives a sandwich at

t.

the Transfer of Immutability Principle will be true only

if we either restrict the scope of the quantifier to certain

types of willed- things

,

or we restrict God's willing to

temporally- indexed propositions. The former alternative will
have undesirable consequences; if we restrict the scope of
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the quantifier,

then we need some reasonable way of

specifying which objects of the divine immutable
will are
immutable.
Descartes does not provide any indication

of how

to do this.

The latter alternative seems reasonable.

The

Transfer of Immutability Principle is required for
the
Immutability Interpretation.
(a)

But clearly propositions like

can change with respect to their truth value.

that propositions like

(a*)

It seems

are the most plausible

candidates for the objects of God's will, ±± the

Immutability Interpretation is true.
This account so far allows that there can be genuine

changes in the world without any alteration in God's will.
This allowance is quite important because Descartes'

foundation for the laws governing natural change is God's

immutability

73

But does this help Descartes explain the difference

between eternal truths and contingent truths? Even though
(a)

is not immutable,

to the immutability of

it seems that Descartes is committed
(a*);

and if he held the

Immutability-Necessity Principle,

(a*)

and other so-called

'contingent truths', when indexed to a time, turn out to be

necessary.

So,

we have not greatly improved the situation

concerning the difference between necessary and contingent

propositions for Descartes. 74
To sum up the problem thus far: An unsupplemented

Immutability Interpretation (Argument

1)

is not sufficient

to explain the necessity of the eternal truths.
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On the

other hand, a supplemented version (Argument
strong,

1*)

is too

insofar as it would commit Descartes to

necessitarianism.

Furthermore, if God's providence consists

of a set of non- temporally- indexed propositions
like

(a)

then the Transfer of Immutability Principle is false;

because the Transfer of Immutability Principle is required
for the Immutability Interpretation,

the interpretation

would be false if the Transfer of Immutability Principle
were false.

On the other hand,

if God's providence consists

of temporally- indexed propositions like

(a*)

then,

if the

Immutability-Necessity Principle is true, then Descartes is
committed to the necessity of all temporally- indexed
propositions.
(1)
(2)
(3)

So,

That is:

The Transfer of Immutability Principle is required
for the Immutability Interpretation.
The Immutability-Necessity Principle is required
for the Immutability Interpretation.
The view of providence consisting of a series of
temporally- indexed propositions is required for
the Transfer of Immutability Principle.

in order for the Immutability Interpretation to have a

chance of being correct, the Transfer of Immutability
Principle,

the Immutability-Necessity Principle, and the

temporally- indexed view of providence must be attributable
to Descartes.

However, we have seen that Descartes is

committed to disastrous consequences if these are attributed
to him.

Clearly, Descartes cannot accept both principles and
the temporally- indexed view of providence.

However, as we

have seen, there is textual evidence supporting an
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attribution of the Transfer of Immutability Principle
and
the temporally- indexed view of providence to Descartes.

The

textual evidence for the Transfer of Immutability
Principle
is stronger than the evidence for the temporallyindexed

view of providence.

However, because the Transfer of

Immutability Principle requires the temporally-indexed view
of providence,

the latter, we might say,

evidence for the former.

So,

'inherits'

the

the trouble-maker seems to be

the Immutability-Necessity Principle.

As the

6

October 1645

letter to Elizabeth and the Burma n passages show, Descartes
is willing to live with the immutability of things. What he

cannot systematically live with is the necessity of all
things.

Moreover, unlike the Transfer of Immutability

Principle and the temporally- indexed view of providence,
there is a total lack of textual evidence to support the

Immutability-Necessity Principle. 75

So,

the way to go about

interpreting Descartes' explanation of the necessity of the
eternal truths is to start by rejecting the Immutability-

Necessity Principle.
Before we reject the Immutability Interpretation in its

supplemented form, we should look at some suggestions on how
to salvage the Immutability Interpretation.

Suggestion

1

:

It has been suggested by Edwin Curley,

that although immutability is not identical with nor

sufficient for necessity for the most part, immutability
plus eternality is sufficient for necessity.
this point,

let us consider Thomas Morris'
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76

To bring out

suggestion that

immutability doesn't entail necessity

77
.

The reason why

this is true is that it is conceivable that some
thing x may

never be able to change (and hence is immutable)
could have failed to exist altogether.

but x

,

The view we have

is that x comes into existence at t and at no
time t

after

t,

this,

immutability doesn't entail necessity.

can x change.

1

Curley agress that, in cases like

of the eternal truths is different.

But the case

Descartes not only

thinks that God is immutable and eternal, but also that he
has willed the eternal truths from eternity.

Now,

as we

have seen, Descartes uses the term 'eternal' in two

different ways:
x is eternal

1

= df

x is eternal., = df

x is outside of time or is timeless.
x exists at all times.

The eternal truths are, at least, eternal.,.

Given that the

eternal truths are true at all times and they are willed by
God's immutable will, then by the Transfer of Immutability
Principle, there is no time at which they can fail to be
true.

So,

unlike the case in which something comes to exist

immutably but not necessarily, in the case of the eternal
truths,

they cannot change and there was no time at which

they were not true.

Hence, according to Curley,

they are

true at all times and cannot be false at any time; that is,

they are necessarily true
There is also some apparent textual evidence for

Curley's reading, although he doesn't sufficiently exploit
it.

Descartes states that the eternal truths and the
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essences they concern "are immutable and eternal."
380)

I

(AT VII

will consider this textual evidence in the next

section
I

have some sympathy for such an interpretation.

However,

this solution merely leads directly back to the

problem of contingency already discussed.

For certainly,

temporally-indexed contingent propositions are willed from
all eternity by God's immutable will,

states the

in fact,

there is always a single identical and perfectly

simple act by means of which he

[i.e.,

God]

simultaneously

understands, wills and accomplishes everythi ng
14;

CSM

I

Descartes

201,

emphasis mine)

.

(AT VIII

"

Do we then want to say that

.

they are necessary because they are true at all times and
cannot be false at any time?

We would be forced to this if

there were not another way in which Descartes explains the

necessity of the eternal truths.

Fortunately for Descartes

and the sympathetic commentator, Descartes does provide

another explanation.
In fact,

there is an important but overlooked point: We

should not think of the immutability as explaining the

necessity of the eternal truths for Descartes.

A careful

look at the texts used to support the Immutability

Interpretation 78 reveals that Descartes appeals to

immutability not to explain the necessity of the eternal
truths, but to answer the different,

though related, issue

of whether God can change the eternal truths he has in fact

willed.

The answer that consideration of God's immutability
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provides is that he can change them only if his will
can
change.

And because his will is immutable, he cannot change

the eternal truths.

this issue,

Thus,

it does not

although immutability explains

(and should not,

for reasons already

mentioned) explain the issue at hand, namely why the eternal

truths are necessary.

Suggestion

2

:

Because Descartes' account of prayer is

nearly identical to the account given by Aquinas, perhaps
Aquinas'
ST Ila

I

solution to the problem is open to Descartes.

In

Iae 83.2, Aquinas addresses the same kind of problem

concerning prayer, contingency, and the immutability of

providence that has been bothering us.

In particular,

Aquinas is concerned with whether prayer is useful
[

conven i ens

]

i.e.,

,

whether is makes a difference given that

God's providential plan is willed immutably from eternity.
He reviews three common mistakes concerning this issue and

rejects them.

79

Aquinas sees that the real problem for an

account of providence and prayer is to reconcile the

immutability of divine providence with prayer and the

contingency of some things governed by providence.

He then

gives an account nearly identical to Descartes' account:
[W]
do not pray in order to change the decree of
divine providence, rather we pray in order to impetrate
impetremus those things which God has determined
would be obtained only through our prayers. (ST Ila
Ilae 83.2)
r

Thomas'

l

solution for reconciling this view of prayer with

the the contingency of

'prayer-responses' is as follows:

When considering the usefulness of prayer, one must
remember that divine providence not only disposes
187

which effects will take place, but also the manner
which they will take place, and which actions will in
cause them. Human acts are true causes, and therefore
men must perform certain actions, not in order to
change the divine providence, but in order to obtain
certain effects in the manner determined bv God
(ST
I

la Ilae 83.2)

Thus, Aquinas believes that the immutability of providence

takes nothing away from the contingency of 'prayerresponses'

in virtue of the fact that God will that certain

things come about contingently and some necessarily; and the

way God does this is by arranging certain types of causes
(necessary or contingent) which will either bring about an
event necessarily or bring it about contingently. Thus,

something is contingent (or necessary) depending on the
nature of a secondary cause
It

would be nice if Descartes could help himself to

this kind of explanation.

available to Descartes.

However,

this explanation is not

Descartes is much less willing than

Aquinas to allow causes other than God.

As he states:

"God

alone is the true cause of everything which is or can be"
(AT VIII 14;

CSM

I

201); and in the 27 May 1630, Descartes

states that, with respect to all of creation,

including

eternal truths, God is their "efficient and total cause."
(AT

I

152;

CSMK 25)

Elizabeth, he states:

And in the

6

October 1645 letter to

"God is the universal cause of

everything in such a way as to be also the total cause of
everything."

(AT IV 314;

CSMK 272) Because the truth and

modal status of a proposition is something that depends
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compl etel

on God,

as does everything,

himself to Aquinas solution.

Descartes cannot help

80

We have so far seen that the Immutability

Interpretation cannot be a correct interpretation of

Descartes
truths.

explanation of the necessity of the eternal
This would be disheartening if it were not for the

fact that Descartes actually presents a better explanation,

one which does not employ the notion of immutability and

which avoids the problem of contingency.

We now turn to

this explanation.

An Alternative Explanation
As Edwin Curley has noticed,

in several texts,

Descartes appears to be giving a different explanation of
the necessity of the eternal truths, one that doesn't make

reference to immutability. 81 For instance, in the Fifth
Replies, Descartes states:
I do not think that the essences of things, and the
mathematical truths [i.e., eternal truths] which we can
know concerning them, are independent of God.
Nevertheless I do think that they are immutable and
eternal since the will and decree of God willed and
decreed that they ^should be so
(AT VII 380; CSM II
261, my emphasis) 82
,

.

And in the Sixth Replies, he states:
God did not will the creation of the world in time
because he saw that it would be better this way than if
he had created it from eternity; nor did he will that
the three angles of a triangle should be equal to two
right angles because he recognized that it could not be
otherwise, and so on.
On the contrary, it is because
he willed to create the world in time that it is better
this way than if he had created it from eternity; and
it is because he willed
that the three angles of a
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t r i angle should npnps s arily pqnal
w ^ xight. flmle.g ^h,^
t h i s if? true and r^n n ot hp nthprwicjo
(AT VII 432; CSM
II 291, my emphasis)
t-

And in the

May 1644 letter to Mesland, Descartes
states
that "even though [e ncore qne God has
willed that
2

some

]

truths should be necessary, this does not
mean that he
willed them necessarily." (AT IV 118; CSMK
235)
In these
passages, Descartes is presenting his real
explanation of
the necessity of the eternal truths: the
eternal truths are

necessary precisely because God willed that they
are
necessary
This is exactly what Descartes needs to say to
avoid
the problem of contingency that plagues the
Immutability

Interpretation.

That is, even though God immutably wills

both necessary eternal truths and merely contingent
truths,
the fact that he wills the former to be necessary
accounts

for the distinction between eternal truths and contingent

truths.

And any account of necessity should be able to

account for the difference between necessary and contingent
truths.

On Descartes' account, this desideratum is

satisfied.

The eternal truths are necessary because God

wills that they be so; and temporally- indexed contingent
truths are contingent, though immutable, because God wills
them to be contingent.
This account is exactly the type of explanation we

should expect from Descartes.

After all, it is

a

central

feature of the Creation Doctrine that a proposition is true
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iff God will it to be true; and
the same is true for modal

propositions
Some readers may be unsatisfied with
Descartes'

explanation of the necessity of the eternal
truths. A reader
may object that Descartes presents
his account too quickly
and without any explanation of its
details.
I am very
sympathetic to this criticism. However, I am
willing to
allow Descartes some leniency here because,
despite the
frustrating lack of detail, he has given an
account that

distinguishes between necessary and contingent
truths; thus,
it avoids the pitfalls of the Immutability
Interpretation.
Also,

this account provides a firm foundation for
modal

truths.
In his

To see this,

^

let us go back in time to Augustine.

li bero arbit rio
.

,

Augustine addresses the problem

of whether God's foreknowledge is compatible
with human free

actions.

Part of his solution consists in holding that
God

doesn't merely know that an agent A will do an action
God knows that, in many cases, A will do a free

1

a,

Because

God is omniscient and infallible, the fact that he know that

A will do a freely absolutely guarantees that A will do a
freely.

The same type of divine guarantee is provided by

Descartes, but in this case it is truths and modalities that
are guaranteed by God's will.

After all, nothing could

guarantee that Dp more effectively than the fact that God
wills that DP.

So,

in spite of its lack of detail,

Descartes' explanation of the necessity of the eternal
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truths both distinguishes necessary
from contingent truths
and guarantees the modal status of
a proposition.
In this dissertation,

I

have tried to make some sense

and to give a sympathetic interpretation
of Descartes'
Creation Doctrine.
The interpretation I have given

accomplishes several goals:

(i)

it shows that the Creation

Doctrine rests on quite traditional theological
assumptions
concerning God's simplicity and his freedom,
(ii)

it shows

that the Creation Doctrine does not commit
Descartes to

bizarre modal theses.

(iii)

It shows that

Descartes has

a

sufficiently robust, though underdeveloped, account
of the
necessity of the eternal truths. Of course, there
is much
more to be said about the Creation Doctrine.
However,

this

must wait for another occasion.
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they deserve until
Leibniz°

m

2

Curley (1984)
(1988)
LaCroix (1984).

1998),

,

(1998),

Geach (1973), Petrik

3

Held by Petrik (1998)
Dutton (1996)
there is "something akin" to the distinctionsays merely that
at work in
escartes.
Dutton has admitted to me in conversation
that
he does not think that the distinction
explains the
n ecessity of the eternal truths.
Richard LaCroix holds
something similar to this interpretation: God
binds himself
to whatever he wills. See LaCroix (1984)
p. 467.
Textual
evidence for LaCroix's view can be found at AT
VII 380
Osier (1994) and (1995) seems to inadvertently
waiver
between the Immutability Interpretation and the Pntpni- a
Interpretation.
Perhaps this is because, as we'll see the
latter is not interestingly different from the former.'
.

i

.

4

Held in varying degrees, by Curley (1984), LaCroix
Menn (1998)
Osier (1995)
Van den Brink (1993)
,

(1984)

,

,

5

Petrik (1998)

6

Osler (1994)

,

,

(1995)

,

Dutton (1996)

,

Petrik (1998)

7

As Oakely states, concerns about omnipotence "led
theologians [in the twelfth century] to distinguish
increasingly between capacity and volition; to tease apart,
that is,
the consideration of what God could do
hypothetically and in—abst racto given the very absoluteness
of his power, and the consideration of what he had chosen
and willed to do in actuality.
During the first three
quarters of the thirteenth century, the period that proved
to be formative for the distinction, the familiar terms
potent a —dei—absdut a came to be used of the former and
PQtenti a dei ordinata of the latter." (1998) p. 441.
.

,

i

In fact, there are at least two book-length treatments
of the history of the distinction: William Courtenay's
Capac i ty and Vo li tion (1990) and Lawrence Moonan s Pi vi np
'

Power (1994)

According to Moonan, "one of the earliest undeniably
recognisable uses of the power distinction" is found in
Geoffrey of Poitiers' (fl. 1215) Summa theologian
(1994)
According to Courtenay, however, an earlier use
p. 57-61.
of the distinction is found in an anonymous commentary on
.
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the Pauline epistles circa 1200
See Oakley (1998) p. 441

Courtenay (1985)

p.

247

.

S

kl
(1984) Ch
2 and ^urtenay (1985)
and
ch °i1. The
ThP same example is used by
others even
9 0 thS si ^nth-century Lutheran JohA !ck
(d
154?) in a series of letters on
1543)
the first book of Lombard's
a s
Se ntences
See Oakley (1998) p. 452
‘

(1990)
11990)

.

m/

f

,

.

.

“Peter Damian (1972) section
12

II.

-

Courtenay states: "God can do more than he
wills to do; divine capacity exceeds divine
volition." (1985) p. 244.
s

Af
_
actuaily
13

Peter Damian (1972)

section II.

In fact, Damian believes that unactualized
alternatives are a necessary condition for both
divine and
creaturely freedom and power: " [Desiderius
position] seems
so absurd and so ridiculous that not only
is the
incompatible with the omnipotent God, it cannot assertion
even be
applied to fragile mankind.
There are many things, after
all, that we do not do and yet are able to
do " (1972)
section II.
'

“Courtenay (1985)
16

(1998)

244

p.

Anselm Cur deus homo II. 5,
and Courtenay (1990) p. 34-5.

Cf.

10

17 in Anselm

,

17

William_ Courtenay states that the distinction had
become established "by the early 13th-century and had
become
commonplace scholastic terminology by mid-century.
(1985)
"
p. 243. According to Moonan (1994), among those developing
and employing the distinction in the thirteenth century
besides Aquinas were Roland of Cremona (d. 1259)
Hugh of
St
Cher (d. 1263), Alexander of Hales (d. 1245), and
Aquinas' teacher, Albertus Magnus (d. 1280).
.

,

.

18

ST la 25.5.

19

See ST la 19.3,

res

°See ST la 19.7,

res;

2

.

19. 8. ad 4.

21

It is interesting to note that even some 17th-century
Calvinist theologians understood the distinction in this
Thomistic fashion.
For instance, Samuel Willard (d. 1707),
in his work, A Comp leaf. Body of Divinity states: "Divines'
do from Scripture observe a two-fold Power ascribed to God,
viz. 1. An unlimited and absolute power, by vertue of which
he can do all possible things, even such things as he never
actually doth... 2. An ordinate power, which is not a Power
,
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dif fe r en t from the former, but
the former
pleased to set limits or bounds to it considered as God
by the Decree wi
t-h
Wlth
respect to his exerting of it is his
works of
lciency
Not that his Arm was shortened in
these
bUt: be aUS
P
hiS PUrpOSe and somet iwes his
promise
has t^d
tied'hhis hands;
h
S
K’
his
Will was otherwise and he pursues
that
all he doth.- p. 70 Quoted in
Oakley (1998) p
'

-

m

A ^ uinas is silent on whether we can
apply the
distinction to agents other than God.
It would seem to D
be
permissible to do so.
,

.

.

^
24

Ord i nal

Qrd i nat

25cf

*

i

1.44,

in Woler

i

1.44,

in Wolter

Ord i nal

o 1.44,
1190.
,

Adams

(1987)

p.

(1986)

(1986)

in Wolter

i

p.

255.

p.

257.

(1986)

p
P

257-259

'

'

and

26

° f course there is a trivial sense in
which they are
identical in God: God is simple, and as such,
his power is
not composed of two different powers.
Rather, as Ockham
states, the distinction is one concerning ways
of
u nderstand i ng—and—spea king of God
s power
.

,

.

'

"Adams
28

58-60

(1987)

See Korolec

p.

1192

(1982

p.

639-640,

and Cross

(1999)

p.

.

^O rd i nal

,

30

31

Qrd i nat

i

i

o 1.44.

1.44,

Quoted in Adams (1987)
in Wolter

(1986)

p.

p.

1195

.

257.

Ibid

In contemporary discussions of God's omnipotence,
many scholars have gone to great lengths to give an account
of the omnipotence of God in light of the fact that God
seems to be unable to do many things.
For instance, God is
not able to make a four-sided triangle; he cannot make it
true that (x exists at t and x does not exist at t)
Furthermore, Anselm and others argue that God cannot make
himself impotent, to sin, to change, to be evil, to lack
some relevant propositional knowledge, etc.
They attempt
to give an account of God's power such that it is consistent
with God's seeming inability to do the impossible and his
inability to do a variety of other things that are possible.
Some find it strange to say that there are things that
finite creatures are able to do but that God cannot do
(i.e., sin or make something too heavy to lift).
But, as
Anselm rightly argues, it is not because of some lack of
power that God cannot sin or change; rather it is precisely
1

195

because God's nature is essentially
perfect
qinninr, 3 "
changing are imperfection. As Anselm states: and
"Again
how
are you omnipotent if you cannot do
all things? Iut?'hSw can
y° u ° a -^ things if you cannot be corrupted,
or tell lies
tr e int ° the false (such as to undo
what has
been^do
^ many similar things?
een done)
and
Or is the ability to do
0t
imp ° tenCe? (£^logion VII, in

^

^

,

A^selm^
33

U998n

William of Ockham (199i;
In Spinoza

1925)

299-346

pp.

491

(Question

article

I,

233-281 and Spinoza (1985;

PP

35

I have taken liberty with the
translation of this
passge.
Because all of the occurrences of potent
ord i nata
and absol ut
are in the accusative, the Latin
actually says potentiam
'ordinat.am
and ahsnl nt-am
n,,«for the sake of consistency, I have left the^in
Latin^but
left out the accusative endings.
1

i

1

1

1

1

,

'

1

1

'

,

•

36

It is interesting to note that in CM II
9, Spinoza
states that, were God to create creatures with essences
other than the ones they in fact have, God would have
to
give us different powers of conceivaility so that we
would
have epistemic access to certain truths. As Spinoza
states:
"it would follow that if God had created things in
a
different way, he would likewise have also constituted our
nature that we could understand things as they had been
created by God." (CM II 9)
That Spinoza even discusses the
'possibility' of God creating an order different from the
actual order seems to be in direct opposition to his claims
made in Proposition 33 of the Ethics
I'm not sure how to
reconcile these views.
.

A-ll of the temporal language employed by philosophers
concerning the distinction cannot be taken literally. When
they write of 'what God has already done' and 'what God
cannot now do', we should understand this to mean that on
the supposition that God does p, God cannot do not-p.

In fact, Spinoza states that from his discussion of
potent i a de —absoluta et ordinata, questions such as
"whether [God] can do better than he does, whether he can do
more than he has done" can be "very easily answered." (CM II
j

9)

See AT VII 125; CSM II 90, AT VII 415; CSM II 280.
40

The commentators at Coimbra, however, distinguished
potentia absoluta from potentia ordinaria
The former is
God's power do anything that does not involve a
contradiction; the latter extends only to what is consistent
.
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with "the common and habitual course
or order nut into
hlng ®
^"M^nrari Co l lec no rn nLrir...^
^

7,

^n

16,

^^

,
lT

.

41

P

Quoted

1.

iror " m

m

Oakley (1998)

454

p.

T
'

11

.

See AT VII 235; CSM II 164.

Tad Schmaltz points out, however,
compelling evidence that Descartes was that there is no
familiar with this
latter work. (1991) p. 138.
Cf
Cronin
1966)

.

43

Petrik (1998)

44

Petrik (1998)p. 418.

p.

32-33

45

Descartes would however, hold that God can
do x dp
po tent a absolute if (but not only if) x is
possible.
,

i

46

Cf.

47

Petrik (1998) p. 423.

48

0sler (1994) p. 130-131.

49

Dut ton

50

Dutton (1996) p. 205 n.22.

Cf.

Scholium

(1996)

Et h i cs

I,

205.

p.

Proposition 29;

Proposition 33

1.

In conversation and correspondence, Michael
Della
Rocca has told me that CM is a hodge-podge of cartesian
spmozistic ideas, and it is very difficult to tell when and
Spinoza is interpreting Descartes and when he is presenting
his own ideas.
.

52

53

54

55

(1989)

Cf

.

Lennon (1998) p. 338-9.

Wierenga (1989)
Wierenga (1989)

p.
,

170.

Wolterstorff (1975)

MQnQ l ogi on XXV, in Anselm (1998)
p.

.

Quoted in Wierenga

171.

“Examples are from Wierenga (1989)

“Wierenga (1989)

p.

p.

172.

172.

Aquinas thinks this is case as well. For instance, in
ST la 9.1, Aquinas argues that God is immutable in virtue of
his simplicity.
In ST la 10.3, he argues that God is
eternal because he is immutable.
So, in the latter case,
God's immutability is conceptually prior to his eternality.
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This, however, does not affect the
point that if God is
eternal, then he is immutable.

Curley (1984) p. 588. Cf Curley
(1988),
41-2professes to deduce them from God'sp
f
^
immutability, which would confirm their
necessity "
" Because
these truths proceed from Godf they
are
_
eternalT'and immutable
... because God's will is such
as^o
produce an immutable effect." p. 351
.

[De c r t e s]

•

i

_

“Nadler (1987)

176.

p.

”? sl r (1995)
"divine immutability provides Descartes
f
f
thS necessit y of the eternal truths
°^
that
God created freely."
p. 152.
Cf
Osier
:

.

.

(1994)

p.

131

.

See CUrley (1984 Van den Brink
(1993), Nadler
r
Even some who hold that the laws of nature
are not
eternal truths hold that they are necessary
truths.
For
in a Recent and interesting paper, Blake
Dutton
(1396) argues that Descartes' laws of nature
are
truths because eternal truths are such that God not eternal
was free to
create them or not to create them and he could
have created
them any way he wished; but the laws of nature
are such that
W S r e t0 create them or not to create them,
\
?
?
that God chooses to create them, his immutability but given
his choice to only those laws compatible with his restricts
immutability.

n
Q Q ^r
(1987)

S

'

1

/

C

64

Margaret Osier has provided an actual argument for
the Immutability Interpretation.
Her argument can be
reconstructed as follows:
1.
23.

4.

5.

God's will is identical with God's understanding.
If 1, then a change in God's will entails a change
in God's understanding.
A change in God's will entails a change in God's
understanding
There cannot be a change in God's understanding
(because this would indicate some imperfection in
God's understanding).
Therefore, there cannot be a change in God's will

Osier (1994)

p.

131.

65

Cf. Dutton (1996) p. 206. Robert Sleigh has pointed
out to me that there must be some mention of omnipotence (or
of
sufficient power') in the Transfer of Immutability
Principle because it is possible that there be a being with
an immutable but insufficiently powerful will.
In that
case, although the will is immutable, it is not sufficiently
powerful to secure the obtaining of its object, let alone
the immutability of its object.
'
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Cf
67

.

AT XI 38; CSM

93,

I

and Menn (1998) p. 351

.

See AT 1 149-50; CSMK 24, AT I 151-3;
CSMK 25-26 AT
118-19; CSMK 235, AT V 166-7; CSMK 348, AT
V 223-24- CSMK
358-59, AT VII 435-36; CSM II 293-94, AT VII
380;
CSM II
z61
,

.

68

Curley blurs the distinction between necessity
and
immutability: "More problematic is the reason he
here
assigns for the immutabi
ty of the eternal truths.
in the
letter to Mersenne, it was the immutabi
ty of God's will.
Here it is the fact that God wills them to be mnmtabi
jf
Descartes is not now inclined to explain the nece.g.g-i
Qf
v
necessary truths by the rmmutabi
ty of God's will, if
prepared to concede that God's will might change, then he's
the
fact that God has once willed the eternal truths
to be
i mmutab l e does not seem to provide much security
for the
future." (1998) p. 10, my emphasis.
,

1

i

1

i

i

i-

1

69 ,

Descartes uses the term 'contingent' in the Regular
CSM I 46)
and in the Princi pi p<=i he states: "In
this one idea [of God] the mind recognizes existence not
merely the possible and contingent [existence which belongs
to the ideas of all the other things which it distinctly
perceives, but utterly necessary and eternal existence " (AT
VIII 10; CSM I 197)
(AT X 422;

,

It is important to notice that Descartes thinks
that
God wills all things that exist or are real; God does not
will the pr i vations involved in sinful actions and erroneous
judgments.
Privations, strictly speaking, are nothing.
They don't require God's causal input.
See the Fourth
Meditation (AT VII 54-61; CSM II 37-42)
71

Cf AT VII 191, 436; CSM II 134, 294, AT VIII 14-15;
201-2, AT V 166-7; CSMK 348, AT IV 332, 354; CSMK 277
282, AT XI 438; CSM I 380.
.

CSM

I

72

While we receive answer at a certain time, God
doesn't answer our prayers at a certain time but from all
eternity
73

See Garber

(1992)

p.

282

74

This problem is not peculiar to Descartes.
For
instance, any philosopher who held, what Knuuttila and
Hintikka (following Lovejoy) call, the 'principle of
plenitude', will face the problem of contingent temporallyindexed truths. According to this principle, which Knuuttila
and Hintikka argue was held by Aristotle, Boethius, and
Maimonides among others, no genuine possibility will remain
forever unactualized.
Knuuttila (1982)
Hintikka (1973)
So, on this view, to say that P is possible is to say that,
at some time, P is actual; to say that P is necessary is to
,
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say that P is true at all times; and to
say
impossible is to say that there is no time that P is
at which P is
actual..
Thus if a truth is immutable, it is
necessary
As
Terence Irwin has stated, Aristotle "treats
'always' as
interchangeable with 'necessary'." Irwin,
(1988) p. 523.
And
Hmtikka (1973) argues that Aristotles' real
'Sea-Battle
Problem' concerns omnitemporal truth' and
not 'past truth'.
'

There is a pr i ma — ac i e strange passage in the
Pass i ons is which Descartes states: "we should
reflect upon
he fact that nothing can possibly happen
other than as
Providence has determined from all eternity.
Providence is
so to speak, a fate or immutable necessity une
m mmuabl
(AT XI 438; CSM I 380, emphasis mine)
"
On one
reading of this, Descartes seems to be advocating
the
Immutability-Necessity Principle. However, because much
of
the material in the Passions was first developed
in letters
to Elizabeth, starting in 1643, we should read
this letter
as being consistent with the 6 October 1645
letter to
Elizabeth; that is, as saying simply that providence
is
immutable (adding 'necessity' for emphasis)
Cf
Gaukroqer
a
.

r

.

]

.

.

.

(1995)

ch.

.

10.

This suggestion was made by Curley when he served as
commentator on my paper, "Immutability and Necessity in
Descartes," at the Central Division APA, April 2000.
77

Morris

7

AT

fi

79

(1984)

145-6; CSMK 23, AT V 166; CSMK 348.

I

See ST la 22.2&4; 23.8; 115.6; 116.3

80

I do think that this means that Descartes is
really
an occasionalist but I realize that this is an incredibly
controversial topic.
I do not have the time to argue for
this here.
,

81

Curley (1998)

82

.

•

In the previous section, I stated that this passage
could be used by Curley to support his suggestion that
immutability plus eternality entails necessity.
In don't
think that his constitutes very strong evidence in favor of
Curley's suggestion to help the Immutability Interpretation,
because, if the Immutability Interpretation is correct,
Descartes cannot mean that the eternal truths are immutable
and eternal because God willed them to be so.
After all, on
the Immutability Interpretation, God does not need to will
that the eternal truths are immutable and eternal in order
for them to be immutable and eternal.
On the Immutability
Interpretation, God merely needs to will them (from
eternity)
and by the Transfer of Immutability Principle,
they will be immutable (and eternal)
I think that,
in this
i

,

.
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passage, Descartes is using 'immutable
and eternal'
f ° r 'Hecessary
although he does not believe that to stanH
immutability plus eternality entail
necessitv
vSU
r
d
thS Pa Sa S fr ° m the Sixth Replies
(a/v^ 9
f
432
?SM £l
11 291)
^ Descartes states
ln which
that the eternal1
truths are necessary because God wills
them to be so
#

rL

'
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